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Abstract 
This thesis is based on my own research experience in 
studying the transformation of rural China in a natural 
village of South China. Drawing on J.C. Oi,s framework of 
••Socialist Clientelism", I intend to explain and explore 
the impact of rural reform in the late 1970s on the power 
relationship between the village cadres and the peasants. 
The findings in Ku Village show the evidence that the 
patron-client bond between the village cadres and the 
peasants has broken down. The powerlessness of village 
organs, an atomistic rural community, and the autonomous 
peasant households are the striking features in Ku Village. 
Now the village cadres are powerless to implement the state 
policy and mobilize the peasants. The peasants are 
autonomous in production and independent of the village 
cadres. To explain the erosion of socialist patron-client 
bond, apart from the similar factors shared with other 
villages (such as the reconstruction of local 
administrative organization, responsibility system and 
division of land), the transformation of local economy 
plays an even more important role in the erosion of 
z Z 
socialist patron-client bond. The development of Shatian 
shaddock plantation totally eliminates the remaining 
control mechanism of the village cadres over the peasants. 
It also enhances the economic power of peasants and makes 
the peasants more independent of the government. 
拳參 11 
In this research, I also attempt to bring the peasants 
back into political analysis and re-emphasize the peasants 
power. The framework of clientelism is inadequate to 
analyze the everyday practice of power. To understand the 
daily dynamic of power, I draw on James Scott's concept of 
••everyday forms of resistance" to analyze the struggle 
between the peasants and those who intend to extract 
interest from them. The findings in Ku Village suggest to 
me that peasants are not powerless and impotent. They 
always employ the everyday forms of resistance to fight 
for their own interest whether in Maoist China or post-Mao 
China. To the peasants, the everyday form of resistance is 
the most significant method to check the unfair state 
policy and minimize their disadvantage. They are far less 
interested in changing the larger structure of existing 
state. So the absence of formal organizations, of open and 
large-scale collective actions in rural China do not imply 
that the peasants are powerless as Marxists claimed; on the 
contrary, it is because none of formal organizations and 
open collective actions are required. 
•參_ 111 
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Chapter One 
Introduction -- Bringing the Peasants Back In 
Peasants do not write their o-wn history nor is 
it written for them. It Is written about and, 
often, without them. Their voice Is barely 
ever heard at those places where decisions are 
made about policies and profits. It Is the 
interests and Images of non-peasants which 
define the ways the "Peasant Question“ is 
being put and resolved In economic and 
political planning by state and agribusiness, 
Impinging deeply on the peasants‘ existence in 
the modern world. 
Shanin, T. 1987 
I. Sister Ling's Story 
The quarrel attracted the attention of the people in 
the fair of Songkou town. More and more people went to 
investigate what happen. A pregnant woman swore at a man 
with arms akimbo in the market area. "I won't pay the 
fee!" she angrily screeched, "You plainly bully me! Okay, 
ask your supervisor to come here. I'll ask him if I have 
to pay so much fee!" The man said:"Don't be so fierce, if 
you don't pay the fee, you can't sell your fruit here no 
matter who collects the fee." More and more people 
gathered here, many pairs of eyes followed their movement. 
No one spoke. The pregnant woman continued to shout:"Don't 
cheat me. I don't believe you! Ask your supervisor to 
talk with me. Everybody knows what you are. Shameless!" 
Then she turned to the surrounding people. She began to 
explain what happened and asked them to have it out. The 
1 
Chapter One 
surrounding people began to judge the right and wrong 
between two sides. The man quickly left the crowd. 
The woman was a villager of Ku Village. People called 
her A Ling. Her husband was a disabled army-man. For her 
family's livelihood, she had to set up a fruit stall in 
Songkou town and sold the fruit she produced. She had set 
up the stall for a long time. But today a man of the 
Industry and Comitierce Bureau suddenly collected the tax 
from her. He asked her to pay two yuan per day. She felt 
it was unreasonable to pay two yuan because she could not 
even earn two yuan in a day. She said: "I am willing to pay 
the fee at a reasonable amount.“ 
The next day, the supervisor came and told her that 
she had to pay the fee in accordance with regulation. But 
because her husband was a disabled army-man, she only had 
to pay two jiao per day. What a great difference! Sister 
Ling in the end paid the stall fee because she thought two 
jiao was reasonable. She said that "two yuan" was just set 
by the low-level staffs without the permission of the 
government. "They arbitrarily decide the amount of fee and 
put the money in their pocket," Sister Ling said. 
This is a story that happens in rural China everyday. 
It reveals the conflicts between local cadres and peasants 
based on respective interest. In this story, we can find 
that peasants are not so powerless as we thought. Ling's 
family is one among millions of peasants households which 
2 
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try to construct their own social world and livelihood, and 
fight for just treatment from the local cadres based on 
their own ideas of right and justice. 
n. Where are the Peasants? 
We often take these daily activities for granted and 
claim them as marginal in the study of social movement or 
class relation because they are often unorganized, 
unsystematic, individual and opportunistic. More 
important, they have no revolutionary consequences. In the 
historical records and archives, we rarely find the record 
of peasants except when their activities are menacing to 
the interest of the state. A great deal of the recent 
works on the peasantry also only concerns rebellions and 
revolution. Much attention has been devoted to organized, 
large-scale, protest movements that appear to put a threat 
to the state. Charles Tilly's view on social movement 
represents the popular notion of social science. 
Somehow a social movement should be more durable 
than a fleeting encounter... it should pursue 
broader aims than the blocking of a particular 
toll [the participants] were aware of their 
common interests and distinct identity, that they 
were self-consciously seeking a set of changes 
considerably larger than the suspension of one 
tax or another^ then we might comfortably begin 
to think in terms of a social movement (Tilly, 
1984:297-317)• 
If we adopt this perspective to study the social movement, 
we will undoubtedly find the simple fact that peasants 
3 
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throughout most of history have rarely been afforded the 
luxury of open, organized, political activity. In Chinese 
history, the large-scale peasant rebellion is just a 
sprinkling in several thousands of years. Because of this, 
peasantry is regarded as powerless, apolitical, and 
passive. One of the most famous comments and analysis on 
peasantry is Marx,s "potatoes analogy". Within Marxist 
tradition, peasants are unorganized and powerless in 
political action. As he states. 
In this way^ great mass of the French nation is 
formed by simple addition of homologous 
magnitudes, much as potatoes in sack form a sack 
of potatoesIn so far as there is merely a 
local interconnection among these smal1-hoiding 
peasants, and the identity of their interests 
begets no community^ no national bond and no 
political organization among them, they do not 
form a class • They are consequently incapable of 
enforcing their class Interest in their own name, 
whether through a parliament or through a 
convention. They cannot represent themselves^ 
they must be represented (Marx, 1987:332)• 
Marx's view on French peasants greatly influences the 
political analysis of peasantry. Customarily, peasants are 
invisible in political analysis. As Kelliher states, 
“[A]nyone familiar with the field of third-world politics 
can readily think of books on the predominantly agrarian 
countries that barely mention the peasantry" (Kelliher, 
1992:233) . Even when they are visible in the analysis, 
their role are often passive and subordinate. 
In the studies of agrarian transformation in post-Mao 
China, Chinese peasants are still treated as a powerless 
and unorganized group, and as nearly irrelevant to 
4 
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political and economic outcomes. When government policies 
come across difficulties and encounter peasants, 
resistance, they often attribute the fault to the backward 
"mentality of petty peasants" (xiaonong yishi) — that 
peasants are conservative, unprogressive, unchanging and 
anti-market. So the state policies can be only carried out 
through compulsory means. Under this analysis, peasants 
just passively respond to the different policies which 
compulsorily exert on them. The agrarian transformation in 
China is intuitively considered as the result of rural 
reform under Deng by many Chinese and foreign scholars. As 
before, the official press serves to adulate the "great 
role" of Deng Xiao Ping's government in conceiving and 
directing the reform. That means Deng and his government 
first analyzed the shortcomings of Mao's collective economy 
and then carried out their market-oriented economy in 
village. Finally, Deng's economic policy brought the dying 
rural economy back to life and won the hearts of the 
peasants (Li, 1992; Tan, 1990). In short, they portray 
Chinese reform as a case of successful policy 
implementation.1 The following statement can be often 
found in official stories. 
Xn the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978, 
our party determined the basic line of "one 
theme, two basic points" (base on the theme of 
economic development, insist the reform and open 
1 In Daniel Kelliher's Peasants Power in China, he strongly 




door policy, and insist four basic rules) • 
Centred on the fundamental line, our party made 
a series of rural economic policies 
Experiences have shown that the rural policies of 
oujT party are completely accurate (Li^ 1992:1). 
This version of China's rural transformation once again 
kicks the peasants downstairs from the 'historical stage,. 
Peasants are treated as supporting or minor actors in the 
transformation, while the rural reform is considered as the 
government‘s bestowing favour and kindness to peasants. 
Most Chinese and foreign representations also like to 
idealize the impact of rural reform and peasants' life in 
village after reform. Many reports emphasize the 
occurrence of "ten thousands income households" {wangyuan 
hu) in rural China after rural reform (Li, 1992 ； Liu, Huang 
& Yang, 1992; Wen & Chen, 1992； Tan, 1990). The romantic 
portraits of peasants life are greatly overdrawn and 
mislead us into thinking that the historical transformation 
of China will benefit all the Chinese and will bring them 
to the "golden road" (jlnguan dadao)• Actually, this kind 
of official story not only hides the discontent of peasants 
towards the rural reform, but also dissembles the conflict 
between state and peasants. 
Historical evidences of China and other countries have 
challenged these bias against peasants. They have shown 
that peasants are able to change their fortune and 
influence the social and political development by using 
different kinds of political action including the offensive 
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and defensive ones (Shanin, 1966; Scott, 1989; Hobsbawn, 
1973)• Scott's study on Malaysian village has come to the 
conclusion that peasants are not powerless. They often 
employ the everyday forms of resistance to fight for those 
who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, and interest from 
them. This perspective has been adopted by some scholars 
to study the peasant society of the Third World and 
communist states (Kochanowics, 1989; Guha, 1989; Jimenez, 
1989; Colburn, 1989; Herbst, 1989; Hart, 1991; Kerkvlict, 
1991)• The empirical data of China shown by different 
scholars also point out that peasants do not just passively 
accept or resist the state policies, they are knowledgeable 
and capable of creating their livelihood. In Mao's China, 
the peasants adopted different strategies to resist the 
state policy. The peasants in Anhui, Sichuan, Henan, 
Shandong and so on widely practised the "responsibility 
system of production" before Deng's policy announcement 
(Kelliher, 1993; Watson, 1984-85; Zhong, 1990; Zweig, 
1989). 
To understand the historical transformation of rural 
China and to fairly assess the reform in the post-Mao era, 
in addition to the official story, we have to hear another 
voice and grasp the view of peasants. So I will treat the 
everyday practice of peasants more seriously in this study. 
For that purpose, I use a south China village (I call Ku 
Village) as an empirical case for me to construct other 
stories told by the peasants whether or not they agree with 
7 
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the official version. It defends an unfashionable thesis 
about an unfashionable class -- peasantry in our world. 
The aim is to bring the peasants back to the political 
analysis and to re-emphasize the peasants power in 
political studies. I will argue that peasants have the 
capability to influence the outcome of state policy and 
construct their own livelihood. Whether in Mao's China or 
post-Mao China, peasants always adopt the everyday forms of 
resistance as their strategies to protect their own 
interest. Throughout this paper, there are three themes 
工 will focus on closely. 1) What kind of power relationship 
between the local cadres and peasants exists in Ku Village 
in Mao and post-Mao China? 2) Why and how is the power 
relationship changed or maintained between these two 
parties after rural reform in post-Mao China? 3) How and 
why do peasants resist those who intend to extract the 
interest from them. In the following chapters, I will 
present the empirical findings of Ku Village, focusing on 
these three themes. 
m . Back to the Village, Search for the Peasants 
To comprehend the dynamic of local politics and the 
daily practice of power, a macro-institutional approach 
seems to be inadequate. So I will employ an actor-
oriented approach in this research. An actor-oriented 
approach emphasizes the importance of placing actors on the 
8 
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centre stage of analysis. According to Long's opinion, an 
advantage of this approach is that 
oj^e begins with an interest in explaining 
differential responses to similar structural 
circumstances^ even if the conditions appear 
relatively homogeneous (Long^ 1992:21). 
The essence of this approach is that concepts and theories 
are grounded in the everyday life experiences and 
understandings of local people, be they peasants, 
entrepreneurs, government officials, or researchers. More 
important, an actor-oriented approach assumes that the 
differential patterns that arise are in part the creation 
of the actors themselves. Social actors are not simply 
seen as disembodied social categories or passive recipients 
of intervention, but active participants who process 
information and strategies in their dealings with various 
local actors as well as with outside institutions and 
personnel. In Giddens' view, 
In following the routines of my day-to-day life 
I help reproduce social institutions that I 
played no part in bringing into being, • • my 
actions constitute and reconstitute the 
institutional conditions of actions of others^ 
just as their actions do mine... My activities 
are thus embedded within^ and are constitutive 
elements of, structured properties of 
institutions stretching well beyond myself in 
time and space (Giddens^ 1987:11) 
So actors participate in social change not as passive 
subjects of the economic, social or institutional 
structures, but rather as agents whose strategies and 
interactions shape the outcome of development. In 
addition, the different patterns of social organizations 
9 
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result from the interactions, negotiations, and social 
struggles that take place between the several kinds of 
actors (Giddens, 1987; Long, 1992). 
However, emphasizing the actors does not mean that 工 
will omit the more 'macro' side of the picture. I will 
also present the macro-institutional change in rural China. 
No one can deny the institutional constraints on the 
interaction of peasants and state. So the articulation 
between structure and agency will not be left out in this 
research. But I still find it reasonable to maintain that 
understanding of the macro phenomena must be built upon the 
exploring of the micro process. I strongly agree with Long 
that: 
all forms of external intervention necessarily 
enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals 
and social groups affected, and in this way are 
mediated and transformed by these same actors and 
structures (Long, 1992). 
In order to provide detailed answers to these 
questions, I stayed in Ku Village about a month in autumn 
of 1993 and I returned to village again in Chinese New Year 
holiday of 1994. Ku Village is located in Mei county of 
North Guangdong. It is a single-lineage village like many 
other Chinese villages. All the members of the village are 
surnamed Ku, and their ancestors have lived many 
generations in the past. 
I adopt participant observation and in-depth 
interviews in this research. Participant observation is 
10 
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the study of people in their own time and space, and in 
their own everyday lives. Before China opened to 
outsiders, it was impossible for western scholars to live 
in a Chinese village to observe firsthand the daily life of 
village. Most previous researches conducted by western 
scholars in the 70s and 80s were through interviews with 
the Chinese emigrants in Hong Kong or other places.^ The 
disadvantage of this method is that the researcher can not 
understand the social situation and local context of the 
interviewees. The misunderstanding may cause 
misinterpreting the data and hence the distortion of the 
social reality. On the other hand, the advantage of 
participant observation is direct observation, not just of 
how people acts, but also of how they understand or 
experience those acts. It enables us to juxtapose what 
people say they are up to against what they actually do 
(Burawoy, 1991; Babbie, 1987; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The 
purpose of field work also helps us to discover and perhaps 
change our biases through interaction with others. For 
example, after interacting with the villagers and 
participating into the daily activities in Ku Village,工 
understand the duality of the peasants' resistance to state 
policy -- not just for material interest, but also for the 
2 The famous ones are Parish and Whyte‘s Village and Family in 
contemporary China (University of Chicago Press 1978); Chan Madsen 
and linker's Chen Village (University of Californian Press, 194 ； s 
State and Peasant in Contemporary China (University of Calxfornia 
Press, 1986); and Walder's Communist Neo-Traditionalism (University of 
California Press, 1986). 
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principle of justice and equity. Moreover, peasants are 
not powerless and passive in accepting the policies imposed 
on them, but they employ their own strategies to protect 
their own interest. So I believe that if we are to achieve 
a better understanding of Chinese local politics, it is 
better to live in Chinese society, as a participant 
observer of the daily pattern of Chinese social life, and 
collect first-hand data in the field. 
In the village, I lived in a villager's (my paternal 
uncle) home. His family is just like the other peasant 
households. So living in his home I can also experience 
the peasants' life of Ku Village. Everyday I talked to 
different villagers and asked the villagers to speak about 
various aspects of the village's recent history (both 
Maoist and post-Maoist period) in minute detail and express 
their opinion on Mao's China and the reform under Deng. I 
also observed many things that happened in those months, 
such as when somebody gets hurt in working, quarrelling 
between the villagers, and many different events. In the 
village, I also participated in some activities such as 
spreading manure, offering sacrifices to ancestor and so 
on. This made me understand more their daily life pattern. 
Acting as an observer, I also observed the pattern of 
interaction between the villagers and local cadres. 工 
tried to understand their action, the meaning of their 
words, and their morality. 
12 
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As this village is my father,s home town, the 
villagers treated me as one of them, and they were often 
willing to answer any question I asked even on some 
sensitive t o p i c s T h i s helped me learn that the 
establishment of trust between researcher and local people 
is very important to field research. 
In-depth interviews were taken to interview the 
village {cun) cadres and administrative region (guanliqu) 
cadres. I took in-depth interview because the village 
cadres rarely interact with the villagers after 
decollectivization. They also work in their fields like 
the other peasant households. To understand their relation 
with villagers, participant observation is not adequate to 
explore the reality. So in-depth interviews becomes 
necessary. The interviews usually lasted for two hours. 
In several interviews, I mainly asked the questions about 
the policy implementations including land distribution, 
responsibility system, family planning, tax collection and 
other issues. I also asked the sensitive questions about 
cadre-peasant relations and their opinions on different 
government policies. All my questions include both Mao's 
and post-Mao's China. ^ 
Apart from participant observation and in-depth 
interview, some policy documents, census and statistical 
3 The ability to speak Hakka language was important for me to 
establish a good relationship with the local people. They often taught 




data were also collected from the government departments. 
These data are used to reflect the historical background of 
Ku Village. 
It is well known that Chinese villages are quite 
diverse, and the implementation of state policy and the 
local response vary considerably by time and place. So it 
is unnecessary to consider my case as "typical" of Chinese 
rural society. I strongly agree that "each Chinese village 
will have a somewhat different story to tell" and they 
reflect part of reality of Chinese society (Chan, Madsen & 
Unger, 1991:2) / 
IV, Summary of the Thesis 
To provide a clear sense of the change of relationship 
between state and peasants under Deng, in Chapter Two 工 
will critically review the current salient theoretical 
perspectives of the local politics in rural China. I will 
pick up Oi's "clientelism" and Scott's "everyday forms of 
resistance" as the theoretical standpoint of my thesis. 工 
will construct the conceptual framework of my thesis 
4. I t i s n o r m a l t h a t s o m e s c h o l a r s m a y q u e s t i o n m y r e s e a r c h t h a t 
o n e c a s e i s i n c a p a b l e o f g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a n d i n h e r e n t l y " m i c r o " a n d 
a h i s 七 o r i c a l . B u t I w a n t t o p i n p o i n t t h a t t h e s t r e n g t h o f s i n g l e c a s e 
s t u d y i s t o g e n e r a l i z e t h e l o g i c a l c a u s a l i t y r a t h e r t h a n s t a t i s t i c a l 
c o r r e l a t i o n , n o m a t t e r h o w a t y p i c a l t h e c a s e i s . A c c o r d i n g t o 
B u r a w o y ' s v i e w , w e s e e k t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f e x i s t i n g t h e o r y ( e x t e n d e d 
c a s e m e t h o d ) . T h i s m e t h o d a t t e m p t s t o e l a b o r a t e t h e e f f e c t s o f " m a c r o " 
o n t h e " m i c r o " . T h e s t r a t e g y o f t h i s m e t h o d i s n o t t o l o o k f o r t h e 
s i m i l a r i t i e s a m o n g d i s p a r a t e c a s e , b u t t o f o c u s o n d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n 
s i m i l a r c a s e s . T h e n w e r e c o n s t r u c t t h e e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s t h r o u g h 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e o f t h e s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n ( B u r a w o y , 
1 9 9 1 ) . s o i n r e s e a r c h , 工 u s e c o u n t e r - i n s t a n c e t o r e c o n s t r u c t a n d 
i m p r o v e t h e o r i e s r a t h e r t h a n r e j e c t t h e o r i e s . 
14 
Introduction 
mainly based on these two theories. Then I will (Chapter 
Three) historically review the social and political pattern 
of Ku Village in Mao China. In Chapters Four and Five,工 
will examine the political and economic change of rural 
China and its impact on the power relationship between 
state and peasants in Ku Village. In these chapters, I 
will try to explain why and how the patron-client bond are 
broken down after the rural reform in post-Mao China. In 
Chapter Six,工 will describe the everyday struggle between 
the village cadres and peasants. These findings will 
confirm the peasants' power and the significance of the 
everyday resistance of the peasants. In Chapter Seven, 
based on the empirical data, I will synthesize the whole 




Understanding Local Politics of Rural China 
Engels elucidates the concept of the "power" 
which is called the state , a power which 
arose from society but place itself above it 
and alienates Itself more and more from it. 
What does this power mainly consist of? it 
consists of special bodies of armed men having 
prisons, etc, at their command, 
Lenin, 1967• 
Chinese communist revolution destroyed the traditional 
power structures in rural society. The landlords have been 
removed from the historical stage while the state and its 
agents appears as the new power in rural society. The 
promise of no classes, no inequality, no coercion, no 
subordination and so forth becomes a mere scrap of paper to 
Chinese peasants. Actually, the state becomes the "big 
landlord" (da dlzhu)• It monopolizes the grain purchasing 
and distribution, regulates grain prices, dictates cropping 
patterns, imposes output targets, and directly extracts 
grain to feed the cities and finance industrial 
development. Tax, resources and grain extraction are still 
the basic issues of peasant politics, which brings the 
state and its agents into conflict with its peasantry.^ 
1 In Bernhardt‘s Rents, Taxes, and Peasants Resistance, he studies 
the rents and taxes relation between the state, landlord and peasants, 
and explains the account for the peasants resistance in the late-Qing 
and Republican period (Bernhardt, 1992). Tax struggle is always the 
root of c o n f l i c t between state and peasants society throughout the 
Chinese history. 
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I. State-society in Communist China 
To understand the state-society in communist China, 
the totalitarian model was widely accepted by western 
analysts in the 1950s and early 1960s. The concept of 
"totalitarianism" emphasizes the capacity of state 
bureaucracy to dominate society directly (Westshy, 1985)• 
In a totalitarian state, power is highly concentrated at 
the political centre, and the centre is capable of both 
monitoring and controlling their society and citizens 
through resource monopoly, military control and so on. 
This model seems to discount the ability of society to 
influence state policy and decision making. It stresses 
the effectiveness of a totalitarian state to mobilize and 
control the ideology of its members under a formal and 
impersonal organizational system. It overlooks the power 
of the subordinate groups to resist and influence state 
policy, at the same time affecting policy implementation 
and pursuing interest through informal channels. Citizen 
are depicted as atomized, passive and politically 
ineffectual in this model (Walder, 1987; Oi, 1989; Shue, 
1988). 
The totalitarian model fell^out of favour in the late 
1960s and 1970s. In rural areas, a growing literature 
argued that through the post-1949 period the "reach of 
state" has been shorter than totalitarian model suggests. 
Shue,s localism and other research reflect that local 
adaptation and distortion of central policies has been a 
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basic feature of the Chinese political system. The local 
state or cadres do not passively accept the policy and will 
of state in an one-way dimension of power relationship. 
They also have the autonomy and flexibility to implement 
state policy and adopt different kinds of strategies to 
bargain with upper government (Lampton, 1987; Oksenberg, 
1974,- Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Oi, 1985, 1989; Shue, 
1988,• Zweig, 1984; Scott, 1985; Manion, 1991). 
However, localism too emphasizes (exaggerates) on the 
ability of local officials to limit central state 
penetration and control of rural village. It posits that 
the state never decisively penetrated the Chinese village 
and its peasant mentality. It also juxtaposes and 
idealizes the role of local officials as traditional 
gentry, who occupy the same local zone of power, and are 
often in a position to bargain with central authority 
according to the interest of village masses. Shue takes 
this argument as she believes that China's new type of 
rural leaders do not represent such a dramatic break with 
the past (Shue, 1988) • In addition, she regards the 
localism as an unintended consequence of state policies 
which have the net effect of "making the identification of 
individuals with their own locality", and "strengthening 
the solidarity and the interests of peasants communities 
against outside, statist domination" (Shue, 1988:53). The 
local officials at all levels self-interestedly loyal to 
the districts in which they served. They distort, deflect 
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and frequently thwart state policy and become an effective 
buffer between the community and state. 
I think that local cadres' political action may have 
some similarities with traditional gentry but not necessary 
the same. It is because local cadres are integrated into 
the formal bureaucratic system, but not the traditional 
gentry. The power and privilege of local cadres are 
granted by state and in this sense they heavily depend on 
the state for their legitimacy. Even though the brigade 
and team leaders' income are directly related to the 
production of the village, their interests are not 
necessary the same as those of the peasants because their 
positional advantage helps them search for their self 
interest. In contrast, the legitimacy of traditional 
gentry are granted by villagers based on their ability of 
holding expensive ceremonies, making large religious 
contributions and giving personal loans and donations and 
so forth. So they are often elected by villagers to 
represent them in bargaining with the state (Duara, 1987; 
Siu, 1989; Zhang, 1991; Fed, 1982, 1992). So treating 
local cadres and peasants as the same interest group will 
hide the fact of conflict and struggle between the peasants 
and village cadres. 
n. state and Its Agents 
The term "state" can refer to the central government 
and its directives. We are clear that not all the levels 
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of state have power to formulate policy, and that the 
levels of policy implementation are not necessarily the 
same ones that they formulated or intended. ^  In this 
thesis, my focus is on the "local state". It is necessary 
to distinguish "local state" and the broad term "state". 
The "local state" here refers to the lowest level of 
administrative organizations which have no power to 
formulate policy but only have power to interpret and 
implement it. To peasants, the local state is more 
concrete because they often directly interact with these 
organizations. In rural China, according to the 
administrative hierarchy, the local government refers to 
the administrative region {guan liqu) and villagers广 
committee (cun weihui), sometimes village small group {cun 
xiaozu). The leaders in these organizations are the local 
cadres. 
How to define "local" is also very controversial among 
different scholars.^ Some scholars such as Shue treats 
"local" as including the commune, brigade and production 
team (Shue, 1988) • However, I think that it is quite 
negligent to mix up these three levels of organization 
because their power and resources, role and status are 
2. The villagers in my case always confuse the concept of central 
government, provincial government, township government, commune, state 
and other state organizations. They indiscriminately refer "state" to 
"the party" {dang) or "the government" (zhengfu) as "state" (guojia). 
3 Different scholars treat different levels of administrative 
organizations as local. For example, Shue looks "local" as including 
the commune, bridge and production team in Mao China. Ox refers to 
"local" only as the bridge and production team. 
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quite different. Formally, in the state's hierarchical 
system, the commune is the lowest level of state 
administration. Only commune-level leaders are considered 
'state cadres, (guojia ganbu), receiving salaries from the 
state payroll and ration coupons for their grain. In 
contrast, brigade and team cadres are considered ,local 
cadres' (difang ganbu), whose wages and grain rations come 
from village coffers; they are still officially required to 
participate in collective labour (Oi, 1989)• These cadres 
day-to-day and face-to-face interact with the peasants. 
They act as the bridge between state and peasants. As Siu 
states. 
Rural cadres were faced with an organized state 
machinery of which they were a part• They were 
also part of...rural society (Siu^ 1989:9). 
In my peasants' sense, they also regard the leader of 
brigade and team as "local cadres". It is because in 
rural China, the conflict and struggle over land, resource, 
harvest, water management, child bearing and daily 
activities between peasants and state take place at these 
two levels, not at the commune or township level. In fact, 
peasants' interaction with the state are filtered through 
these local cadres. These cadres engage in a day-to-day 
relationship with peasants and routinely interpret state 
policy for them. Although they are not "state cadres", 
they are state agents. To the peasant, they represent the 
state because they implement state policy and control the 
upward flow of information (Oi, 1989; Siu, 1989). So the 
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role of local cadres can be confusing. They sometimes 
represent the state, but they sometimes represent the 
peasants. The important point for me is not only to 
clarify which party they represent, but at what condition 
they represent state or peasants. 
So I do not adopt the commune level as a useful unit 
of analysis because it only represents the unit of 
administration. In my view, "local" refers only to the 
lowest level of administrative organizations which have no 
power to formulate policy but have power to implement it. 
They can be seen as the intersection of state and peasants. 
The major reorganization of rural administrative 
system took place in 1982. The highest level of rural 
administration, the commune, returned to the "township" 
(xiang or zhen)• Similarly, the production brigade, the 
second tier of commune administration, was converted to the 
administrative region or villager's committee (guan liqu or 
cun weihui)• The lowest level, the production teams, became 
the villager's committee or village small groups (cun 
weihui or cun xiaozu) / As with the commune, the township 
only represents the lowest level of administrative unit, 
but not the units of production or accounting, and peasants 
do not directly participate in politics at this level. In 
this research, therefore, the level of analysis is focused 
4 The cun xiaozu is the lowest level when the village population 
is large. But if the village population is small, cun weihui is the 
lowest one. 
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on the brigade and production team in Mao's era, guan liqu 
and cun weihui in post-Mao era. 
in. Socialist Clientelism in Rural China 
To understand the local politics at the village level, 
Oi's clientelism is a helpful framework. Political 
clientelism has emerged as a major growth point in social 
science analyses and no longer is the concept restricted to 
the field of social anthropology. Increasing efforts are 
being made by sociologists and political scientists to 
investigate its empirical roots and theoretical 
ramification (Eisenstadt & Lemarchand, 1981; Eisenstadt & 
Roniger, 1980; Eisenstadt, 1984). In recent year, 
clientelism has been employed to analyze the communist 
system. (Tarkowski, 1981; Baker, 1982； Rigby, 1970). 
Students of communist politics regularly note the 
importance of personal ties, and the significance of 
informal bonds in economic and political spheres in 
communist society. Clientelism is also employed by Jean Oi 
to analyze the village politic of China. 
According to Scott, the patron-client relationship can 
be defined as: 
a special case of dyadic (two-person) . ties 
involving a largely instrumental friendship in 
which an individual of higher socio-economic 
status (patron) uses his own influence and 
resources to provide protection and/or benefits 
for a person of lower status (client) who, for 
his part, reciprocates by offering general 
support and assistance^ including personal 
services^ to the patron (Scott, 1972:8). 
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Two characteristics of the patron-client dyad are its basis 
in inequality and its diffuse flexibility as a system of 
personal exchange (Scott, 1972; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 
1980)• As an analytical type, clientelism guides 
comparisons of rural politics by focusing on two 
institutional features. First is the resource dependency 
and control in vertical political system, and second is the 
networks of instrumental-personal ties between the superior 
and subordinate. 
A. Resources Dependence and Control 
Clientelism recognizes the constraints placed on 
individual behaviour by the system of surveillance and 
political control, and stresses the positive incentives 
offered for compliance. Political loyalty is rewarded 
systematically with income opportunities, special 
distribution, and so forth that the officials of government 
are able to dispense. From the clientelist perspective, 
the authority of state is derived from its monopolistic 
control of allocating opportunities, goods and resources. 
It ensures the local government to represent the will of 
central because local governments and organizations highly 
depend on the distribution of resources from the central. 
The organizations are also the focal points for the 
delivery of public goods, services, and other material and 
social advantages that are not readily available from other 
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sources. So the individuals also highly depend on their 
organizations for satisfaction of their needs (Oi, 1985 & 
1989; Walder, 1986; Lu, 1989). 
In rural China, after collectivization, participation 
in collective labour became the only means of obtaining 
grain outside the black market where price was high and 
supply was uncertain. At the same time, in collective 
agriculture, all peasants in China also enjoyed a certain 
security level or subsistence guarantee. Each peasant was 
to receive a monthly minimuin amount of grain as a basic 
ration {jiben kouliang), independent of work points. 
Because individuals lacked availability of alternative 
sources for the satisfaction of their needs, they became 
the clients to the organization to which they belonged (Oi, 
1985 & 1989). So that "the greater the proportion of needs 
satisfied by the enterprise and the fewer the alternatives, 
the more dependent is the labour force" (Walder, 1986)• 
In the clientelist political system, individuals not 
only socially and economically depend on the organization, 
they also personally depend on their leaders. It is 
because team leaders derive authority from their ability to 
influence the distribution of rewards in collective 
agriculture. They have power to influence the work 
distribution of everyday, opportunities for outside 
employment, and the allocation of welfare and relief. It 
forces the peasants to depend on their leader to fulfil 
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their needs and to keep good relationships (gaohao guanxi) 
with their leader for pursuing their interests. 
B. Networks of Instrumental-Personal Ties 
Clientelism posits a paradox of communist political 
system which develops stable networks of loyal clients, who 
exchange their loyalty and support for preference in income 
opportunities and other rewards. The crux of Oi,s argument 
is the predominance of personalized access to the power of 
allocation which deflects direct and formalised state 
control. Participation is viewed not merely as formal 
input in the policy-formulation process. Instead, it 
focuses on the way non-elites try to affect the policy 
implementation process and to further their particular 
i n t e r e s t T h e clientelist model assumes considerably more 
flexibility, subjectivity, and personal sentiment in the 
exercise of control that may or may not result in effective 
policy implementation. Moreover, as Walder points out: 
...these impersonal standards dictate 
preferential treatment in return for loyalty and 
ideological adherence, and standard party 
leadership practices require the cultivation of 
stable networks of such activists in all social 
settings (Walder^ 1986:6). 
The result is a highly institutionalized network of 
patron-client relations that is maintained by the party and 
5 For example, in her book, she explains the deviant behaviour of 
local cadres keeping grain from the state is not simply a .case of 
personal greed to the desire of peasants to consume more graxn. She 
argue^that it is a form of peasant participation and strategies for 
survival. 
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is integral its rule. Moreover, the clientelism posits a 
rich subculture of instrumental-personal ties through which 
individuals circumvent formal regulations to obtain 
official approval and other resources controlled by the 
low-level officials. These client-patron ties are 
structurally encouraged by the political and economic 
system of communist party, which creates scarcity and 
leaves so many legal and distributional decisions to the 
discretion of lower-ranking officials. So the individuals 
often exchange their loyalty and support and become clients 
to their leaders and superiors for pursuing their interest. 
Because of the exchanged relationship, the clientelist 
model also emphasizes that the relationship between 
different parties was not a simple one-sided dependency. 
The patrons also depend on their clients in turn because 
they needed their cooperation to fulfil state policy and 
control the other non-clients. The state depends on the 
local cadres to implement the policy and the local cadres 
depend on the peasants' cooperation in production. If the 
local cadres do not cooperate with government, the goal of 
state policy can not be achieved. At the same time, if the 
peasants do not cooperate with local cadres, they will fail 
to meet the goal of government ； and if the cadres do not 
fulfil their official duties, they are subject to sanctions 
by their supervisor. So the local cadres exchange 




In short, the characteristic of politics in China is 
the variety of patron-client relationships at each level. 
Peasants are clients to local leaders and local leaders are 
clients to higher level leaders. Personal networks 
(guanxi) are integrated features of the state,s capacity to 
rule, and this informal system of politics (clientelism) 
created by the communist system is an indispensable 
supplement to its formalised structures. 
IV. Everyday Form of Resistance in Village 
The clientelist model has made a significant 
contribution to our understanding on the formation of power 
relationship between the village cadres and peasants in 
rural society. However, it cannot help us fully understand 
the dynamic of power. This model omits or overlooks the 
power of peasants. From this perspective, we find that 
peasants are passive and powerless to resist the extraction 
from state and reconstruct their own livelihood. They can 
only be offered more benefits through exchanging their 
personal loyalty and support with the local cadres. 
However, the exercise of power is a challenge-response 
process. The peasants are not as powerless or passive as 
we imagined. They are capable of checking the unfair and 
injustice policy and social arrangement from those who want 
to extract their interest. To understand why and how the 
peasants resist and emphasizing the peasants power, I draw 
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on James Scott's concept of "everyday forms of peasants 
resistance"• 
Supplementing the view of open and organized political 
action, Scott suggests a broader perspective of peasants 
politics, which treats the everyday practice of peasants 
more seriously. He argues that much of the politics of 
subordinate groups falls into the category of "everyday 
forms of resistance" which includes such acts as foot-
dragging , dissimulation, false compliance, feigned 
ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, 
arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, 
anonymous threats, and so forth (Scott, 1985, 1989 & 1990)• 
The striking feature of everyday resistance is that 
they require little or no coordination or 
planning; they make use of implicit 
understandings and informal networks; they often 
represent a form of individual self-help; they 
typically avoid any direct, symbolic 
confrontation with authority (Scott, 1985:29). 
The purpose of such resistance techniques is to avoid 
notice and detection. It reflects the tactical wisdom of 
peasants because peasants are always working the system to 
their minimum disadvantage (Hobsbawiti, 1973; Scott, 1985;). 
As Scott points out, most of the subordinate classes are 
far less interested in changing the larger structures of 
the state and the law. They avoid conflict made open 
challenges to officialdom because such activity is 
dangerous and will probably be met with armed force and 
bloodshed (Scott, 1985; Burn, 1988). So no formal 
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organization , no open and large-scale collective action, 
does not mean that peasants are powerless; on the contrary, 
it is because none is required. 
Moreover, Scott thinks that the social structure of 
the peasantry is not suitable for them to employ the large-
scale collective action owing to their geographical 
dispersion, a class scattered, lacking in formal 
organization, lacking in organizational skills and 
experience and so forth. In contrast to the classes higher 
in the social stratification, peasants lack a variety of 
political resources that allow them to influence the elites 
and officials, such as the political campaigns, lobbying, 
and legal assistance by which they can influence power. So 
for the peasants and other subordinate groups, everyday 
forms of resistance have been the only resort short of 
rebellion. Scott further elaborates that the everyday 
resistance is so common in socialist state just because of 
the institutional c o n s t r a i n t s T h e system of the 
socialist state allows little ways of resistance. The 
state directly controls the means of production and 
coercion, and typically forecloses open protest. Open, 
As Burn states, in China "state policy in most of the period 
tied peasants to the land. Authorities effectively prevented rural to 
urban migration through the household registration and rationing 
systems. China's leaders isolated the peasantry from itself and 
reduced opportunities for peasant interaction unsupervised by the 
party.“ Moreover, although authority established a nationwide network 
of peasants' associations, with branches organized in village, "these 
organizations were effectively controlled by the party. Peasants' 
associations functioned chiefly as a method of transmitting party 
policy to the countryside" (Burn, 1988:170-171). These constrain the 
organization and collective action of peasants. 
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organized and radical confrontation will bring out a tragic 
outcome. So the resisters rarely intend to make a 
revolution and their actions do not openly challenge the 
existing power arrangement (Scott, 1989)• 
Scott also writes that the reasons for peasant 
resistance appear to have both a moral and a material 
basis. As Scott states: 
The struggle between rich and poor … i s not 
merely a struggle over work, property rights 
grain, and cash. It is also a struggle over how 
the past and present shall be understood and 
labelled, a struggle to identify causes and 
assess blame, a contentious effort to give 
partisan meaning to local history (Scott, 1985)• 
So a purely economic-interest account of such resistance is 
inadequate because the peasantry have a host of principal 
reasons underlying their resistance such as equities, 
justice, fairness. Scott thinks that if the norm of justice 
is broken by those who intend to extract interest from 
them, the peasants will fight for their self-interest. 
Although much of the everyday resistance is comprised 
of individual actions, this is not to say that these 
actions lack coordination. Scott believes that underlying 
the everyday resistance, there is a consensus and 
consciousness among the villagers. Scott states that: 
One of the striking things about peasant society 
is the extent to which a whole range of complex 
activities from labour exchange to wedding 
preparations to rituals are coordinated by 
networks of understanding and practice. It is 
the same with boycotts, with techniques for 
evading taxes and forced crop delivers, and with 
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the conspiracy of silence surrounding thefts from 
landlords (Scott, 1989:23). 
Although there is a variety of practices among the 
resisters without formal cooperation and organization, they 
actually have unity of purpose. They share similar values 
and knowledge. Silence, tacit complicity and hiding the 
fact of resistance of other villagers are another form of 
cooperation between the peasants. Scott thinks that there 
is no requirement that resistance take the form of 
collective action. 
In Scott's view, to the subordinate class and 
peasants, this everyday form of resistance is the most 
significant way of resistance because first, it avoids the 
direct meeting with armed force and bloodshed, and minimize 
their lost; second, it increases the management cost of 
government although government can determine to prosecute 
thousands of cases, raise the penalties for noncompliance, 
and appoint more enforcement personnel. So the everyday 
resistance is the relatively safe technique peasants often 
employed. It is the choice of peasants, but not due to 
their impotence. Peasants rarely intend to make 
revolution, and their actions do not openly challenge 
existing power arrangement. So it is undoubted that we 
often find there is little open confrontation from 
peasants. 
Therefore, Scott's concept of "everyday forms 
resistance" provides us a wider view of resistance and 
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class struggle, which intends to bring the peasants back 
in the political stage and emphasizes the power of peasants 
and subordinate groups. Treating the everyday practice of 
the peasants more seriously, we will widen our view of the 
dynamic of power. 
V. The Changing Village Politics under Deng 
Social change in rural China has received much 
scholarly attention as the rural reform launched in the 
late 1970s basically altered the political and economic 
structure of rural society. In post-Mao China, the 
abandonment of the communes, the recurrence of family 
farming and free markets have greatly influenced Chinese 
peasants' life. Chinese peasants, free from the 
constraints of collective agriculture, can diversify their 
production away from the singular emphasis on grain 
production. They not only can decide what they produce, 
but also can exchange their products and surplus in the re-
opened markets. Additionally, many of them leave their 
villages and move to the cities. Most scholars are 
concerned with the impact of rural reform on state-peasants 
relation and cadres power, which is also my concern in this 
thesis. 
There are different opinions about the change of 
state-peasant relations in post-Mao China. Some analysts 
(eg. Zweig, 1983 & 1984) conclude that the rural reforms 
have destroyed the power of state to control local society 
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as policy distortion and misinterpretation often occur in 
post-Mao China. Others (eg. Watson, 1984-85) show that 
local cadres have lost their power as a result of the 
reforms because the growth of markets provides the range of 
opportunities outside the boundaries of the redistributive 
economy. The cadres now lose their positional advantage in 
controlling the life chances of the peasants. Some 
scholars (eg. Shue, 1988 & 1990) worry that the reforms 
have succeeded in destroying the power of local cadres who 
are the peasants' "protective buffer" against the state. 
They also consider that the introduction of market forces 
have broken the solidarity of the village that will 
strengthen the state control on the village society. But 
some (eg. Oi, 1986 & 1992; Nee, 1991b & 1992; White, 1990) 
think that reforms do not dismantle the government command 
structure because the local cadres still control the 
allocation of resources, investment and management of local 
enterprises and so on. So the power relationship only 
changed in form but not in nature. In other words, 
peasants under Deng are still powerless and. controlled by 
local cadres. 
Continuing to employ the ^lientelist model as my 
framework to study the village politics in post-Mao China, 
I will ask if the patron-client bond still continues in 
rural China. Some research conducted in post-Mao China 
suggests to us that the village politics only altered in 
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form, but maintained in the nature of clientelism (Nee, 
1989, 1991 & 1992; Oi, 1986, 1990 & 1992). 
They think that the local government still plays as an 
owner of corporation after decollectivization of 
agriculture because it owns public property such as 
enterprise, various pieces of equipment as well as forest 
land, orchards, fish ponds and so on. So it has the right 
to offer a certain individuals permission to operate the 
corporation's property or business. As Oi states: 
Although peasants are no longer dependent on the 
team to allocate their grain rations or to 
determine the amount or kind of agricultural work 
they must do, they still need authorization to 
leave the team for any length of time, and local 
level recommendations for certain jobs and 
training, and for loans. Moreover^ peasants are 
still dependent on centralized distribution --
and by extension^ local officials -- for 
agriculture inputs, including seed, chemical 
fertilizer^ and most importantly, the allocation 
of land (Oi, 1985:264-265). 
In addition, fiscal reform is another important factor 
to keep the power of local government since fiscal reform 
has assigned the new role of local government as a 
corporation. As Oi state: 
The major objectives were to make localities 
fiscally self-sufficient, to reduce the central 
state's own fiscal burden^ and to provide 
incentives for local authorities to promote 
economic development. The most important of the 
fiscal reforms was a tax responsibility system 
for each administrative level down to the 
township. By the mid-isaos, provinces, 
municipalities, prefectures, counties, and 
townships were subject to bottom-up revenue-
sharing system that required localities to submit 
only a portion of their revenues to the upper 
levels and then allowed them to retain all, or at 
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most, of the remainder (Oi, 1992:102-
So the local governments become independent fiscal 
entities that have both responsibility for local 
expenditures and the unprecedented right to use the revenue 
they retained. This stimulates the local governments to 
pursue their interest as a corporation which tries to 
maximize its profits. The best way to maximize the profit 
is to develop rural industry and enterprise (Oi, 1992). 
In terms of contract-responsibility system for rural 
enterprise, the local government is able to maintain 
effective control on the financial flow of village and 
township industries. The relationship between contractors 
of enterprise and the local government is much more complex 
than the bare outlines of the responsibility system would 
indicate. Actually, the contractors do not simply fulfil 
the taxes to the state, and pay the rent and management fee 
to the village and township government. As Oi states, the 
local governments still exert significant control over 
their enterprises through a web of rules and regulations. 
It continues to limit management autonomy, use of 
enterprise profits, access to credit, and allocation of 
investment opportunities and key inputs. Therefore, the 
dependency relation between the local government and 
villagers continues. 
So in rural China, the local cadres function like 
corporate boards of directors. Village cadres, township 
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heads, and leaders of economic commissions make decisions 
ranging from spending, investment, and loans to hiring and 
also make provisions to assist their enterprises in 
acquiring credits and needed inputs. Apart from 
controlling the local resource, local governments acting as 
a corporation try to provide the services and benefits to 
the villagers. They still take the role as local patron. 
Oi thinks that localities having rural industry can provide 
more services and are more likely to be strong effective 
governments, and vice versa. It is because the village 
with highly developed industries will extract more funds 
and make more profit from the enterprises. Therefore, the 
rural enterprises and industries form the new basis of 
cadres power. The extraction of profits from enterprises 
is one of the most important mechanisms for the local 
governments to operate as a corporation, and the power of 
local government is correlated with the level of 
industrialization of that rural areas (Oi, 1990 & 1992)• 
Additionally, although the market mechanism gradually 
erodes the redistributive power of state and its 
gatekeeper, market forces are still constrained and 
dominated by continued bureaucratic micro-intervention. On 
the one hand, the local cadres keep their position in state 
bureaucracy, on the other hand, they participate in private 
business. Thus the partial reform in China gives rise to 
hybrid elite of cadre-entrepreneurs. In post-Mao China, 
cadre-entrepreneurs structurally locate in networks that 
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allow them to maximize benefits from both the public and 
private sectors of the socialist mixed economy. They often 
distort the allocative mechanism of the market involving 
the personal connection within the state organizations. 
They are likely to experience lower transaction costs on 
trade across the boundaries of the redistributive and 
private economies, which may provide them with more ready 
access to scarce resources and marketing outlets. Hence, 
peasants and entrepreneurs often have to seek to establish 
the personal connection (guanxi) with the local cadres, who 
hold pivotal position, to gain access to resource and 
marketing outlets. Because of this, the patron-client bond 
is still maintained after the rural reform (Nee, 1991 & 
1992). 
In short, the local government tries to keep the 
collective power under the economic reform. Industry forms 
the new basis of the collective (corporation) in which the 
cadres still controls the resource and provides the benefit 
to the clients (rural enterprise and peasants) like in 
Commune era. The market becomes the other source of 
cadres' power. So the local state still acts as a patron 
despite the change of the agricultural organization and 
introduction of market mechanism. The local cadres still 
frequently act as brokers or middlemen in exchanges between 
peasants and the state. They negotiate household quota 
production with the state, collect taxes and other fees, 
and control permits to engage in business, and enforce 
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regulation. The patron-client relationship only alters in 
form, but not in nature in rural China after rural reform. 
The power and privilege of officials actually does not 
diminish. 
However, the empirical findings of my case suggest 
that the patron-client relationship between village cadres 
and peasants has been broken down in some rural areas like 
Ku Village. There is no need for the peasants to exchange 
their loyalty with village cadres for obtaining resources. 
After the reconstruction of the local administrative 
organization, the village organs have lost their outside 
support and back-up from the state. Moreover, the carrying 
out of responsibility system and the division of land, and 
the commercialization of local agriculture, have destroyed 
the power basis of the village cadres. In this study, I do 
not intend to reject other scholars' conclusion that the 
patron-client bond between local cadres and peasants still 
maintains in rural China. I think the most important task 
in this thesis is to explore how and why the patron-client 




Legacy of the Past — Ku Village Under Mao 
r^eire has never been a total break, an 
absolute discontinuity between the past, even 
the very distant past, and the present. Past 
experience continue Into the present, adding 
to it. 
F• Braduel, 1977 
I agree with Braduelopinion that there has never 
been a total break between the past and the present. In 
order to understand the transformation of Ku Village after 
1978, it is reasonable, here, to trace the history of Ku 
Village under Mao. So in this chapter,工 intend to provide 
the background of the transformation of Ku Village in post-
Mao China. 
In 1949, like other villages of China, Ku Village was 
little different from what it was centuries before. Every-
day and every year, the villagers practised the similar 
production and interacted in the routine pattern. However, 
the Chinese Communist Revolution had fundamentally 
transformed these traditional villages. It destroyed the 
traditional rural elite and organization, and brought about 
the political and economic transformation of rural society. 
In this chapter, I will study the peasant life in Ku 
.-----
Village under Mao and map out the picture of the power 
relationship between peasants and village cadres. 
To provide the answer in detail, in-depth interviews 
enabled me to develop a much more detailed and accurate 
picture of the nature of peasant life in Ku Village under 
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Mao. It is the history constructed by the collective 
memory of the villagers in Ku Village. It is their own 
history full of their feeling, which embodies their hope 
and disappointment, their joy and bitterness, their praise 
and disapprobation. I mainly interviewed the old villagers 
who experience the land reform, collectivization and other 
campaigns of communist party. My in-depth interviews were 
not necessarily formal, as I asked the information through 
the daily chatting with different villagers. My interviews 
had no time limit and no standard format. I am not sure if 
the peasants have lost their memory of past. Most of them 
cannot describe the past experience in detail. To the 
peasants, land reform and collectivization are campaigns 
with deep memories. So in this chapter, I will emphasize 
the land reform and collectivization in Ku Village. The 
statistical data of Songnan xiang is obtained from the 
official statistics and the statistical data of Ku Village 
is provided by the former accountant of Ku Village. In 
this and following chapters, to protect the privacy of the 
villagers and our interviewees, I have altered the names of 
all the people who appear in this thesis. 
I try to systematically integrate the scattered data 
presented by different villagers into a standard set of 
topics: 1) the setting of Ku Village; 2) reconstructing the 




I. The Setting of Ku Village 
Ku Village is located on the far north of Mei county 
in Guangdong (see the Map I & Map II) • it comes within the 
jurisdiction of Songnan Xiang. It is a single-lineage and 
small natural village as is common in rural China. In Ku 
Village, the population was about 260 in 1992 and its 
household totaled about 61 (see Table I) • According to the 
former accountant, who keeps the census data and statistic 
data of Ku Village, the population of Ku Village stayed 
constant in these forty years. 
Table I. Selected Statistic of Songnan Xiang and Ku Village 
Total Population Total Household Total Manpower Arable Area 
unit; acres 
Ku Songnan Ku Songnan Ku Songnan Ku Songnan 
Village Xiang Village Xiang Village Xiang Village Xiang 
1978 255 / 61 / 90 / 246 / 
1981 / 16,515 / 4,044 / 6,541 / 13,772 
1985 / 15,924 / 3,823 / 7,286 / / 
1992 260 16,723 61 4,090 95 7,535 228 12,848 
Source: Commune Statistic Data of Mel County In 1981; Statistic of Income 
Distribution of Agricultural Economy in Mel County In 1985; The Data of Basic 
Situation of Mei County's Villages in 1992 • The data of Ku Village is provided 
by the former accountant of Ku Village. 
All the villagers engaged in agriculture. The 
predominant crop was paddy rice before 1978. The minor 
crops are vegetables, sweet potatoes, peanut, banana, sugar 
cane, oranges, tangerines and so on. There are only about 
200 mu of arable land scattered in the mountain village, 
averaging 8 fen per villager (see Table I) Before the 
1. Fen is the unit of area. One mu is equal to ten fen. 
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rural reform in 1978, villagers, income mainly depended on 
the field of rice. As the income of Mei county was lower 
than national average income before rural reform, most area 
of Mei county was defined as "poor mountain region" (pinkun 
shanqu)• 
Ku Village is surrounded by a range of craggy 
mountain as in Chinese painting. There is a small stream 
running across Ku Village and field. The Villager told me 
that the stream joins with the main river (Hang Jiang) of 
Mei county. In mountainous area, Ku village is not so 
remote. But the transportation of Ku Village is poor as 
there is only one small path from Ku Village to Songkou 
town (the nearest market town)• After a rain, the road 
will become muddy and rugged. People easily get stuck in 
the mud. From Ku Village to Songkou Town, if riding the 
bicycle, we have to spend 30 to 45 minutes. If walking, we 
have to spend more than an hour. If villagers go to the 
county seat, they have to take the long-distance bus in 
Songkou town. Travel to Mei county from Songkou town still 
requires half day. The mountain interferes with Ku 
Village's communication with the outside world. 
Every village has its own story about its history. Ku 
Village also has the tale of the Ku lineage. Ku Village is 
a Hakka community. All the males are descended on their 
fathers' side from a common ancestor. According to the 
inscription on a tablet in Ku ancestors hall, the 
villagers' founder was the successful candidate in the 
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highest imperial examination (JinsM) of Ming Dynasty. 
They were settled there several hundred years. According 
to the history of the Hakka, Hakka had moved from inland 
(Zhongyuan) China to south China in the Xijin Dynasty to 
find refuse from war and famine. 
A young villager, Brother Li, told me that there had 
been three lineages of other surnames long, long ago. But 
after several generations, the other lineages disappeared 
because of their wrong geomantic omen (Fengshui). Brother 
Li told itie: 
The Fengshui of Ku Village is good. The range of 
mountains surrounding Ku Village is like an 
ancient folding chair, and the stream running 
across the village Is like a jade waistband of 
traditional officials. This kind of Fengshui 
makes many descendants obtain the high honour in 
education and become the officials. 
To honour their ancestors and affirm their common 
roots in the past, the Kus built an ancestral hall within 
the village which kept the scared tablets and records 
containing the genealogies of their village. On Chinese 
New Year or other important traditional festivals like 
yuanxiao^ zhongqiu, the villager will offer sacrifices to 
their ancestors. The ancestral hall became the public 
property after collectivization. It became the grain store 
of the production team. The religious activities were also 
banned in the collective era. The hall was returned to 
villagers in the late 1970s and was repaired by the 
villagers. 
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n. Reconstructing the Old Political Economy 
Ku Villagers conditions are not dissimilar to those of 
other villages located in peripheral areas that are distant 
from a central place. its political and economic 
integration following land reform and collectivization has 
followed essentially the same pattern as other villages in 
China. Like other villages of China, Ku village 
experienced the Communist Liberation in 1949, land reform 
in following year, then collectivization from mid-1950 to 
the 1960s, and finally the cultural revolution in the late 
1960s. The first two movement brought greater impact in 
rural society rather than cultural revolution which mainly 
influence the city population.^ 
A. Land Reform 
The news of the triumph of the communist party spread 
from Songkou town. The people who came back from town 
often brought the news to Ku Village. The new government 
became the subject of much discussion among the villagers. 
To the villagers, no matter the National Party or Communist 
Party, whoever can provide the good life for them is a good 
2. I do not means there was no impact by the Cultural revolution 
on rural society. In relative sense, the villagers of Ku Village 
think that Cultural Revolution is meaningless to them. Although I can 
find wall slogans of the Cultural Revolution elsewhere, the cadres told 
that it was only the fulfilment of state policy in form. 
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government. The land reform in 1950s brought the hope to 
Kus.3 
In 1950, the work team and military were sent to Mei 
county for carrying out the land reform. To the villagers, 
land reform was a terrible experience. They told me that 
the "mass struggle meeting" (qunzhong pidou dahui) of land 
reform was fierce. The rich peasants and so called 
"landlord" were arrested and their property and land were 
all expropriated. In the "struggle meeting", the landlord 
knelt on the ground and the poor peasants exposed his 
crimes. During the meeting, the angry peasants burnt the 
landlord's land deeds and shout slogans led by the work 
teams. If the "landlord" did not admit their guilt, they 
would be beaten by the angry masses. In the end of 
meeting, many landlords were "head broken and bleeding" 
(toupo xueliu)• When Baba, an old female villager, 
recalled the land reform, her heart still fluttered with 
fear 
3. To the communist government, land reform has another kind of 
meaning. As many scholars believe, land reform introduced by Chinese 
Communist was not only to demolish the power and influence of the rural 
elite, but also to redistribute landholding in the village and give 
land to the peasants (Huang, 1990; Schurmann, 1968)• It aimed to keep 
the promise to peasants and gain support from them which occupying at 
least 80% of total population. ^ 
The radicalism of land reform seems to indicate that state did 
not have full control over the action of villager cadres and local 
leader. In the state document {Instruction on the Question of Checking 
Village Cadres' Unhealthy Tendencies of Working Attitude and Law of 
Land Reform of Chinese People Republic), government clearly stated that 
cadres could not use the coercive method such as beating, killing, 
corporal punishment and so on to implement the land reform, but 
violence and coercion was prevalent in land reform. On 1st, December 
1949, the Communist government passed on the policy - Instruction on 
the Question of Checking Village Cadres' Unhealthy Tendencies of 
Working Attitude [guanyu juizheng xiangcun gongzuo ganbu buliang 
zuofeng de jueding de zhishi]• On 28th, June 1950, Chinese government 
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dlath^^ Nnt"^^' a/1 the villager were scared to 
彻 rec? to i^e fair and help the 
cv^nfiS^ P/ere our relatives. We really sympathized with them. 
According to Uncle Si, an old villager, the reality 
was that there was little intra-village stratification in 
KU Village. The landlord of Ku Village did not own very 
extensive landholding as government mentioned. Some only 
owned small pieces of land and had to work most of their 
lands themselves with the aid of hired help. Uncle Si told 
me that some villagers took advantage of land reform to 
make reprisals.^ 
The land reform involved of personal resentment. 
Because my father lived in Indonesia, they said 
he w-as capitalist and planned to label me as the 
"black five categories" (hei wulei) . But as my 
brother was a Communist party member and official 
in Shantou, in the end^ they did not dare to 
bother me. 
The land reform seems to refute the myth of solidarity 
that its existence is intuitive in rural community. Uncle 
Si's wife clearly stated that the same surname and lineage 
was meaningless to them.^ She said: 
announced the Law of Land Reform of Chinese People Republic [zhonghua 
renmln gongheguo tudl gaigefa]. 
Although state controls the power of policy formulation, it 
cannot control the operation process and the outcome of policy. This 
also explains why communist government so much emphasis on ideology 
control and political campaigns. 
Most social scientists believe that the common clan and lineage 
will create the sense of identity and solidarity among the villagers 
(Huang, 1990; Shue, 1988; Whyte and Parish, 1978). But the empirical 
data tells me that there is absence of anything one would call 
"community solidarity" among the villagers in Ku Villager. I agree 
with Chiu (1992) that social connection or solidarity which constitute 
complicated relationships are extremely dynamic and fluid. It is not 
something autonomous and given. I state this point here because 
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vTAJ^^r are interest conflicts between the 
villagers, everyone is for himself 
So although they sympathized with the fate of "landlord", 
most villagers accepted the land redistribution and 
supported the land reform at that time because 
redistribution of land was a benefit to them, at least it 
was no harm to them. 
The land reform gave each family in the village a 
class label - "rich peasant", "upper middle peasant", 
"middle peasant", "poor peasant" - according to their 
quantity of landholding and household property. No one in 
the village can provide the real number of different class 
for me. The villagers only told me that there were less 
than five households labelled as "rich peasants". Almost 
all the Kus were the "poor peasants". The class labelling 
reconstitutes the class structure in rural China, which 
determines how much "political capital" the villagers 
owned. This political capital can be translated into power 
and can influence the life-chance of the villagers, and 
determine the power relationship between the villagers and 
their leaders. A villager, about 30 to 40 years old (I do 
not know his name) expressed his feeling of class 
labelling, 
Because my father was the staff of Guomingdang, 
our family was labelled as the "five black 
categories" (wulei fenzi)• Our labour were only 
solidarity is the essential concept in the study of peasant resistance 
and power. Solidarity is considered as an important factor to organize 
the political opposition of peasants. 
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二 二 i n half, even though we worked harder 
2，others, we still bore in hunger. We could 
not raise our head everyday. 
According to villagers, Chungshen (the party secretary 
of Xiaohuang) can become the secretary because her 
household is the "poor peasant". 
The villagers became self-cultivators after land 
reforms. Instead of sending payments to landlords, they 
now paid taxes to the state. In other words, the state 
became the new big landlord. For Chinese peasants, state 
extraction and state power penetration directly into the 
village was the first time in centuries. Land reform 
represented the first step in the massive penetration of 
state power into their lives. 
B. Collectivization 
After the land reform, the so called "local landlord 
gentry" was destroyed in Ku Village, and in its place came 
the extension of the state apparatus 一 一 Songnan xiang 
government. The xiang government reflects the major 
interest of the state in the rural areas. It become the 
state's main instrument for handling the villages• 
Like the other villages of rural China, Ku Village 
experienced sudden and great transformation in the mid-
1950s. It began in the form of mutual-aid team, then in 
the form of early stage collective and higher stage 
collective, and ended in the organization of People's 
Commune. To guarantee the supply of agriculture, the 
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"three-fixed policy" ~ unified purchase quota (tonggou), 
unified sale quota (tongxiao) and unified production quota 
(dingchan) — were carried out in the village.? The 
introduction of Commune system basically ended the 
collectivization movement, and the commune system founded 
the basic political and economic administrative system 
prior to rural reform in the early 1980s. 
A commune is divided into a number of production 
brigades, which are further sub-divided into production 
teams. In Mei county, there are 32 communes. In Songnan 
commune, there are 13 production brigades. Ku Village is 
divided into two production teams under the jurisdiction of 
Xiaohuang brigade.^ 
7. It aimed to intensify its exploitation and control of the rural 
society. To extract more from rural society, agricultural output had 
to increase. Land reform had given the peasants land, but did not lead 
to an improvement of the over-all agricultural situation, and 
government could not easily extract the surplus from village. It was 
because grain production was overwhelmingly in the hands of rich, 
middle, and poor peasants. Peasant producers still controlled their 
means of production, production process, and the allocation of grain 
between on-farm consumption and market sales. For the economic 
consideration, communist government speeded up the pace of cooperation. 
Mao believed that collectivization seemed to the answer to the problem 
of increased need for agricultural surplus (Mao, 1975). 
The production team is the basic production and accounting unit 
which owns the land and is responsible for all the decisions involving 
the deployment of available manpower, managing production and 
distributing the income generated by the production team. In theory, 
the overall planning of production is subject to certain guidelines 
such as quotas for grain and basic commpdities which must be sold to 
the state at fixed prices, and the quotas for other agricultural 
products such as fruit vegetables, fish or meat. In practice. Brother 
Ming, a former vice brigade party secretary, said that the production 
team has some flexibility or discretion in meeting different quotas or 
exceeding certain quotas. The production team has substantial autonomy 
in making investment decisions involving its own manpower and saving 
such as organizing the production, resource arrangement. 
The production brigade co-ordinates the annual production plans 
of the teams on the basis of quotas assigned by the commune and 
allocates certain agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and pumps. But 
its more important functions are to undertake investment and 
development activities. In addition, it provides certain social 
services like primary schools, health clinics, entertainment 
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All the peasants were organized into the collective 
agricultural organization. The collective replaced the 
family as the unit of production and accounting. Their 
life was different from that of pre-1949. Simply speaking, 
they could not choose which crops to plant, when to 
harvest, who should work where, how much to spend on 
fertilizer, what was the price of the products and so on. 
The lifestyle was standardized and no one could choose 
their livelihood. 
According to different villagers' recollections, every 
morning, through the broadcasting networks, the team leader 
awakened the peasants, then they met the villagers under 
the tree or at the village entrance. The day,s work was 
assigned at that time. Occasionally, the morning political 
activities. Brigades may also organize credit co-operatives and 
militia units. The brigade also serves as the seat of the party branch 
and is the lowest level at which the party operates through direct 
contact with the rural population. 
The commune functions to co-ordinate, supervise and guide all 
these activities of production teams and production brigades. It 
undertakes larger projects requiring a considerable workforce or 
substantial financial resources such as large water conservancy 
projects or rural roads and industrial units. In addition, it provides 
supplementary social services, particularly secondary education and 
hospital facilities. The main political function of the commune is to 
supervise and implement the political and administrative policies of 
the state and to strengthen the ideological and political basis of the 
rural society. The communes performs certain other functions, such as 
military training, control of the movement of population and the 
collection of state taxes. While in its political role the commune is 
responsible for implementing government policy at the local level, its 
economic role is to provide leadership guidance, and assistance for 
agricultural and rural development through production planning, 
provision of essential inputs, the diversification of the rural economy 
and provision of certain social services. In short, the People's 
Commune is a composite unit of local government that encompass the 
whole range of economic, social administrative and political functions 
for the rural community. 
My account of the content and function of commune system is 
brief, interested readers may consult more detailed descriptions in 
Parish and Whyte‘s Village and Family in Contemporary China and Aziz's 
Rural Development: Learning from China and elsewhere. 
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lessons were carried out at that time. The team leader 
blew his whistle to signal the start of the workaday. 
Villagers, daily income were calculated into work 
points (grongrren) . The calculation of work points was 
different in the slack season (nongxian) and the busy 
season (nongmang). According to the former vice-party 
secretary of Xiaohuang, Brother Ming, in the slack season, 
a villager who contributed labor to the collective could 
receive 8 working points. In busy and harvest time, a 
villager could receive 10 working points per day. Ten 
working points were equal to 0.4 dollar. Not all the 
villagers could earn the full work points because the 
labour was divided into full labour, semi labour (elder and 
young), and non-labour. In a collective, the grain, oil 
and vegetables and other rations were distributed to the 
peasant household. The amount of ration was based on the 
labour of that household. If the peasant household had 
more labour, their life may be better. 
At the end of year, the income of production team was 
divided among the villagers based on villagers' work 
points. Brother Ming told me that the cash value of work 
points was diverse in different brigades. Some brigades' 
cash value of working point were even lower than 0.4 
dollar. If the villager's cash value could cover the cost 
of rations at the end of the year, the excess cash value 
was paid in money to the villagers. Otherwise, the 
villager had to pay to the collective. Uncle Qiang, an old 
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villager, told me that many villagers owed money to the 
collective at the end of year. 
The Kus really did not understand why the policy of 
communist government often changed. Uncle Xiang expressed 
his feeling as follows: 
what happened. The government 
二 s says th? neivr policy is benefit and good 
u No matter good or bad, they have 
we have no choice. 
In reality, the villagers were not willing to join 
into collective production. They did not want to give back 
their land and turn over their private property such as 
production tool and so forth to collective, especially to 
the relatively rich households. The villagers thought that 
they were cheated by Communist Party. Granduncle WenDe, an 
old villager, stayed in Singapore before 1949. when he 
heard that land was divided by Communist Party, he came 
back to Ku Village. But the land reform only made the 
villager happy for a short period. In the 
collectivization, the Kus lost all their property. To 
them, land is very important. They hated any government 
who occupied their land. Granduncle WenDe told me: 
Don,t believe the Communist Party. They often 
change their policy. I think I wouldn't have -
come back to Xiaohuang if they didn't tell me the 
lie. 
The Kus could not refuse to join into collective because 
the cadres would visit and persuade them everyday. The 
other villagers who had joined into collective, would also 
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discriminate against them and criticize them in the mass 
meetings. 
In short, full collectivization means that all the 
property became public and the state reasserted its control 
over the land. Such an all-village cooperative made 
possible the development of a planned all-village economy, 
particularly for the basic grains. After the 
collectivization, the state become much more than just a 
tax collector in rural society. it planned for and 
controlled rural commerce, and exercised complete power 
over household economic decision making. Of course, there 
are considerable variations in the internal arrangement 
that have evolved in various communes. But according to 
the former and present cadres of Ku Village, the formal 
arrangement and structure of commune, production brigade, 
and production team of Ku Village is similar to the general 
situation. 
ni. Socialist Clientelism in Ku Village 
From land reform to collectivization, the communist 
government fundamentally transformed the rural society. The 
traditional organizations had be乡 n replaced by the new 
village government and the party had substituted the gentry 
as the dominant elite in the rural regions. This implied 
54 
Ku Village Under Mao 
that state power now stretched down to the administrative 
village.9 
In the village, the village cadres implemented the 
state policy, transmitted the state order and organized the 
production. They acted as the brokerage between the state 
and rural society. As their power were offered by the 
government, they basically represented the ideology of 
government in the village. In socialist system, the cadres 
obtained their power through the distribution of party 
controlled goods. They controlled the essential goods 
including food, work, and income opportunities and so on. 
The villager in socialist system depended on those 
political leader for a wide range of goods in Mao China. 
A. The Power of Local Cadres in Ku Village 
In the formal and informal interviews with the 
villagers and local cadres (former and present), they 
provided me an image of the local cadres as powerful in 
controlling the activities of the villagers in collective 
9. Before 1949, the traditional gentry acted as the protective 
brokerage who linked the state and rural society. The removal of 
middleman between state and village let the crucial point of 
intersection between state power and the village community occur at the 
level of the villager or production team. State power directly 
penetrated into all aspects of the village. As Huang states: "the old 
triangular relationship between state, gentry or landlord, and peasants 




agriculture. This was due to their ability to control the 
subsistence and livelihood of the peasants.� 
The Xiaohuang brigade party secretary, Chunsheng, 
clearly stated that they had strong power in collective 
era. She said that: 
In collective era, when we said , y e s � n o 
villagers dared to say • it was because the 
villager begged for everything from us. 
The "everything" include the grain, work distribution, 
private plots, welfare, sidelines and so on. After 
collectivization, participation in collective labor was the 
only means of obtaining grain. Although the black market 
was always existed, as its activities were illegal, the 
supply was unstable and the price was higher. If the 
villagers exited from the collective, their subsistence 
would reach a crisis. 
Firstly, most important, the local cadres controlled 
the income of the peasants in collective. They had the 
power to determine the work schedule and assigned the work 
to the team members. As the work-point value and 
difficulty was different in various tasks, in order to 
obtain the high work-point value and easy tasks, the 
villagers tried to keep a good personal relationship with 
the cadres. According to Brother Ming, some jobs such as 
10, As Oi ‘ s states that "teams leader derive authority from their 
ability to influence the distribution of rewards in collective 
agriculture. The degree to which they can capitalize on their official 
positions varies, but unscrupulous team leader have 七he potential and 
the power base to become "local emperors" (tu huangdl) in China's 
countryside" (Oi, 1989). 
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carrying the stones, cutting the trees and so on, were 
worth few work points and were both difficult and time-
consuming. This job was Often assigned to one they termed 
as "mischievous element" (tiaopi fenzi). In contrast, some 
prestige jobs, such as tractor driving or herding the 
cattle, which required little energy but paid high work 
points, were often assigned to the one had good relations 
with the cadres. Brother Ming said: 
产 e n assigned the good job to our family 
members, close relatives or those who had good 
relationships with us. It is just the way of the 
^orld (renzhi changqing) • 
Secondly, the village not only controlled the 
collective income, but also controlled the private income 
of the village. Although the Ian were given over to 
: collective, the failure of Great Leap, the peasant 
households of Ku Village were still allow to keep a little 
private plot {ziliu di). So everyday, after contributing 
the labour to collective, the villagers carried out some 
sideline activities on their private plot. However, they 
still could not plant anything they wanted on the private 
plots, especially in the campaign of "cut the tail of 
capitalism" (ge zibenzhuyi weiba)• Uncle Si told me, 
At that time, everyone had not enough food to 
eat • I had five children. Only depending on the 
ration was impossible to live. So I decided to 
plant some sweet potato and sold in open market. 
But the leader did not allow it and said that it 




under the ideology of "a grain must be taken as the key 
link in agriculture" (yiiiang welgan), many sideline 
activities were banned. 
Apart from the power of work allocation, the local 
cadres also controlled the job opportunity outside 
agriculture. Brother Ming told me that sometimes the 
factories in city would employ the contract labor. The 
contract labour jobs in urban areas were particularly 
attractive because they provided the opportunity for 
peasants moving to city even temporarily. Sometimes, the 
peasants would become part of the permanent urban 
population if they could establish a good network in city 
when they were working in contract jobs. The competition 
for these prestige jobs was keen as there was little job 
opportunity in Xiaohuang. So the villagers who had no 
personal relationship with the cadres would not be able to 
obtain the opportunity. The brigade leader and team leader 
played an important role in selecting the workers. The 
recommendation of the team leader was usually a 
precondition. 
Brother Ming told me that the decision making was 
carried by voting in the brigade meeting. One time, the 
brother of the Xiaohuang brigade party secretary 
(Chunsheng's brother) was recommended to work in Mei 
county. In the meeting, there were seven cadres. Three 
voted for and the other three voted against the 
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recommendation. Brother Ming's voting was critical to 
influence the result. Brother Ming said: 
llr^'broth^. very i^r^portant. If i voted against, 
= Jose the chance to work in 
secondJ-T . If b/^other i^as my good classmate in 
.sc^ hooi, and I didn't want to have 
Chunsheng. So I voted for him in 
5 二二 化".he became the cadre in County ^ s 
Agriculture Committee. 
In addition, the village leader also allocated welfare 
like other team resources. The "economically distressed 
household" (kunan hu) would be particularly dependent on 
their local leader. They had to approach the team leader, 
told him their problems and ask for a loan or subsidy. 
Because they could not afford the education fee of their 
children, they had to ask the leader issuing the 
certificate to remit the school fee. A villager. Uncle 
Qiang, told me that he "felt himself like a beggar" when he 
approached the cadres. For the survival and education of 
his children, he could only beg for the aid from the team 
leader. Officially, though the team leader needed higher 
approval before the loan could be granted, loan application 
never reached the higher levels for approval without the 
team leader's recommendation. 
Furthermore, the local cadres also controlled the 
migration of the peasants through the household 
registration system. In Mao's China, both urban and rural 
population had no freedom of internal migration from one 
region to another. The people had to get the certificate 
(zhengming) of permission sealed by the local government. 
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Because the chop was held in the hand of local cadres and 
the certificate was issued by them, in order to make things 
convenient, the villagers always tried their best to keep 
good relations with local cadres. Uncle Wu told me that he 
had to bring some gifts to cadres of the brigade after he 
visited his brother in Shantou. The "chop" power of local 
cadres also influenced different aspects of peasant life 
such as marriage, birth and so on. The marriage and birth 
certificate were also sealed by the local cadres. Liqing 
and Brother Ming's marriage had been intervened by brigade. 
Since Liqing,s family was labelled as "black five 
categories", the brigade asked Brother Ming to consider the 
marriage carefully. They said that Liqing would influence 
Ming's prospects. But Ming insisted to marry Liqing. In 
the end, he had to resign his post in brigade and joined 
the army. 
Due to severe food shortage and lacking other 
alternatives, the peasants economically had to depend on 
the collective for subsistence. Personally, they had to 
depend on their village leader for more benefits. The team 
leader prominently controlled the peasants' basic means of 
subsistence. Therefore, the team leader could exercise 
their power to control the action of peasants, and mobilize 
them to participate into the public affairs such as 
irrigation projects. The local cadres were also easy to 
fulfil the target of state policy such as birth control. 
For obtaining the support from the villagers, the village 
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cadres often exchanged the benefit such as work point, 
welfare services and outside job opportunity for the 
loyalty and support from the villagers. This dependent 
relationship forms the clientelist politics in rural China. 
The peasants are clients to their team leaders. Their team 
leaders are clients to brigades, and brigades are clients 
to communes. It constitutes a hierarchical patron-client 
relationship. 
B. The Dilemma of Local Cadres 
According to Brother Ming, under the communes and 
the brigades, clear distinction was always made between the 
cadres who ate "state rice" (chi guojia fan) and those who 
ate "collective rice" (chi jiti fan)• All the commune 
cadres ate "state rice". But in brigade, only part of 
cadres ate "state rice". The cadres who ate "collective 
rice" had to participate into daily production. At the 
team level, all the cadres ate "collective rice". Their 
income were also counted into work points and were 
correlated to the collective income. 
Regardless whether the cadres ate "collective rice" or 
"state rice", their authority was appointed and paid for by 
the government. Placing the local leaders on the position 
of state bureaucracy had decisively broken their dependence 
on the village. The village cadres in Ku Village really 
lacked the incentive to serve the village by protecting it 
against the state although they came from Ku Village. 
61 
Chapter Three 
To the villagers, the village cadres were state agents 
Who represented the state and implemented the state policy. 
Although the local cadres came from the village, the 
villager told me that cadres did not take care of the 
interest of village like the traditional gentry or 
brokerage. The interest of state always overrides that of 
kin and village. As Baba stated, 
Kin? Relative? So what? They [local cadres] 
never take care of our interest. They only serve 
for themselves. 丄 
In most situations, when the state policies 
contradicted to the local interest, they would comply with 
the state policy because their positional advantage helped 
them avoid the harmful influence of state policy. They 
often resisted the state policies only for self-interest, 
but not for the villagers'. Their positional advantage 
helped them to further own interest and practice 
favouritism. Brother Ming told me that there were 
different strategies the local cadres employed to search 
for self-interest. For example, the accountant often 
counted more grain on his family's quota. The register 
staff often cheated in the working point register. The 
store keeper sometimes stole the grain and fertilizer, and 
sold in black market. 
To the village cadres, although the managerial and 
distributive power was concentrated in the hands of the 
local leaders, there were limitations on their power as 
they were also client to upper government. The local 
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cadres complained that their opinion was difficult to pass 
from down to top as they only had power to transmit and 
implexnent the quotas, target, and development plan from 
above. Chunsheng, told me: 
llJ'Zt-'''' choic，• If ^e cannot fulfil the task 
二ill be subject to sanction and te 
ll rt^i^^^^ the leader of the higher level. If 
Ijln)舶et quota, we also flel losing face 
She complained that the higher level often ignored the 
reality of local as they did not know what was going on at 
the lower level. The policies were often unrealistic and 
unpractical. She told me that the local always had to 
respond to national trend. For example, when the state 
advocated planting the cotton, the commune compelled the 
brigade to follow the policy. But they argued that cotton 
planting was impossible in Ku Village because the climate 
and soil was not suitable for planting. But fixed quotas 
made resistance impossible because the local cadres heavily 
depended on the state for privilege and legitimacy. The 
team leader depended on the brigade for his office and 
right to distribute the goods available within team, and 
thus ultimately for his power 
Moreover, the relationship between peasants and local 
cadres is not a one—side dependency. The local cadres also 
depend on villager to a minimal extent. Although local 
11. As Oi states, "if the upper level decide to reduce agricultural 
inputs, cut the team budget, demand higher grain sales, and lower grain 
rations, the team leader, as a subordinate, has no choice but to carry 
out such directives" (Oi, 1989:145). 
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cadres exercise their power to implement state policy, the 
success of the policy depends on the cooperation of the 
villagers. If the villagers do not cooperate with them, 
the local cadres will fail to meet the task of state. The 
local cadres also clearly know that if they are too harsh 
to their villagers, the villagers will resort to force. So 
Chunsheng explained that although they had different means 
such as using the threat of coercion to enforce policy on 
the villagers, they still tried to keep good relations with 
the villagers. The frequent political campaigns also 
provided the opportunity for the villagers to fight against 
their local cadres. During the campaign, the villagers 
could expose the wrong thing of the local cadres to the 
work team that came from upper government. To protect 
their position, the local cadres would also try to obtain 
the support from the masses. 
In this sense, the local leaders can be described as 
both a patron and a client. The local leaders themselves 
depend on both the state and their villagers. So this kind 
patron-client relationship is not a simple one-sided 
dependency and the clientelist relationship is quite 
unstable. 
C. Weapons of the Peasants 
In the villager's view, the collective was like a 
concentration camp. In the collective, the peasants lost 
freedom to make decisions on what to produce, how to 
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produce, and where to sell. They only received the income 
depending on their labour contribution. They chose how 
much to work, not based on their relative preference for 
leisure and goods, but on whether or not to work at all. 
Everyone at the time felt hunger. The villagers did not 
understand why they were still very poor, why the poverty 
and inequality were still prevalent in rural China. They 
thought the Communist Government broke her promise of 
equality and riches. They said that "we will only trust 
the money in our pocket", and they would not trust the 
communist government any more. The villagers told me a 
joke in the campaign of "recalling past suffering and think 
over the source of present happiness" (yiku sitian)• 
工n the campaign of "recalling past suffering and 
think over the source of present happiness", an 
old women was asked to tell of her suffering in 
the "old society" (jiu shehui) But when she 
told about the Yuan Shi-kai era, she could not 
help saying that people was full In Yuan era, but 
hungry nowadays. So the old women said that Yuan 
era was the new society^ but Mao era was the "old 
society" • In the end, the old women was 
criticized as "anti-revolutionary". 
The Communist Government lost her legitimacy after the 
Great Leap because the government broke her promise of 
equality and riches to peasants. With the poverty of rural 
society, the inequality between urban and rural was rife in 
Mao China. In the recollections of the villagers, we can 
find their disappointment. In the village, I often heard: 
12. There is symbolic meaning in the word "old" and "new". "Old" 
implies hunger, poverty, unhappiness and vice versa. 
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ver^poor at that time [Mao^s China] . We 
tft:ef，rfect Clothes. All' my clotheJ were 
h的 no coins in our pockets. 
I t 二 / o o d [rice] to eat. So most 
Itii^n^J^ eat the banana leaf, grass root, 
c化"ai^d wild herbs now eaten by pigs. 
Many villagers^ belly became bloated. ^ 
To the villagers, it was a terrible dream in Mao's China. 
They could never forget the "hunger". 
Although the peasants suffered a lot in Mao's era, 
under the condition of strict control of state bureaucracy, 
monopoly of resource, closure of market and other life 
chance alternatives, peasant seems to be powerless to 
resist state policy. In Ku Village, according to Uncle Si, 
there were seldom direct confrontation with authority 
because the villagers were afraid of the terrorist means of 
government. He said: 
Because they had guns, if we resisted the 
government^ all the things would be taken away 
and we would be put into prison. 
The revolutionary terror of land reform was still fresh in 
the minds of the rural population. No peasant wished to 
take risk. Although the government advocated using 
peaceful and persuasive methods to carry out the policy, 
various forms of compulsion were still used by local 
cadres. Under the state socialism of Mao, the structural 
disadvantage constrained the political action of the 
peasants. Although the structural disadvantages 
constrained the political action of the villagers' we 
cannot deny that there were still narrow species of power 
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they could employ to make the lowest magnitude of influence 
in Mao China. it is reported that there was sporadic 
resistance to collectivization in rural China. It appeared 
to have mainly taken the form of passive non-compliance, 
withdrawal of effort, slaughter of farm animals and so on. 
This kind of resistance is what James, C. Scott called the 
"weapon of the weak" — everyday forms of resistance.^^ 
After the collectivization, the traditional 
organization had been replaced by the government apparatus. 
In Ku Village, the peasants were in no way organized by 
themselves. Due to the limited space of opposition, 
everyday forms of resistance became the available 
alternative because they required little or no co-
ordination or planning. They often represented a form of 
individual self-help, and they typically avoided any 
direct, symbolic confrontation with authority. The 
purpose of these forms of resistance was to avoid notice 
and detection. 
In Ku Village, the villagers often employed the way of 
passive resistance. They often took small effort in 
collective production because the income was not positively 
According to Scott‘s viewpoint, everyday forms of resistance 
are so common in state-socialist forms of agriculture because such 
system allow little else in the way of opposition. Under state 
socialism, "Controlling directly the means of coercion, the state 
typically foreclose open protest, except in utter desperation, and the 
formal bodies that purport to represent the interest of agriculturist 
are, as often as not, transmission belts for instructions from the 
authorities" (Scott, 1989:15). 
The ordinary weapons of relatively powerless group include such 
as foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance, 
desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, slander, sabotage, 
surreptitious assault and anonymous threats, and so on. 
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related to how much effort they put out, but related to how 
much time they spent on the collective work. So the 
villager told me that they often had a long rest in working 
while the cadres did not pay much attention on them. in 
summer' they often enjoyed the cool in some shade and 
chatted with other villagers under the tree. But under the 
surveillance of the team leader, they pretended to be 
working hard. This action influenced the productivity of 
agriculture, and to some extent reflected the discontent of 
the villagers. Uncle Xiang told me in collective 
production, 
…p/e work when the cadres are around^ then we 
relax when they go away. We make sure we always 
look like we are working hard when the cadres are 
there. So they have no any excuse to deduct our 
work points. 
Dissimulation was another strategy of the peasants to 
resist state policy. Feigned sickness was rife in Ku 
Village. Villagers who wanted extra time for sideline work 
often went to the team leader and asked for time off and 
left from their collective duties by saying that "I am ill" 
(you bing)• On the general situation, the team leader 
approved their request by "opening one eye and closing the 
other". 
If the team leader did not approve their request, the 
villager would slander the "unfairness" and "corruption" of 
the leader. During the political campaign, the villagers 
exposed the wrong things of the team leader and attacked 
the cadres in public meetings. According to the villagers, 
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if they dared to adopt this defensive strategy, it was 
significant to protect themselves and their families from 
discrimination by the cadres. But most peasants were 
afraid of the vengeance of the cadres because there were 
many opportunities for the cadres to take revenge such as 
assigning them heavy work.14 
reigned ignorance was also a form of resistance. 
According to Uncle Si's wife, there were political meetings 
every week or month in Mao era. In most meetings, the 
cadres read out the policy document or newspaper, and 
explained the directives from the government of higher 
level. But the villagers often fell silent and seldom 
spoke. Some talked among themselves, some slept, and some 
knitted. They seldom actively listened or responded in a 
meeting. Even if called upon to speak, they would not 
express their true feelings in the meeting. If we treat 
the political meeting as a means of ideological control, 
the action of the villager may be regarded as anti-control. 
So we can say that even though the state can exercise the 
material force directly coercing the action of the 
peasants, it cannot persuade and control the mind of the 
villagers. 
14. The situation was similar in Chen Village, the interviewee of 
Chen village stated: "Most of the mass were afraid. The cadres were 
like emperors: brigade emperors and team emperors. If you complained 
about them, they might want to take revenge, something very frightful. 
Because a peasant has no way of leaving a village. A cadres's revenge 
could take the form of assigning them heavy work for years to come" 
(Chan, Madsen & Unger, 1992:47-48). 
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Moreover, as Kelliher states, one essential asset of 
peasants is their initial control over the harvest 
(Kelliher, 1992). The strategic position of peasants 
forced the local cadres to consider their interest to some 
extent because the local cadres need the co-operation of 
peasants to fulfil the quota and target of state policy. 
Kelliher states that: 
Peasants plant the crops, and their hands are the 
^^ff^ to touch the harvest. State socialism does 
nothing to alter this fundamental premise of 
peasant political life The State needs the 
rarin product to feed the cities, to earn foreign 
exchange, to accumulate capitals, and to supply 
industry with raw material (Kelliher, 1992:26). 
Therefore, the sluggishness and the shoddy work of the 
villagers will greatly influence the agricultural 
productivity of state. But I have no desire to gainsay 
that this form of resistance will also influence the 
livelihood of the peasant because their income will be 
directly related to the income of the team and collective. 
Regardless of the limitation of peasants resistance 
under Mao, we understand that power is not just conceived 
as a property or possession of a dominant class or state. 
The subordinate groups can still employ the "weapon of the 
weak" to resist the dominate group and struggle for their 
interest, even in the structural disadvantage. 
V. Conclusion 
When one thinks of monolithic state, few 
countries leap faster to mind than Maoist China. 
Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
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Ustate machine reached out to control more and 
二 二 —aspect^ of China's economy, polity, and 
fZ t^y：從 no. time in the past 350 years has 
二，state exercised as much power over the lives 
o:r Its citizens (Zweig, 1989:151). 
It is a view widely shared by scholars that before the 
rule of communist government, the state was only concerned 
with the maintenance of order and the collection of taxes. 
The agrarian economy is chiefly an object of taxation, and 
the peasant is chiefly a source of tax revenue. Aside from 
tax collection, neither state interferes much with 
agriculture and peasant life (Huang, 1990; Schurmann, 1968; 
Zweig, 1989) . During most of Chinese history, the state let 
society organize itself. Villages develop various forms of 
cooperation based on kinship, work, religion, and other 
ties. The state also uses these local organizations for 
its own interests which are 
maintenance of control through the exercise of 
self-defense and judicial functions; and the 
facilitation of exploitation through the 
collection of revenues^ the registration of 
population, and the execution of public works 
(Schurmann^ 1968:407) 
The scholars of Chinese study widely share the opinion 
that in Chinese administrative history, formal state 
administration did not reach below the level of the county 
The iija system of the Ming was an essentially civil form of 
village organization which grounded villagers into blocks of 
households. The baoja system of the Qing, which similarly grouped 
households, was essentially a military organization. However, in 
general, both systems were for the maintenance of order, the collection 
of taxes, and registration of population. They served the function of 
control and exploitation of state. In traditional villages, local 
elites afforded the task of tax collection and public affair such as 
taking charge of religious ritual, managing irrigation and so on. 
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(xi助）.16 It is because yamen, the representative of 
state, was set up in the xian. The yainei. office symbolizes 
the relationship between state and society. There the 
leaders of civil society and the officer of government 
meet. 
The new revolutionary state, however, was more 
ambitious than simply to extract surplus from the 
countryside. The land reform introduced by Chinese 
Communist was to destroy the traditional elite, the 
official-landlord gentry, and give land to the peasants 
(Schurmann, 1968)• The collectivization intended to weaken 
the rich peasants, integrate their property into the 
collective and create all village collective economy based 
on the natural village. More important, in order to 
produce food for its growing population and provide savings 
for industrialization, fundamental transformation of the 
traditional village became necessary. To do so, the state 
has not only to extend its vertical reach down to the 
village, but also to expand the horizontal scope of its 
powers, to encompass especially rural economic life 
(Schurmann, 1968; Huang, 1990; Shue, 1988). The communist 
party stretches down to the production brigade, where the 
party branch committee (dangzhi bu) takes over for the 
state. The party branch committee secretary becomes the 
post-revolutionary equivalent of the old administrative 
16. The xlan was an administrative unit consisting of a commercial 
town surrounded by an agricultural region linked by economics, 
political, military, social and cultural ties. 
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village head. In the commune system, real power rests with 
the party. The party makes the decisions in regard to all 
major activities of the xiang and commune. in addition, 
the party represents the ideology of central government and 
the link between the leadership and the masses. it has 
become the integrating element of the new society.口 
Collectivization seems to be the only appropriate way 
to guarantee quick accumulation because peasants working in 
the collective enable the government to extract more from 
rural society. It ensures the peasant does not secretly 
harvest and sequester grain. Like working in the factory, 
peasants will be brought together to labour under the eyes 
of watchful oversees. The triumph of the communist 
government is not only a monopoly of the resources [land] 
of production, but an absolute prohibition against the 
private market. In the collective, peasant lost their 
control on resources and means of production, their labour 
process, their* products and interaction with market. 
Participation in collective production became the only 
source of subsistence. So the peasants economically depend 
on their production. As the local cadres derive authority 
from their ability to monopolize the resource distribution 
and influence the life chance of peasants, personally, the 
villagers depend on the local cadres for more benefits. 
For the loyalty and support from the peasants, the local 
17. As Huang states, what distinguished the revolutionary state 
from earlier ones is the Party organization paralleled the formal 
apparatus of government at every level. 
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cadres exchange the resources with the villagers. So the 
structure of socialist system determines the patron-client 
relation in rural China. 
However, the role of patron in socialist society is 
somewhat different to the traditional one. Many scholars 
have mentioned the dilemma of local cadres in rural China 
(Shue, 1988; zweig, 1989; Huang, 1990; Oi, 1989). As Zweig 
states. 
The ^  cadres monitored local activities and used 
. party authority to dominate village 
politics. They were also the major agents of 
巧 te interests in the countryside. However, 
tea;^ and brigade officials'^ positions In local 
society also force them to consider the interests 
of their fellow villagers (Zweig, 1989:155)• 
There are different cases in Mao's China to show that 
the cadres act as traditional gentry who often consider the 
local interest of their fellow villagers. They employ 
different kinds of strategies such as withholding the 
truth, misreporting the data and so on to resist state 
policy • 18 
Although there are some similarities between local 
cadres and traditional gentry or patron, we cannot confuse 
Shue ‘ s localism emphasizes the ability of local officials to 
limit central state penetration and control of rural village. She 
juxtaposes the role of local officials and traditional gentry who often 
stand for the local interest and bargain with the central authority. 
She states that:"It seems quite clear that local cadres in horizontally 
regarding or regional units who stayed in their positions for any 
length of time inevitably came to identify with and represent the 
interests of their localities and regions. Their own careers and 
reputations were, after all, intimately tied to the fates of those 
areas and regions. The mind set of these local officials was strongly 
characterized by an inclination to pursue the interests of their own 
areas against other areas and, when necessary, against the demands of 
the vertical state apparatus" (Shue,1988:56). 
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the role of local cadres and traditional patron or gentry. 
As Schurmann points out, 
=』=7,!t:co"\o巧? Po爬r 贴s i^ased。乃 land 
pop/er was based on its 
^nnlli ^ to the state bureaucracy, and its 
S = i = r i r / s : b / / 7 ， d on its 一 i / n � l states 
Moreover, their legitimacy are granted by villagers based 
on their ability to hold expensive ceremonies, make large 
religious contribution and give personal loan and donation 
and so on. But after the movement of the communist 
government, all these sources of power have vanished. By 
contrast, the local cadre^s power, as Oi states, granted to 
them by the state, derives from his position in the 
administrative hierarchy (Oi, 1989) . So he has less 
incentive to protect the interests of the village. when 
the policy is imposed from government, he often complies 
with the requirements of the state. 
However, the exercise of power is grounded in the 
challenge-response mechanism of class conflict. Although 
the government or local cadres control the life-chance and 
survival of the peasants, we cannot deny that they can 
employ the everyday forms of resistance to challenge the 
domination. According to James Scott, resistance is not 
necessarily the organized and violent political action like 
Marx mentioned. They require little or no co-ordination 
and planning. The peasants often employ this form of 
resistance to express their discontent and protect their 
self-interest. The unintended consequence of this politics 
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is difficult to measure, but the everyday actions of the 
subordinate group tell us they are not really powerless. 
Their everyday resistances also tell us that the 
government's adopting material force can only control their 
action but cannot persuade their mind. 
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The Ku Village in Transformation (I) 
- T h e Retreat of the State 
，e^i though we may know why that which 
nappened happened suddenly, we may still be in 
tAe dark about why it happened at all, 
一 一 K. Polanyi, 1957 
Like other agrarian societies of China, Ku Village is 
undergoing transformation. Some social institutions are 
retained while others are abandoned. One of the obvious 
changes is the reconstruction of local administrative 
organization. State power-holders declare the political 
reform in rural areas as the "decentralization" of power 
and "limitations" on excessive state interference because 
according to the Law of 1982, the formal governmental 
organization returns to the xian or zhen level. The 
state's agents at zhen or xian level no more interfere with 
the rural economic life, and the villagers are offered 
autonomy in production and almost all aspects of life 
(White, 1990; Wang, 1992; Zhong, 1990). Some scholars 
argue that the communist state increasingly loses its 
ability to reach rural society based on the evidence that 
the distortion of policy often occurs at local (Zweig, 1983 
& 1984) . But some argue that this should not be allowed to 
mislead us in thinking that the state has retreated from 
the village. They insist that the party-state still 
influences the life of the peasant if it wants to do so, 
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and the introduction of market forces exposes peasants to 
less predictable Economic conditions in which the central 
government can intervene more directly (Shue, 1988). 
The evidence of Ku Village suggests to us that state 
has withdrawn from the village after the reconstruction of 
local administrative organization and the introduction of 
responsibility system. The intention of this chapter is to 
map out the macro-institutional change which Ku village 
shared with other villages in China, and find out the local 
response in this change. It will also study the impact of 
political reform on the power relationship between the 
rural cadres and villagers in Ku Village. Understanding 
the macro-institutional change is quite important to 
understanding the change of the power relationship between 
the village organs and the local government because no one 
can deny the institutional constraints on the human agency, 
especially in socialist state. 
I. Reconstructing the Rural Administrative Organization 
In Ku Village, the reform of rural political 
institution was carried out in the early 1980s. As before, 
the policy was transmitted from Songnan commune to 
Xiaohuang brigade, and then to the production teams in Ku 
Village. The villagers only knew the reconstruction of 
local administrative organization in the mass meeting held 
by the production team. But according to the villagers, 
there was not any great reaction among the villagers 
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because the government often changed its policy in their 
eye.i 
From 1958 until 1982, the lowest level of government 
used to be the coinitiune. it was the grass roots government 
below the county level and it functioned as the collective 
economic and management unit.2 m 1983, the political and 
administrative authority of Songnan Communes transferred to 
Songnan xiang or township government, with economic 
functions transferred to subordinate economic management 
committee (jingji guanli weiyuanhui). It aims to separate 
the politics and economic, and permits a greater degree of 
independent management of the rural economy.^ under the 
new local government arrangement, the township people's 
congress elects the township people's government. Under 
the township people's government, there are different 
committees discharging responsibilities in the areas of 
dispute mediation, public security maintenance, tax 
� S o m e have commented that it is only the revival of traditional 
government which does not directly intervene the village below xlan, 
Shue (1988) basically takes the opposite standpoint. She believes that 
the dismantling of collective economy will shake both the 
organizational skeleton of honeycomb polity and the morality of 
localism. The leaving solidarity of the village permits the state to 
penetrate into rural communities and strengthen state's influence on 
village society. 
2. The combination of government administrative and economic 
management (zhengshl heyl) created a number of problem. As Wang 
states, "many of the problems stemmed from the over concentration of 
decision making powers in the hands of a few commune leaders. 
Particularly troublesome was the interference of the commune, in its 
role as governmental administrator, in the activities of the production 
team" (Wang, 1992:161-162). 
More important, as White states, power is decentralized or 
redistributed in favour of individual villagers and autonomous 
villagers‘s committees (White, 1990). 
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collection, education, public health, and family planning 
and so on. 
At the same time, Xiaohuang production brigades were 
converted to administrative villages (xingzhen cun) led by 
villager's committee (cunmin weiyuanhui), and production 
teams in Ku Village were converted to village small groups 
(cunxiao zu) . But in 1989, Guangdong government modified 
the structure of local administrative organizations. The 
administrative districts committee (guanliqu weiyuanhui) 
replaced the villager's committee at the level of the pre-
reform production brigade, while the villager's committee 
replaced the village small groups which set up in natural 
village. The new structure of local administrative 
organization is shown in the following figure. 
Figure I. Structure of Local Administrative Organization in Guangdong 
Pre-reform Post-reform 
Peoples' Commune Township or Xiang Government 
I I Brigades Administrative District Committee 
or Villager's Committees (Administrative Village) 
Production Teams Villagers' Committees 
or Village Small groups (Natural Village) 
According to Article 111 of the 1982 constitution and 
the "Organic Law Governing Village Committees of the 
People's Republic of China" in 1987, the law provides a 
grass roots level of local self-government below the 
township structure in rural areas. Although the villager's 
committee undertakes a number of administrative tasks in 
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areas such as water conservation, villager's welfare 
programs, mediation of civil disputes, public order, and 
rules governing villager's conduct, it is not recognized 
formally as local government unit. So the relation between 
the village committee and township government becomes 
ambiguous. From 1986 to 1987, the NPC's^ Standing 
Committee debated questions concerning the relation between 
the villagers' committees and township government. 
Finally, according to the law, the role of the villagers, 
committee is to serve as "a bridge" between the villagers 
and local township authorities, and the villagers' 
committees are not a governmental organ but a mass 
organization. The chairman, vice-chairmen and members of 
villages' committee are elected by the villagers. Any 
villagers over age 18 can participate in village 
conferences to discuss and decide village affair (Zhang & 
Bai, 1989; Xie, 1991)• 
The law also suimarizes the duties and 
responsibilities as: people's mediation, public security, 
public health and other matters in order to manage public 
affairs (such as road and bridge repairs)• provide social 
services (such as nurseries and homes for the aged, 
organizing the cultural and recreational activities in 
their areas), mediate civil disputes, help maintain public 
order, convey resident's opinion and demands, and make 
suggestions to the people's government as a channel between 
4. NPC is National People's Congress. 
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the government and the masses (Zhang & Bai, 1989; xie, 
1991,• Wang, 1992). 
In sum, the reconstructing the local administrative 
organization aims to allow peasants to exercise autonomy 
over their own affairs. Additionally, it provides an 
opportunity for the 800 million peasants to learn and 
practice democracy through election of village committee. 
n. Local Response to the Political Reform 
To the Kus, the reconstruction of local administrative 
organization was meaningless to them because the local 
organizations in Ku Village only changed in name, but not 
in n a t u r e T h e r e is a great distance between 七he state's 
goal and the real situation. 
As the new constitution states, reorganization is to 
separate the politics and economies and enhance the 
efficiency of local government. But in Ku Village, the 
separation of politics and economy is still not clear. The 
local cadres still work in the old way. Now in the 
administrative district committee, there are only three 
cadres: Chunsheng, the party secretary, is also the party 
secretary in brigade; Chongshen, the accountant, is also 
the old cadres in brigade; A Ling, the women's 
representatives, is a new cadres after rural reform. As 
many posts have been abolished and many cadres have 
Like all organizations and politics, there is a disjuncture 
between leadership intention , organizational behaviour, and the actual 
results of action (Lampton, 1987). 
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resigned, the present cadres have to take over the other 
duties, whether politics or economy. For example, all 
three cadres have to take over the duty of family planning, 
in the commune era, the infraction of village rule and 
quarrels between villagers were used to be dealt with by a 
brigade-level public officer. But now, Chunsheng and 
Chongshen have to take over the duties of mediating dispute 
and other different kinds of responsibility. This 
evidence indicates that there is no separation of politics 
and economy at the lowest level. At the production team 
level, without any economic function to perform, the 
villager's coimittee no longer needs a full-fledged 
villager's committee. There is just a village head and a 
part-time accountant.^ 
In addition, the other goal of rural political reform 
is to enhance grass-roots democratic practices. According 
to the constitution, the democratically elected villager's 
committees have been constitutionally and legislatively 
mandated. However, the available evidence of my case 
indicates that political reform has not enhanced grass-
roots democracy. The former brigade leader. Uncle Bi, told 
me that an election was held only once after the law was 
passed down. Uncle Bi clearly knew the stipulation of the 
constitution. He explained it to me in detail when I 
interviewed with him. 
The part-time accountant only calculates the simple income and 
output of the public finance of the village twice a year. 
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l^l ^^^ohuang administrative district replaced 
the Xiaohuang brigade. Formally, there are five 
二 ^ ^ � a n f r t y secretary, aistrict (qu) head? 
tlaurftl nrr • "^�舶乃 representative and public 
h ^ ^ of peer. The party secretary is elected 
party members in villages. The other 
cadres are elected by representatives of 
villagers^ committee. in the villager's 
committee there are two cadres. One is the 
^ilage head and the other is the accountant. 
i/3ese two cadres are elected by the 
representatives of households. The election of 
district is carried out 3-5 years, 
and the election of villagers' committee is 
^r^ied out 2-3 years. But it is quite common 
t巧 locality take a negligent attitude toward 
state policy, when the policy is transmitted to 
locality, the locality often fulfils the 
requirement of state in the first time because 
the policy is tightly implemented by the 
government of higher level at first. Afterward, 
the stipulation of state is often ignored by 亡he 
locality as the control of government is 
loosened. 
Therefore, after some cadres resign, the local government 
often reassigns the new member to fill in the vacancy. The 
new cadres, such as ALing, are appointed by the township 
government. Not all the cadres are satisfied with the 
election arrangement； the party secretary is not elected by 
the villagers. Chongshen express his discontent in the 
interview. He complained the unfair election institution. 
We are elected by the villagers, but they [the 
party secretary] are elected by less than twenty 
party members in the village. We have no right 
to elect and dismiss them no matter how good or 
bad of their performance. It is the 
characteristic of Chinese socialism... 
Moreover, the law states that while the villagers' 
representative congress may dismiss the elected cadres, the 
village regulations may be promulgated only with the 
approval of the villagers' representative congress, and the 
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expenses needed to run public utilities must be discussed 
and approved by the congress. However, it is a mere 
formality. The congress actually does not exist in the 
village. Villagers are not willing to participate in the 
representative congress because they think the meeting will 
waste their time in production. Chunsheng told me: 
Now mass meeting will be held. The villagers 
ar^ y^d丄产rent to the meetings held by us. We 
asA:ed ^  them to join the meeting; we had to 
distribute work points to them. 
Therefore, in Ku Village, the cadres are appointed by the 
xiang government. The villagers have no right to dismiss 
them. All the decisions are made by the cadres, but not 
the villager's representatives. 
The other goal of rural political reform is also to 
promote village-level autonomy. The constitution of 1982 
clearly creates a division between township government and 
village level organization. The township government is 
formally regarded as the lowest organ of state power, and 
the villagers, committee or administrative district 
committee is defined as a mass organization of self-
management at the grass-roots level So the role of 
villagers' committee is to assist local government in 
administrative work and leadership over production. Their 
relation with township, as officially defined, is "one 
7. According to White's view, "This constitution was intended to 
turn the villagers' committee into bridge between state and society in 
rural China and to shift the balance of power between township and 
village cadres in favour of the village" (White, 1990:54). 
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between those who guide and those who are guided" (Zhang & 
Bai, 1989; Xie, 1991). However, in reality, their relation 
is one between the leader and those who are led. The 
village leaders subordinate to township official as before. 
They seem to have no right to refuse township government's 
directive and assignment. They are still the extensions of 
the state into the village and still the mouthpiece of 
government to introduce the state policy to the villagers. 
In the interview with Chunsheng, she said: 
s产e policy and task are passed down from 
t乃e township government. We will join the 
meeting in township government. Then we passed 
the policy down to village. 
If we cannot fulfil the task [eg. tax collection 
and birth control], our salaries will be 
deducted, 
This implies a continuous obligation of village cadres 
to take orders from township cadres. The structural reform 
means no change in the relationship between the township 
and administrative district committee and villagers' 
committee. This change in the end is purely symbolic. 
State policy is transmitted to village progressively 
through administrative hierarchy as before. When the 
policy comes to township, all the brigade cadres have a 
meeting in township government. Then the brigade cadres 
transmit the policy to the team head. Finally, the team 
heads hold the mass meeting and propagate the state policy 
to the villagers. But the village head, Uncle Leng told 
me: 
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二 二 。 m o r e , hold the mass meeting. No 
二 二 e /illingr to participate into the 
ineetiT^ gr eve/i if ^e pay the work points to them. 
a'lltJj"^^ the statement of state policy on 
vili fgl, rec? paper and then post it in Vhe 
However, after the interview, I looked for the poster in 
village. I could not find the remainder of the posters.工 
asked a young villager. Brother Xin, if he found the poster 
put out by the villagers, committee or administrative 
district committee. He answered me: 
工 ^ on't know, it is irrelevant to me. i -just 
care how to make money. 
Although the village administration is no longer 
officially titled a "brigade" and "production team", old 
habits die hard and the villagers normally continue to 
refer to the village organs as the "brigade" and 
"production team". No villager really understands the 
content of constitution. They do not care about the 
reconstruction of the political organization because they 
say that the communist government often changes the things 
they made and they have been accustomed to the change. 
The reconstruction of administrative organization 
redefines the role of village organs and the village cadres 
and their relationships with the state. However, the 
village organs are still the state's representatives in 
village. They still play the important function of policy 
implementation such as tax collection, birth control and so 
on. Although the state treats the village organs as the 
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lower administrative organizations in village, the paradox 
is that the state does not pay any financial support for 
village organs to maintain their functions and legitimacy. 
After the fiscal reform in the inid-1980s, localities become 
fiscally self-sufficient. It aims to reduce the central 
s t a t e�o w n fiscal burden, and to provide incentives for 
local authorities to promote economic development. 
However, the localities without any enterprises and 
industries often cannot bear the fund for welfare services 
and public affairs. As the state does not provide any 
financial assistance, the village organs fall in the 
situation of paralysis or semiparalysis. Chunsheng firmly 
told me that "the local government doesn't provide any coin 
to us" 
ni. Paralysis of Village Organs 
The structural reform seems to bring paralysis or 
semiparalysis to the village organs. The first obvious 
phenomenon is that the village organs no longer act as 
bodies which provide services and benefits to their 
members, and the local cadres no more intervene the daily 
production of the peasant as the iiKiividual households have 
replaced the collective as the unit of production and 
accounting. After the "responsibility system" and land 
People interesting in the detail of the rural political reform 
can also read J. E. Croll. 1987. "Reform, Local Political Institutions 
and the Village Economy in China.“ Journal of Communist Studies 3:28-
51； J. p. Burn, 1983. "Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979-1982.“ Asian 
Survey 23:692-772. 
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redistribution was put into effect, the functions of 
village organs reached to nearly zero. The remaining ones 
are: transmitting state policy; taxes collection; and birth 
control. But there is no guarantee that the village organs 
can fulfil these tasks smoothly. 
Although the institutional arrangement has been 
redesigned, their job descriptions rewritten, and their 
working relationship with peasants has changed, the 
expectation of their party superior and the villagers 
remain the same. The Kus think that the village organs are 
still the state's representative in village as before 
because they implement state policy and transmit the 
state's orders. When the village organs and its agents 
cannot fulfil their duty, a crisis occur in their 
legitimacy. The villagers blame the irresponsible organ 
and its agents in daily chatting. In Ku Village, I find 
that in the eye of the villagers, the roles of villagers' 
committee and administrative district -- especially the 
villagers' cominittee -- are not important. They believe 
that they are irrelevant to the cadres now. The principal 
of the village primary school. Uncle Xiang, often expressed 
his discontent to the government and local cadres in the 
daily chatting with me. One night, when I asked him if 
they still had to make good relations with the local 
cadres, he angrily said: 
We have nothing to plea from the local cadres! 
Nothing! Even if we have^ we still solve the 
problem by ourselves. Now everyone does anything 
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illytt::广二 f plant my Shatlan shaddock, 
^ [local cadres] work as their official. 
Uncle Si also said: 
hlTfo period of the collectives, ^e 
=iv do 工J for everything. Now we 
n^iLf ^ things for ourselves. For most 
cadres 历。^亡 of the time, ^e don't need the 
in daily chatting with the villagers, the Kus gossiped 
among themselves that the cadres were useless. Uncle Xiang 
said: 
The present government does nothing for the 
pec^ple. For example, the local government can 
/2ot afford construction of the school. All the 
funds are donated by the overseas villagers 
Dan't blame 亡hejn/ Our great communist party is 
poor; it has no money! 
They [local cadres] only take the salary, but do 
nothing. 
Many villagers showed their dissatisfaction toward the 
present government. A former villager, Liqing, commented 
about the evaporation of the community structures that 
existed in her own day. She said the local organization in 
Mao's era had provided organized activities such as lion 
dance, film show and so on for the villagers in the 
important festivals such as the Chinese New Year, Yuan Xiao 
festivals and so on. The villagers believe that the local 
government must play the role of coordinator and has 
responsibility to organize the activities for the 
villagers. It is quite contradictory to find that the 
villagers on one hand hate the collective era, but on the 
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other hand, they expect the brigade and production team to 
maintain some functions they accepted. 
In the Chinese New Year of 1994, when I came back to 
KU Village. I found there was no group festival activities 
in the village. m the dialogue with Liqing, she looked 
back at the collective life and compared it to the less 
cohesive community where she now spent her Chinese New Year 
holiday each year. 
Before, the brigade or production team at 
festival could organize different kinds of 
activities such as lion dance and paying for a 
9roup^s New Year call. Now, instead of such 
community get-together, people just watch TV and 
videc^ cassettes, playing cards, gambling in their 
op/ji homes. Now the villagers have no sense of 
belonging to the village. The entire sense of 
community life is weakened, and I regret it 
deeply. Now I don't like to return to the 
village in New Year's holiday. 
The village organ not only lost its function to 
provide welfare service to the villagers, but it also lost 
its function to manage public affairs. For both road 
paving and construction of the school, most of the needed 
funds come from the villagers and the donation of overseas 
villagers, little comes from the team and brigade coffers. 
There was a event happened in Ku Village that shows that 
villagers were discontented with the village organs and 
cadres. 
The villagers are very dissatisfied with 
road paving between the Xiaohuang and Songkou 
town. They think that it is the local 
government ^ s responsibility to pave the way for 
villagers. However^ the fund in the end was 
shared by the villagers. Uncle Si told me that 
in 1992, the villagers paid 20 yuan per person. 
The villagers hoped the administrative district 
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愁二〜，k”ood use of their money in 
r e L l t ^ ^ r ^ ^ . ^ ^ ' ' ' ' improvement. Hop/ever, ^ the 
^^^ uras not satisfactory because the road 
becam^ ^uddy and rugged after a rain 
fair the village, when I went to a 
= 工 二 k o u town with the villagers, it had 
二 rua二 y r^fore • So the road became muddy 
iTss^^^^lV the motorcycle and vehicles 
二 'rr^ S people P/ere easily spattered with 
芸 二 i h e f a l s o easily got %tuck in the mud. 
Brother Xin just experienced that day. 
^ Jhe villagers were filled with anger because 二 严 ， 加 e y cursed the cadres of 
^^^^nzstrative district committee and also swore ， f 乃 e transportation Department. j tried to 
find out the reality of this event. One of my 
relatives Uncle Bing, told me the reality when 
工〒丄ted him in Songkou Town.' The project of 
P^X^ng the way was contracted out to a private 
building team by administrative district 
committee. But the building team only got it 
done in a slapdash manner. When the officer of 
the transportation department came to check the 
quality of the road, the building team invited 
the officer to have a meal in a restaurant. As 
a result, the officers of the transportation 
department never checked the quality of the 
paved road. But the newspaper declared that the 
w^ay had been paved. This event aroused 
villagers' discontent with the village organ, not 
only due to its incapability to afford the paving 
fund, but also their dereliction of duty. This 
event taught the villagers that the village organ 
was incapable in public affairs. This event also 
enhanced the difficulty of village organs to 
collect fees for public affairs. 
Furthermore, the villagers are discontented with the 
heavy burden of education. Theoretically, schooling is 
compulsory and free, but in reality it is not. Each 
student has been required to pay a deposit of 50 yuan per 
primary student and 100 yuan per secondary student. The 
tuition fee of the secondary student also increased from 19 
yuan to 185 yuan. If the students do not pay the deposit, 
9. He is a staff in the transportation department, so he knows the 
reality well. 
92 
The Retreat of State 
they will not be allowed to enter school. The villagers 
called it "high priced education" (gaojia shu). Uncle 
Nianhua heaved a sigh when I talked with him about the 
education in village. He said: 
二 二 二 。 彻 y o u have money, you can enter any 
二c^ol you wanted. Songkou secondary school il 
a fajaous school in Mei county. Before, only the 
二od students can enter this school • But now if 
IZ'i can pay 1,800 yuan, even if your score is 
办 e 产 the score line (fenshu xian) , you still can 
ejiter Songkou secondary school • 
Although the villagers can afford the various school fees 
such as book charges, snack fees, renovation fees and so 
on, they grumble about the heavy burden. They question the 
obligation of government. In the eye of villagers, the 
government always intends to extract the money from them by 
every possible means. Uncle Xiang expressed his discontent 
when I was chatting at his home. 
Government did not afford any obligation 
nowadays^ but always want to steal the money from 
our pocket • Do you know in the eye of 'Uncle 
Peasants' (nongmin bobo), a coin is very large? 
They distinguish clearly that coin of mine and 
yours. It is difficult to get a coin from uncle 
peasants ‘ pocket. 
Moreover, the village organ fails to fulfil its 
responsibility of education. For the school construction 
and repairs, the local government does not afford the 
needed funds any more. Most of the funds come from the 
villagers' families and donations from overseas villagers. 
The Songxi village primary school was built by the overseas 
villagers. The funds for extension and repairing all come 
from the donations of overseas villagers. The cadres and 
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uncle Jiang have asked me for a donation for the school 
repairing fund. 
The paralysis of village organs is also reflected in 
the practice of hanging out shingles. After 
decollectivization, private property has been returned to 
the villagers. The villagers' house which the brigade 
previously occupied as their office have been returned to 
the villagers. So now the administrative district 
committee of Xiaohuang has not any formal office, where to 
hang out the shingle becomes the problem for the cadres. 
At first, the cadres planned to borrow the Aged House (the 
recreation centre of the aged) as their temporary office 
and hang out the shingle on the door of Aged House. The 
old villagers refused the request of the cadres. 
Granduncle De said: 
The Aged House is built with the donations of 
overseas Chinese, but not the local government. 
It is unreasonable for them to occupy the place 
as their office. If they want to hold the 
meeting here, they must just come into the Aged 
House after they become 60 years old. 
When I mentioned this event with Chunsheng, she was very 
angry and said: 
• • . they said we must join the Aged House, and if 
not, they will not allow us to have meetings 
there. Now, no one respects us and understands 
our job. We only serve for them, but they treat 
us as the enemy. 
Now the shingles of administrative district committee 
are hung out on the door of the store. I have visited the 
store with ALing. The store is far from the village. The 
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villagers, committee also has no formal office. According 
to the cadres and villagers, the office has not any real 
function to them because the cadres can have the meeting at 
any one cadres' home, and the villagers can visit cadres, 
home. But it symbolizes the existence of the local 
government• 
The reforms have placed new burdens on the village 
cadres. Today they retain an obligation to enforce 
unpopular state directives without the back-up of authority 
and lack of the control mechanism (resource control) as 
before. The difficulty of the task reduces the incentives 
for cadres. Chunsheng clearly stated that if higher level 
officials permitted her to retire, she would not stay on 
the repugnant post any longer. She always complained about 
the work load or the unfair treatment that they had 
encountered. On the one hand, they must fulfil all tasks 
assigned by the state and withdraw pressure from their 
superiors; at the same time, they have to take peasants' 
feeling into consideration and face the pressure from the 
peasants. So now they often fall into a very awkward 
situation. 
Compared with the brigade leader, the role of the 
prior team leader has almost totally eroded. The reforms 
plainly reduce the duties and powers of the team head. The 
team heads are not called on to coordinate and hand out 
works assignment as each household now work in their own 
field. The remaining task of the team leader under reform 
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is only to transmit the order and message, and contract out 
the public asset to the villager and collect the contracted 
fee. The tasks such as collecting the grain quotas and 
disbursing agricultural supplies have been done by the 
Administrative District. So now it has become difficult to 
persuade anyone to become a team leader. In Ku Village, no 
one is willing to take the post. Uncle Leng at first also 
refused to take the post of village head. After the 
persuasion of Administrative District cadres. Uncle Leng 
promised to return to the post temporarily. 
The local cadres lack incentive to do the task well as 
they obtain little benefit. According to Brother Ming, in 
order to strengthen village leadership, collective 
subsidies for cadres at village and administrative district 
level were reintroduced beginning in 1 9 8 3 . � Their salary 
was very unattractive. The village cadres were dissatisfied 
with their treatment compared with the village cadres of 
Pearl River Delta. Uncle Leng resentfully said: 
They [the villager cadres of Pearl River Delta] 
get several thousands per month, but what about 
me? I only get 36 yuan per month. What a great 
difference! I hear the people say that they who 
sell a piece of land to foreign investors can 
earn a large amount of money. We are so poor. 
The villagers do not respect us any more. 
1�. The level of income for individual cadres vary by post and are 
linked to the income level of the villages. Cadres in relatively 
prosperous area typical receiving large subsidies, whereas cadres in 
poor localities are either inadequately compensated or fail to get 
subsidies at all (White, 1990:49). Because subsidies are derived 
largely from the proceeds of village industry and enterprise, villages 
with a weak industrial base make the cadres rely on private income 
derived from agricultural production and on bonuses from the township 
(Oi, 1990; White, 1990). 
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The subsidy of administrative district cadres is also low. 
Chunsheng obtains loi yua^ subsidy per month. chongshen 
and ALing only get 90 yuan and 88 yuan respectively. 
The village cadres whom I interviewed attributed the 
deterioration of power to the weakness economic power of 
collective.11 Chunsheng said: 
Our authority cannot compare with before. In the 
collective era, the peasants were more obedient 
， ， f e they depended on us for many things such 
r t 巴oblem of feeding. But now the peasants 
households do the work individually. Basically 
t/iey do not need 亡he assistance from us. Today 
collectives lack funds. We cannot afford the 
funds for public affairs such as irrigation 
conservancy and road paving. As a result, the 
villager think that we are useless to serve them. 
So nobody listens to our order. • 
Chongshen expressed the similar opinion. 
Grassroots cadres now are powerless. We cannot 
order the villagers to do anything as before. On 
the other hand, if they ask you to do the things 
•for. them, you cannot refuse. If you don't 
satisfy their request, they will say you are 
useless. Collectives now have no money. No 
money, no power! If the cadres can't manage 
business well, they will look down upon you like 
a dog! In Deng's China, who thinks anything of 
us? 
In sum, the remaining functions of the local administrative 
organization are to 1) transmit the state policy and 
message to village; 2) keep and contract out the public 
access; 3) collect the tax and fee; 4) implement the family 
planning policy. Without the strong backing of the local 
n. Based on Oi's argument, the rural industry and enterprises 
provide the collective basic of the village. They provide the 
opportunity for the village cadres to control the resource of village. 
So she hypothesizes that in villages with high industrialized level, 
the village cadres obtain more power to control the village. 
97 
Chapter Four 
government in terms of finance and coercion, the village 
cadres find that it is difficult to implement the policy. 
rv. Conclusion - An Unorganized Rural Community 
The reconstruction of local administrative 
organisation implies the withdrawal of the state from the 
village. The state now only concerns itself with 
maintaining order and the collection of taxes. in 
empirical research conducted by other scholars, they find 
the social structure of natural society has been modified 
by the recent changes, which has strengthened the family, 
kinship ties, the lineage, and the village (Potter & 
Potter, 1990)• However, the findings in my village suggest 
that rural reform is not necessary to bring a revival of 
traditional organizations. Staying in the village for 
about two months, I experienced the mid-autumn festival, 
spring festival, harvest season and Chongyang festival. 
Theoretically, all these festivals are important to the 
peasants. I expected that there were some group activities 
such as religious rituals to be held in the village. 
However, I could not find anything. The everyday affairs 
and the festival activities were held based on the unit of 
individual households. This feature seems to support 
Siu's argument that the Marxist state has managed to 
destroy the traditional culture and society. The influence 
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Of the socialist state was more than superficial. As she 
stated, 
. 卯 ^ 拍 r s whether popular rituals 
rej^ival^ or new interpretations of 
M=li• 二 d e r the powerful influence of the 
1 二 i t r '.J 卯uld argue that they are the 
nr^^n；^ Jn^the 1980s, I see the elaborate 
P/n二 ？〜the party-state making itself felt on 
n • ife through individuals who have 
internalized what state power means and what one 
reminds one not so much of what has been 
retained, but of how much rural society has been 
transformed after revolution (Siu^ 1989:11). 
If Ku Village shares the similarity with other village 
elsewhere of pre-1949 China, I think that the influence of 
Mao's collectivization and political movement on Ku village 
is deep and far because the traditional organization has 
disappeared even after the rural reforms since the late 
1970S.12 In Mao's China, collectives replaced the 
functions (such as irrigation program, education, military, 
welfare services and so on) of the traditional 
organizations. As Fei states, the rural organizations 
emerge because of functional necessity. The peasants often 
need cooperation in the irrigation program which the 
individual family often cannot afford. For security, the 
villagers have to organize themselves in fighting the 
invasion of outsiders (Fei, 1992)• The commune system 
basically combined all the functions of traditional 
organization. I think this replacement is successful. 
12. I do not mean the that the resurgence of traditional 
organization is impossible in future. 
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The socialist state also intended to replace the 
functions of individual household as the unit of production 
and accounting. But this revolution seems to have failed. 
The collective farming at least guaranteed basic securities 
(such as grain ration, welfare funds and health care) that 
Chinese peasants had not enjoyed in the past. But in the 
poor mountainous area like Ku Village, peasants always 
lived close to subsistence margins. The collective farming 
did not bring any improvement of living standard , and the 
peasants household still fends for itself (Parish, 1985; 
Nee, 1985)• As Nee states, 
the minimal welfare system combined with a lack 
of a tradition of charity, even between kinsmen, 
render peasants all the more dependent upon their 
family as a source of basic security and well 
being (Nee, 1985:170)• 
After the decollectivization, no organization emerged 
to substitute the vacuum of the paralysed or semi-paralysed 
village organs in Ku Village. There is no family growing 
into a powerful group whose members demonstrated 
patrilineal descent from a common ancestor. There is no 
cooperatively owned properties except the ancestral halls 
and guanyin temple. No elder and wealthy kinsmen can held 
the collective rituals. No one can control the trade as 
well as local agricultural production through credit and 
trade monopolies. Based on Fei's view, that the 
traditional organizations do not occur may be due to its 
functional unnecessary. So it is unreasonable to think 
that households have to cooperate in cultural and religious 
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practices. To the Kus, they think that the cooperation 
between the villagers is not necessary and the traditional 
organizations are meaningless to them nowadays. There is 
little opportunity for the villagers to cooperate in long 
term. So there is no need to establish the permanent 
organization and institution in the village. The 
cooperation in Ku Village is temporary and occurs issue by 
i s s u e S o in Mid-Autumn festivals, Chongyang festival 
and Chinese New Year, I found the Kus worshipped their 
ancestors and guanying by individual households. in the 
worship process, the households of the village compete with 
one another for wealth and prestige through comparison of 
their sacrificial offerings, rather than cooperating in the 
process. In agriculture production, the individual 
household is adequate as a production unit. So the 
villagers have no reason to prefer cooperative work 
arrangement (I will discuss and describe the economic life 
of Ku Village in detail in Chapter Five). 
The reconstruction of the local administrative 
organization also has eroded the patron-client bond between 
the village cadres and villagers. The rural cadres in 
Mao's era basically depend on the outside backing of state 
to guarantee his domination of local resources. As their 
13. Because the administrative district committee cannot afford the 
road paving, villagers organize themselves and form a temporary road 
paving committee. They prepare to write the letter to the overseas 
villagers and ask them to donate the road paving fund. This committee 
is led by a villager, Uncle Bing, whose sister often donates the fund 
for public affair in village such as temple repairing, bridge 




authority was provided by the state, the withdrawal of 
state,s support (including the financial and coercive 
force) has destroyed the power of the patrons. Now they 
are powerless to implement the state policy and perform 
their role of local patrons who protect the interest of the 
village and provide the welfare service to the villagers. 
They have lost their legitimacy as local leaders. 
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The Ku Village in Transformation (H) 
- T h e Source of Peasant Power 
I^e small-holding peasants form a vast mass, 
the members of which live In similar 
condxtions but without entering Into manifold 
relations with one another. Their mode of 
production Isolates them from one another 
J^nsteacf of bring them Into mutual 
intercourse Each Individual peasant family 
IS almost self-sufficient; Itself directly 
produces the major part of Its consumption and 
thus acquires its means of life more through 
exchange with nature than In Intercourse with 
society, A small holding, a peasant and its 
family； alongside them another small holding, 
another peasant and another family. 
K. Marx, 1958 
The intention of Marx to map out the unorganized 
political action of the peasantry is to point out that 
different modes of production will determine different 
political behaviour of the agents and classes. Although I 
am not an economic determinist, I still recognize that the 
local economic structure will constrain or influence the 
political action of the local people. In more than two 
decades, the state initiated efforts to develop and 
consolidate collective farming and impose ideology on the 
rural society. However, the collectivization only changed 
the peasants' life in form, but not in nature. As I 
present in Chapter Three, villagers lacked genuine 
enthusiasm when working on the collective fields; by 
contrast, they put in much effort to work on household 
private plots and sidelines. The performance of peasants 
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greatly influenced the productivity of agriculture and 
hindered the capital accumulation of state. 
The only way to overcome sluggish and almost stagnant 
agricultural production was for the Chinese government to 
dismantle much of the commune structure and require the 
production team to contract out the teams' land to the 
village families. In the late 1970s, when rural reform 
began, the peasants in many areas moved quickly to 
dismantle collective farming chose instead to farm as 
individual households. The responsibility system and 
division of land seemed to erode much of cadres, former 
power which was based on their position within the 
bureaucratic hierarchy and exercised through control of 
resources that determined peasants' economic well-being. 
The village cadres no more intervened in the daily 
production. The peasants obtained autonomy in decision 
making and in the production process. 
But some scholars (eg. Oi, 1989 & 1992; Nee, 1991 & 
1992) argue that the village cadres still control the most 
important resource (land) of the peasants because the land 
remains collectively owned. The village cadres also 
control the contracting out of rural enterprises and 
various pieces of equipment, as well as of orchards and 
fishponds. I agree with them that resource dependency is 
still the control mechanism of the village organs and its 
agents. However, the empirical findings in Ku Village tell 
us that although village cadres control the contracted 
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land, they lost their control over the economic life of 
villagers. To grasp this political reality, studying the 
process of economic transformation in Ku Village becomes 
necessary. 
L The Responsibility System and Land Redistribution in Ku Village 
The core of the new agricultural policy adopted was 
the so-called "production responsibility system". 
Responsibility systems for agricultural production were 
experimentally introduced beginning in 1978, and have 
spread to all the rural area of China nowadays. The 
central theme was to reorganize production from one based 
on the collective to one based on the individual 
households. It aims to stimulate the enthusiasm of 
peasants in production and increase the agricultural 
productivity because peasants will earn whatever they can 
get from the land and their income is once again related to 
their effort and performance.^ 
Different teams employed different kinds of systems in 
the early 1980s. But in Songnan commune, all the brigades 
adopted the "big contracting of production" system in 1981 
(See Table 11)• 
1. There are enormous kinds of responsibility system occurring 
from 1979 to 1985 such as: specialized contract, compensation linked to 
output (zhuanye chengbao, llanchan jlchou)； unified management, output 
linked to labour (tongyl jingylng, llanchan jlchou)； production 
contracted to groups, compensation linked to output (baochan daozu, 
llanchan jlchou)； Production contracted to household (baochan daohu) or 
linking output to the household {llanchan daohu)； tasks contracted to 




Table II. Production Responsibility System in Mei County 1981 
C � 麵 咖 ~ i y p e . Type3 Type4 TypeS TypeS Type7 
Chengdong 13 163 2 i 
Chengbei 20 289 9 160 
Chengjiang 16 229 4 1 3 276 
Meijiang 13 193 1 7 218 
Shishan 12 246 2 192 
Meixi 15 224 t 244 
Shikang 14 177 2 217 
Shuiku 2 9 177 
Daping 12 161 i , J 
Nankou 18 285 c； 160 
Yaoshang 14 167 3 280 
Hesi 15 198 1 164 
Jingyi 5 56 195 
Fangjiang 17 273 56 
Shuiche 18 217 1 273 
Meinan 13 143 216 
Changsha 12 106 1 
Xiyang 14 127 104 
Baigong 14 170 2 ill 
Bicun 22 266 1 2 1 le 246 
Yanyang 16 182 34 { 4 ^ 
Sancun 12 116 2 t^Z 
Songkou 16 205 1 204 
Songdong 11 105 . • 
•Songnan 13 149 I49 
Songyuan 22 376 5 371 
Longwen 14 227 3 224 
Taorao 15 161 224 
Baidu 24 278 5 3 270 
Fuda 4 58 2 56 
Songkou town 2 22 
Total 428 5578 81 2 1 8 36 5443 
Source:Mei county Statistic Bureau, 1982. Agricultural Statistic Data of all 
Communes in 1981• 
Note: Typel 一 Collective Production 
Type2 - Partial Contracting out System 
Type3 - Specialized Contract, Compensation Linked to Output 
Type4 - Production Contracted to Groups, Compensation Linked to Output 
Types - Unified Management, Output Linked to Labour 
TypeS 一 Production Contracted to Household 
Type? - Linking Output to the Household or Big Contracting of Production 
In the household contracting system, an individual 
household receives a contract for fixed plots of land in 
return for fixed payment and obligation to the state 
(including taxes, welfare funds, collective investments, 
procurement quotas and so on) . The household keeps all 
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other produce for its own use or for sale. This method 
implies that there is no more "unified distribution" of the 
teams' products. Peasants basically become self-employed 
and they "compensate" themselves directly with their own 
output. They have also responsibility for providing their 
own food needs.2 
The "big contracting of production" are accompanied by 
land redistribution. in Ku Village, the responsibility 
system and land redistribution was carried out in 1980. 
The whole process is reconstructed through the formal 
interview with the village cadres and informal interview 
with the villagers. 
According to Uncle Bi, the former brigade cadres, the 
policy of "big contracting of production" (dabao gan) was 
not implemented smoothly because there were different 
reactions and responses to this policy among the villagers 
and cadres. The villagers, brigade and team cadres 
popularly accepted and welcomed this policy. But the 
commune cadres was not willing to carry out this system. 
He said: 
2. People interesting in the details of other kind of 
responsibility system can read Kathleen Hartford, 1985, p31-61. 
"Socialist Agricultural Dead: Long Live Socialist Agriculture i 
Organizational Transformation in Rural China" in E.J. Perry and C. Wong 
Eds. The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China• Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. People interesting in the detail of division 
of land and responsibility system in rural China can also read G. E. 
Johnson, 1982. "The Production Responsibility System in Chinese 
Agriculture: Some Examples from Guangdong. “ Pacific Affairs 55:430-451; 
E>R. Judd, 1992. "Land Divided, Land United.“ The China Quarterly 
130:338-356； A. Lu, 1987."The Reform of Land Ownership and the 
Political Economy of Contemporary China.“ Peasant Studies 14:229-249; 
J. Unger, 1985-6."The Decollectivization of the Chinese Countryside: a 
Survey of Twenty-eight Villages.“ Pacific Affairs 58:585-606. 
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^Ir-J^tli time' the commune cadres could not ：二 ==�厂t their thinking. They thought it 
^f? only taking the road back to "old society" if 
It^^.r^ Elective land was distributed to 
tTiZttTil But we [brigade cadres] strongly 
the Pol^Lcy because it p/as the way for 
t二巧卯—i^s to riches. In reality, dividing the 
^，fh - f- household only means renting the land 
r^ t乃e individual, but not the individual having 
the ownership of the land. Their thinking are 
foolish! But under the pressure from upper 
government ^ and local masses. in the end, the 
had divided to individual households. 
But in Uncle Nianhua's interpretation, the commune cadres 
in fact did not worry about "taking the road back to old 
society" (zou huitou lu) , but worried about losing their 
power. He told me another story about the land division. 
They [commune cadres] were not willing to carry 
out the policy because they worried that they 
^ould lost their power to control us. After the 
l^nd division^ the commune no more retained their 
role in centralized planning the production and 
unified distribution of the resource. We [the 
brigade] need not listen to their orders any 
more. 
The local cadres felt that they were scapegoats for past 
mistakes. After the decollectivization, these cadres lost 
the most because the collective economy that had given them 
power was dismantled. It is not too difficult to 
understand the mixed reactions of the rural populace to the 
reform. The commune cadres certainly wanted to prevent any 
change that will threaten their power and interest. The 
victims, of course, hope the reform will break the 
inequality and bring them out from poverty. The peasants 
welcomed the decollectivization because they have lost 
confidence in collective economy. 
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Ku Village has 61 households with a total population 
of 260, and a total labour power of about 95. In 1981, the 
production teams in Ku Village adopted a responsibility 
system locally referred to as "divide the land to the 
households" (fentian daohu)• The land includes wet fields 
(shui tian) and dry land (ban di) . The wet fields and dry 
land were divided into three grades, determined by quality, 
productivity, degree of slope and irrigation conditions. 
Land was allocated to households based on the number of 
mouths to feed and its available labour supply. Household 
representatives drew lots for plots in each grades. In Ku 
Village, the wet fields occupies about 210 mu and the dry 
land is about 37 mu. Each person can receive only O.B mu 
cultivated land. The land divided by drawing lots will 
make the household receive their allotment in scattered 
pieces, but the villagers believed that it was a fairly 
easy arrangement for to the division of land. More 
important, they believe that this method would reduce 
dispute and conflict between the villagers because it is 
decided by their fortune. Nothing is to blame except their 
own fortune. Some villagers abandoned their assigned field 
in remote a r e a s z 
> 
Some other villages in China also used the similar method. 
People interesting in details can also read K. Li, 1986. Chinese 
Peasants Life in Social Transformation -Case Study of Taoyuan Rural 
Community. Hunan People Publisher; I. Thireau, 1988. "Recent Changes 




After the division of land, each peasant household had 
to meet the compulsory rice purchase quotas. The 
purchasing price of grain was 28-30 yuan per 100 jin. 
Before 1992, the villagers had to meet the compulsory rice 
purchase quotas in kind. The peasants have to pay 30 jin 
each mu. But in 1992, a new rule allowed the peasants to 
pay their rice-delivery quotas to the state in cash, rather 
than in rice. The taxes are collected by the 
administrative district committee. According to Uncle 
Leng, the cadres take up this task because the cadres can 
earn the commission from the tax bureau. This policy 
releases peasants from the rice production and allows them 
to shift to more profitable commercial agriculture. Others 
also use their contracted land to grow fruit and 
vegetables. Apart from the compulsory grain purchase 
quotas, peasants also have to fulfil some other 
responsibilities. In Ku Village, the households have to 
pay the five guarantees grain (wubao Hang) / education 
grain (jiaoyu Hang) and favouring treatment grain (youdai 
Hang) • The money is used for public works, for education 
and for different social services. For instance, the money 
of five guarantee grain is allocated to the old peasants 
supported by the collective under the five guarantees 
program. According to Granduncle Wende, the old peasants 
4. The childless and infirm old persons who are guaranteed food, 
clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses by the government. 
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of "five guarantee household" are all sent to the elderly 
house in xiang J 
The other properties of the village also have been 
distributed to the villagers. Farm tools, from shoulder 
poles to winnowing baskets, were sold off to all of the 
families. Even the expensive ones such as tractors, were 
sold to the villagers whose cash came from the remittances 
from their overseas relatives. The villagers without 
overseas relatives were be unable to afford the cost. The 
threshing workshop also was contracted out to the 
villagers. 
Furthermore, the teams and brigade's fruit trees and 
fish ponds were contracted out to the villages. The 
contracted households have to pay each year the sum they 
had bid, and in exchange they gained total right over the 
yields of the trees and ponds. In Ku Village, five public 
fish ponds have been contracted out to the villagers from 
500 yuan to 1000 yuan per year. The total contract fee of 
all collective property is about 5,2 00 yuan per year. The 
expenditure of villagers' committee mainly come from this 
There are a variety of peasants‘ responsibilities to government 
in different places. According to the villagers, they think the burden 
is not too heavy when compared to other rural areas in other provinces. 
It is reported that the peasants are affording the heavy burden of 
government. There are different items they have to afford. The heavy 
burdens have aroused the discontent and resistance of peasants. The 
central g o v e r n m e n t has paid attention on this problem and advocated to 
reduce the burden of peasants and prohibit the local government to 
collect the unreasonable taxes from peasants (Farmers Daily, 1993). 
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fee. In sum, the village's assets are being parcelled out 
piece by piece.^ 
n. Political Economy of Shatian Shaddock Planation 
The development of Shatian shaddock plantation has 
brought another great transformation of Ku Village. 
Shatian shaddock plantation has become the dominant farming 
activity in Ku Village and the main income source of the 
peasant h o u s e h o l d T h e commercialization of the local 
economy just erodes the remaining control mechanism (land) 
of village cadres. In this section I will study how the 
development of a cash crop in Mei county, recurrence of 
local market, and increase of job opportunity outside 
agriculture influence the power relationship between the 
village cadres and villagers. 
6. It is reported by different scholars (Siu, 1990; Chan, Madsen 
& Unger, 1992； Hartford, 1985) that the responsibility system was not 
always done voluntarily. The reports reflect not only resistance 
merely from high-place cadres, reports also indicate that the 
resistance came from local villagers. Some peasants were not willing 
to divide up their teams ‘ land and equipment and refuse to go draw lots 
for the parcels of land. This situation is quite different to Ku 
Village. 
7. To understand why the peasant have obtained power to resist the 
village cadres, we have to clearly comprehend the production process of 
Shatian shaddock. If the village cadres can still control the resource 
of production (mainly the land) and interfere into the production and 
trading process of the villager, they basically can maintain their 
power. 
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A. The Development of Shatian Shaddock Planting 
There are different versions about when the Shatian 
shaddock begin to plant in Mei county.« The policy of 
"opening out the wasteland and planting fruit tree" (kaifan 
zhongguo) was formally carried out in 1985. But the 
peasants of Mei county had widely planted the Shatian 
shaddock in some villages (but not Ku Village) before the 
government formally advocated the policy in 1985. 
According to the former vice-chairman of Agricultural 
Committee of Mei county, secretary Li, Yanyang town (the 
richest town in Mei county) was the first one to practice 
Shatian shaddock planting in 1973 or 1974. At that time, 
Shatian shaddock was only treated as sideline activity 
because the government still insisted "grain must be taken 
as the key link in agriculture" {yiliang weigan) • But this 
sideline activity brought some improvement in living 
standards to the Yanyang peasants. The experience of 
Yanyang told Secretary Li that to bring Mei county to 
riches, the only way was to develop Shatian shaddock 
planting. In 1974 and 1978, when he was the leader of 
Yaoshang commune and Songnan commune, he encouraged the 
brigade to develop Shatian shaddock as the sideline 
activity. His opinion was criticized by his supervisor, 
8. The development of Shatian Shaddock plantation is a complex 
process which involves the planned intervention by government and the 
local response of the village. The transformation of the economic 
structure is an outcome of the struggles and negotiations that take 
place between government, local cadres and villagers with differing and 
conflicting social interests. 
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since developing cash crops was strictly prohibited in that 
era. But he continued to experiment with planting in 
Nanxia commune. 
After the rural reform, Secretary Li planned to carry 
out large scale production of Shatian shaddock in Songnan.^ 
But the villagers and grassroots cadres were unwilling to 
plant the Shatian shaddock because they never planted 
Shatian shaddock before and worried whether the tree would 
bear fruit. No one wanted to take the risk of planting 
shaddock. Secretary Li said that they used persuasion and 
compulsory means to impose this policy on the villagers. 
Villagers who planted one sapling would be subsidised four 
or five jiao. The village cadres had to play the leading 
role and took the lead to plant the Shatian shaddock. Each 
team also had to fulfil the quota of planting. If the 
teams failed to fulfil the target, the village leader would 
be punished with the deduction of bonus. To enhance the 
confidence of peasants and grassroots cadres, Secretary Li 
organized the villagers to visit the planting situation of 
Nanxia. Chunsheng told the similar story. She said: 
When the policy was transmitted to the village in 
1981, the villagers responded coldly because they 
couldn't be assured that planting shaddock could 
earn money. We had to take the risk first. In 
1984 or 1985, we got the first good harvest. 
Then the upper government official visited our 
village and appreciated our result• 
9. Songnan is one the poorest communes in Mei county. It's other 
bad name is "poor nan" (qiong nan) which means that this place is very 
poor. Ku Village is located in Songnan. 
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S 二 I t ""^ ant to become rich, plant the 
= L � _ o c k " (yaozhlfu, zhongguoshu) . Our 
lori 二sjere very "clever"; from that time on, 
讯ore and more villagers planted Shatian shaddock. 
Uncle Nianhua presented the similar story to me. 
At the beginning, even if you freely sent the 
sapling to the household, no one got it because 
no one knew whether the tree could bear fruit 
二 the government had to subsidize the villagers, 
tr. you plant one sapling, you would be subsidised 
five Jiao and half jin fertilizer. The Kus was 
，s timid as a sticker. Only a small group dared 
try. In the early 1980s, when the policy came 
^own, we had to persuade them about planting 
shaddock one household by one household. 
B. The Impact of Shatian Shaddock Plantation 
The statistical data shows the income of peasants of 
Mei county increased quickly in these sixteen years. In 
the Table III, we can find the average income of Songnan 
sharply increased from 62 yuan in 1980 to 1230.3 yuan in 
1992, increasing nineteen times. Compared to the average 
income of whole Songnan township, Xiaohuang was higher, 
which was 1565 yuan in 1992. Comparing to the whole 
Xiaohuang Administrative District, the average income of Ku 
Village was even higher, which was 2 000 yuan in 1992 (Mei 
County Agricultural Coimittee, 1992)• 
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Income in Different Townships of Mei County from 1980-92 
^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ 1991 —— 
- - - 9 3Se.O 丨 25 严 1 
Chengjiang 1 0 3 3 ：：^  q a I I ' I ! / 
冗 ijiang 67!；' ： 广 1323 
fi.g 506 6 L (iVB � F - F F 
Daping 88.5 96.9 334 5 qai L . . Nankou 86 1 oq T Ht't 
Yaoshano 工 ？？ 365.5 902 1232.2 
Hesi o 66.6 264.6 734 1008 
“？®"- . 7 5 . 2 9 6 . 9 3 3 2 . 0 888 1107 3 
， 8 8 . 6 8 8 . 7 2 5 1 . 7 653 9 0 ^ 
Fangjiang 67.2 95.8 282.4 783 1 1 5 4 二 ，ch= 67.3 102.9 321.7 854 1068 Changsha 90.6 94.1 356.0 / / 
^lyang 87 99.8 343.0 780 1063 
B^gong 93.6 107.2 385.0 951 1216 
Bicun 105.6 112.3 349.1 1001 1228 
Yanyang 112.9 125.6 515.5 1324 1630 
Songbei 81.5 117.3 366.0 952 1232 3 
Songdong 72.8 88.0 340.4 931 1160 • 
•Songnan 62.0 94.2 376.2 966 1230 
Songyuan 60.6 91.6 244.0 781 988 
Longwen 86 93.4 340.0 936 1201 
Taorao 81 116.2 374.0 863 1081 
Baidu 70.7 101.7 401.6 1036 1318 
Fuda 85.5 96.7 399.2 968 1210 
Songkoutown 49.3 60.8 254.4 852 1107.1 
Meinan 64.7 76.3 312.3 861 1089 
Total 78.7 100.2 357.9 916 1178 
Source: Mei County Statistic Bureau, 1982. Agricultural Statistic Data of all 
Communes in 1981• [meixian yijiubayi nian gegongshe nongye tongji ziliao]； 
Agricultural Economic Productivity Distribution Statistical Report ±n 1985 & 
1992. [yijiubawu he yijiujiusan nian nongye jingji shouyi fengpei tongji 
baobiao] 
The villagers attributed the sharp increase of income 
to the shaddock planting. They often told me that the 
Shatian shaddock brought them to riches. There are seven 
households having their own motorcycles. There are two 
households having tractors. There are twenty-five 
households buying their televisions. In the village, I can 
find there are many new houses building in these several 
116 
rhe Source of Peasants Power 
years. According to my estimation, thirty-five (57.4%) 
households have built their new houses. "The new house is 
built by Shatian shaddock" is the popular saying in the 
village; this means that only after the planting of shatian 
shaddocks, villagers can afford to build new houses. 
There is another indicator of the importance of 
shaddock planting in Mei county. In Table V, the data 
shows that the area of shaddock planting increased from 875 
mu in 1978 to 112279 mu in 1991. The income of fruit 
occupied 13.1% of total income of Mei county in 1992. In 
Songnan township, the income of fruit occupied about 61% of 
its total income and the area of fruit increase from 833 mu 
in 1986 to 3385 mu in 1989 (Mei County Statistic Bureau, 
1992). 
Table IV. The Area and Productivity of Shatian Shaddock in Mei County. 
(Selected Years). 
1949“19571978 1985 1986 19^ 1988 1989 1 9 ^ 
Area 
(mu) 530 1005 875 19725 63945 88867 96469 88767 104535 112279 
Productivity 
(dun) 362 599 80 814 1946 2924 4312 5485 16594 31000 
Source: Liu et.al, 1992. The Rich Road of Mel County [Meixian zhifu zhi ru]. 
Beijing: Red Flag Press. Wen & Chen et.al, 1992. The Shatian Shaddock of Mel 
County [Meixiang Shatian You]. Guangzhou: The University of South China 
Polytechnic Press. 
There are different opinions on the role of government 
in the development of Shatian Shaddock between the 
villagers and rural cadres. In the interview with cadres 
and peasants, we are able to identify the differences in 
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their views of shaddock planting. They both construct 
their stories based on their respective interests. 
According to Chunsheng, the improvement of peasants' life 
in Ku Village was due to the governments' accurate policy. 
Because of the lack of cultivated land, the government 
encouraged villagers to reclaim the wasteland and plant the 
shaddock. Uncle Nianhua told me that "whoever opens up the 
wasteland, owns the land" was the policy of local 
government. The credit cooperative also provided low 
interest loans to the villagers to purchase the fertilizer, 
saplings and other resources. Brother Ming and the 
official of Agricultural Department also emphasized the 
role of government in the development of Shatian shaddock. 
They said the government not only provided the low interest 
loans and subsidies to the peasants, but also provided 
knowledge of planting technique to the peasants. For 
example, the Mei county government cooperated with the 
South China Agricultural University to conduct the research 
of Shatian shaddock and publish a book of planting 
techniques. The government also searched the market for 
shaddock, by holding the Shatian shaddock festivals and 
introducing the Shatian shaddock to the overseas Chinese 
and trader from other cities and provinces. 
But I heard a different view from the village 
peasants. The villagers denied that government provided 
any assistance to them. All the land was reclaimed by 
themselves. The loan was only provided to the "big 
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planting household" (dahu). Their funds were mainly come 
from the remittance of overseas relatives or were borrowed 
from friends and relatives. Secretary Li also recognized 
that the credit cooperatives were difficult to provide loan 
to every household. Basically, the government encourages 
peasants to be "self-reliant" (zili gengsheng)• Actually, 
the whole production and trading process is self-reliant in 
Ku Village. Certainly, there is little cooperation among 
the individual households, and there is little assistance 
from local government and cadres. 
There is another difference between the view of 
government and peasants on the land ownership and the tax 
on the Shatian shaddock. I will describe the conflict in 
detail in Chapter Six. 
C. Planting Process and Cadres Power 
After the decollectivization, all the means and tools 
of production were no longer distributed by the collective. 
As 工 have stated before, the main resource of production of 
shaddock planation -- land -- is reclaimed by the 
villagers, but not distributed by the government. So 
allocation of land is no longer ^ the power resource of 
village cadres to control the production of villagers. 
Shatian shaddock is a plant which does not need to grow on 
fertile land as rice does. This natural characteristic 
reduces the physical constraints of shaddock planting. 
According to Uncle Si, all the flat land in village had 
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been fully utilized for shaddock planting. Now the 
villagers reclaimed the wasteland along the band of the 
river and at the slope of back mountain. Some even 
utilized the rice fields to plant Shatian shaddock trees 
(although this was prohibited before 1986, according to 
Uncle Bi). 
The other input for shaddock tree planting, such as 
saplings, fertilizer, tools (eg. water pump) were not in 
the hands of village cadres. The villagers obtained these 
resources in the market. in general, peasants have to 
invest 900 yuan per mu, averaging 30 yuan per tree. The 
price of saplings increased from 4 jiao in 1980 to 1.2 yuan 
in 1993, about three times. There are two kinds of 
fertilizers the peasants used. One is chemical fertilizer 
and the other is home fertilizer (zijia fei)• The second 
one is from the excrement and urine of pig and human being. 
The chemical fertilizers used for Shatian shaddock include 
potassium (40 yuan per 100 jin) , phosphorus (26 yuan per 
100 jin), nitrogen (70-80 yuan per 100 jin). All of them 
are no longer provided by government. The price of the 
chemical fertilizer is determined by market. Generally, 
the shaddock tree begins to bear fruit in three to four 
years, producing up to 50 years. The income from shaddock 
is 2000 yuan per mu. The price of shaddock fluctuates 
according to demand of the market. The water is freely 
pumped from the river which is also not controlled by the 
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village cadres. The peasants also learn their technique 
from their planting experience and from the books. 
Moreover, the peasants are autonomous in the 
production process. Peasants can make decisions on what to 
produce, how to produce, and where to sell. They can 
decide the time distribution of daily life and how much to 
produce. Broadly, the planting cycle of Shatian shaddock 
includes the sapling planting, turning up the soil, 
fertilizing, artificial pollination, weeding, eliminating 
the insects, irrigation and harvesting. 
The sapling is often planted in spring (Form February 
to April) because the rainfall is concentrated in this 
season. Fertilizing, eliminating the insects, irrigating 
and weeding is done throughout year. The irrigation of the 
shaddock mainly depends on the rainfall. In the dry season 
(mainly concentrating on July, April and September) , the 
villagers often pump the water from the river in the 
village. So all the households in Ku Village have electric 
pumps. When the trees bears fruit, the villagers have to 
put much effort to take care the trees. They visit the 
shaddock trees twice per day. Some villagers even set up 
beds under the shaddock trees because the fruits sometimes 
were stolen by other villagers or outsiders. After picking 
the fruit (in October), the villagers begin to turn up the 
soil and spread the fertilizer on the soil. The flowers of 
shaddock often open in the January or February. The 
artificial pollination is often done in this period. This 
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process will influence the harvest. Basically, shaddock 
planting is not a time and labour intensive production. 
There are only two busy seasons in a year (October, January 
to February). One person can manage 30 to 40 trees. Two 
or three family members are quite enough in the whole 
planting process. So the shaddock plantation releases more 
labour from planting process and allows people engage in 
other sideline activities such as trading or participating 
into industry. 
October is the busy season of peasants because the 
villagers gather the shaddock after Mid-Autumn festival. 
The villagers often have to employ temporary labour in the 
collection of shaddock. They mutually employ and pay 10 
yiiaii to 12 yuan per day. Voluntary assistance no longer 
occurs in the village. If they cannot employ the labour 
inside the village, they will employ outsiders. 
The harvest mostly depends on the climate and 
management. So there is great uncertainty among the 
villagers. "Ijiving off nature" is always the rule of 
agriculture. In October of 1993, I was staying in the 
village. It was raining everyday. The peasants worried 
very much about the harvest because before the harvest, the 
shaddock tree must not absorb too much water, or the fruit 
will become rotten. Everyday, they discussed their 
situation of shaddock tree. Each households had different 
extent of lost harvest. 
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The trading of Shatian shaddock is a face-to-face 
transaction process. The town merchants come to the 
village and directly collect the fruit from the peasants 
households for resale or export. After getting an 
agreement on price, the buyers pay i 舰 ediately and 
transport the shaddock away. If the villagers cannot sell 
out the fruit, they have to package the fruit with the 
plastic preserving bag and store it until they can get a 
good price. There is some variation in purchasing prices 
to the villagers. Uncle Si planted 30 trees. He sold 1.5 
yuaji per jin and earned 6,2 00 yuan this year. His 
productivity increased two times compared with 1993. Uncle 
Chang planted 40 trees, and he sold 1.56 yuan per jin and 
had 16,000 yuan income. Most households had 5,000 yuan to 
8,000 yuan income from shaddock. There were 10 households 
earning ten thousand yuan and six households earning twenty 
thousand yuan. Most villagers do not dare to risk storing 
the fruit until they can get a good price. Uncle Chang 
expressed his thinking: 
Villagers do not dare to take risks, as you know, 
we have worked hard for a year. Although the 
fruit has been collected, if the money is not in 
our pocket, we don't set our mind at rest. One 
time we stored the shaddock at home^ but my wife 
cannot get to sleep. But some villagers dare to 
store the shaddock and wait for the good price. 
In our village, someone sell 1.8-2,2 yuan per 
jin. In Chinese New Year^ they even sell 3.3 
yuan per jin. 
There are villagers collecting the shaddock from other 
households and directly trading to town and city. 
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According to the villagers, most shaddocks are re-sold and 
exported to Pearl River Delta, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, 
Guangzhou and Shantou. Some even export to Hong Kong and 
overseas. 
I describe the process because I want to point out 
that the local government lost its power as it cannot 
intervene in the production and trading process with the 
villagers. They also cannot influence the price of 
shaddock. They cannot act as the middlemen to dominate the 
market and countryside through wholesale activities. in 
other words, the government cannot influence the survival 
of peasant households. :Like the villagers, the village 
cadres plant their Shatian shaddock and trade their fruit 
directly with the buyers. The local government cannot 
monopolize the purchasing and distribution of agricultural 
commodities. Furthermore, they do not have the new 
responsibility to find market for the peasants' crops as Oi 
described. Their positions do not provide any advantage 
for the village cadres. 
D. The Other Income Sources 
After the decollectivization, in rural regions, the 
market once again became the most important trading 
institution. 10 This is what is usually called a periodic 
10. The local market can be defined as "an authorized public 
gathering of buyer and sellers of commodities meeting at an appointed 
place at regular intervals" (Chui, 1981). 
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market. The villagers of Ku Villagers visit the periodic 
market six times per month on 5th, 8th, I5th, I8th, 25th, 
28th. On the market day, I can find the undifferentiated 
role of the villagers. The producer, consumer and trader 
are usually the same persons in Ku Village. The villagers 
often sell their product such as vegetables, fruit, pork, 
and chicken in market. At the same time, they buy the 
daily necessities in the market. The villagers also engage 
in other part-time activities such as transport service. 
For example, Brother Xin often transports the goods for the 
villagers by his tractor between Songkou town and Ku 
Village. Some villagers also use their motorcycles to send 
the villagers to the town market because there is no public 
transportation in Ku Village. 
This kind of economy allows a rational division of 
time between production, trade and other activities in 
order to achieve a fuller employment of the most abundant 
resource ——labour. The surplus labours often find the job 
in Pearl River Delta. Ten percent of the young people 
leave the land and become workers in factories. 
The recurrence of the local market replaces the role 
of local government in distribution of local resources. 
There is no need for the villagers to establish good 
relations with local cadres and become clients to them. 
The job alternatives outside agriculture also release the 
villagers from over-dependency on land which may be the 
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only control mechanism of local cadres after the 
decollectivization. 
ni. Conclusion _ The Autonomous Peasant Households 
The transformation of economic structure of Ku Village 
has had a big impact on the life of the villagers. The 
household-based mode of production shapes the power 
relationship between the cadres and villagers. The cadres 
are no longer allocating work assignments, administering 
work points and regulating private plots. All these powers 
are transferred to the hand of peasants. The villagers 
once again control their own production process which 
erodes the power of village cadres to intervene in their 
everyday practice. But this does not means that the 
village cadres totally lose their power, because the formal 
ownership of the key means of production (land) is still in 
the hands of the production team and brigade. 
Unintendedly, the development of shaddock devalues the 
rice production as well as the cultivated land contracted 
out by government. The higher income of shaddock planting 
combined with the low profits and the high costs of grain 
production have resulted in a surplus of land (contracted 
land) in Ku Village. The purchasing price of grain is very 
low, only 28-30 yuan per 100 jin. Before 1992, the 
villagers had to meet the compulsory rice purchase quotas 
in grain. But in 1992, the Guangdong government abolished 
the tax paid in kind and allowed the peasants to meet the 
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compulsory rice purchase quotas in cash.- This policy 
releases peasants from the rice field and the peasants have 
more freedom to engage in other sideline and non-
agricultural activities. So in Ku Village, peasants want 
to dispose of or at least to decrease the amount of land 
they originally contracted for under the responsibility 
system. Some households like Uncle Si have transferred the 
contracted land to other households which have more labour 
power. After the transferring of land, the tax is paid by 
the new holder of the land. Now most peasants family plant 
the grain only for self-consumption. The surplus land is 
used to plant the shaddock tree. The devaluation of 
contracted land and the change of tax policy also erode the 
power of village cadres as they cannot control the land of 
peasants any more through the contracts. The village 
cadres still maintain the power in some rural regions of 
China because the rice production is still the dominant 
farm activity and the contracted land greatly influences 
the survival of the peasants. 
The introduction of the market also means the peasants 
can obtain their resource of production in the market, and 
not depend on the distribution of state. Small scale 
agricultural production, small scale ownership and small 
scale exchange are three characteristics of small peasants' 
n. Before the change of tax form, the grain is collected by grain 
bureau! Now the cash is collected by the tax bureau. The government 
intends to transfer market risk to peasants as government collecting 
the tax in kind has to bear the fluctuation of grain price in market. 
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economies. This vi* r^ ^ 汽 丄nis Kind of economy makes the peasants, 
household more independent and reduces the middlemen's 
services to a minimum as the peasants often can provide 
their own needs of adequately. The small scale and face-to-
face transactions of Shatian shaddock between the buyers 
and the individual households actually eliminate 
intermediaries and brokerage. At the same time, this type 
of face-to-face transaction also serves as a buffer to 
check the external impact which threatens to siphon off the 
economic surplus from the locale. In the face-to-face 
transactions, the price is negotiated between the producers 
and wholesalers. If the peasants feel the price is 
unreasonable, they can store their Shatian shaddock and 
wait for a higher price. Shatian shaddock is not a highly 
perishable fruit; it can store for 200 days. So the 
villagers need not sell their goods as quickly as possible 
if they have other sources of income such as some family 
members working in factories or engaging in other sideline 
activities. 
In short, the transformation of the local economy 
totally breaks down the patron-client bond between the 
village cadres and the villagers. The basis of cadres' 
power has been eliminated since they no longer control the 
local resource (especially the land), nor provide any 
assistance to the villagers. On the other hand, the 
peasants households have obtained their autonomy and 
independence in production and transaction. There is no 
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need for them to exchange their support and loyalty for 
more resources and benefits. So it is not surprising to 
find the erosion of the patron-client bond in Ku village. 
Furthermore, this chapter not only intends to explain 
why and how the peasants obtain their economic power, but 
also reflect that peasants are rational and self-
protective. The success of Shatian shaddock is not only 
the outcome of planned intervention of state policy 
implementation. if the shaddock planting does not bring 
benefit to the peasants, they will not accept the policy. 
In chapter six,工 will point out that the peasants are not 
passive and just acquiescent to the state policy imposed on 
them. If they feel the policy is unjust or harmful to 
their interest, they will adopt different kinds of 
strategies to fight that policy. They are rational and not 
"as timid as a sticker", as the cadres described. 
129 
Chapter Six 
Everyday Forms of Struggle in the Ku Village 
The peasantry has acted politically often 
enough as a class-like social entity. 
Importantly, also In the world of industrial 
societies It has shown as ability for cohesive 
political action. These were not only belated 
battles of a pre-capitalist type, for their 
common Interests have driven peasants Into 
political conflicts also with capitalist 
landowners, various groups of capital-related 
townsmen and with the modern state. 
T. Shanin, 1966 
In this chapter, I will depict the everyday forms of 
struggle between the rural cadres and villagers in Ku 
Village after the rural reform in the late 1970s. I 
attempt to argue that peasants are not as powerless as 
Marx states. In Marx's famous comment on the peasantry, he 
states: 
• • • .They [peasants] are consequently incapable of 
enforcing their class interest in their own name, 
whether through a parliament or through a 
convention. They cannot represent themselves^ 
they must be represented. Their representative 
must at the same time appear as their master^ as 
an authority over them, as an unlimited 
governmental power that protects them against the 
other classes and sends them rain and sunshine 
from above. The political influence of the 
smallholding peasants, therefore,, finds Its final 
expression in the executive power subordinating 
society to itself (Marx, 1987:302). 
In Marx's view, peasants are incapable of enforcing 
their class interest in their own name, and cannot 
represent themselves. They are powerless to organize 
themselves due to the household-based mode of production 
which constrains the small holding peasants to enter 
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manifold relations with one another. i basically do not 
agree with this comment on peasantry. No organization does 
not mean there is no resistance of the peasants. I do not 
think that only violence or revolution can be counted as 
"real resistance", and bring out the significant outcome. 
The fact in Ku Village proves that peasants, who employed 
the everyday forms of resistance such as foot dragging, 
desertion, false compliance, feigned ignorance, slander, 
sabotage and so on, are also capable to check the state 
policy and fight for those who seek to extract labour, 
food, taxes, rents and interest from them. They adopt the 
"everyday forms of resistance" because it is the most safe 
and significant way to fight for their own interest. 
Moreover, it is because the villagers do not intend to 
openly challenge the existing power arrangement. This kind 
of resistance requires little coordination or planning. It 
represents a form of individual self-help. This kind of 
resistance is not so strange to the Kus as they have become 
the way of peasants' life. As I have stated in Chapter 
Three, this form of resistance was prevalent in Ku Village 
in Mao's China. According to the data collected from Ku 
Village, I distinguish villagers' resistance into two 
types: defensive actions and offensive actions. 
However, I do not think that exercise of power is a 
zero-sum game that one gains the power means other will 
lose their power. Otherwise, I believe that the exercise 
of power is a "challenge-response" process. So in this 
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chapter, I will also adopt the concept of everyday struggle 
to study the action of village cadres.^ Facing the 
challenge of authority from the villager, they do not 
willingly and gladly surrender their power. They also try 
their best to keep their power. 
I. Everyday Forms of Resistance I - Defensive Action 
The defensive actions of the villagers often claim 
threatened rights which the villagers have already 
exercised routinely. When the villagers face injustice and 
unequal extraction and treatment from the government, they 
often adopt the defensive resistance which aims to defeat 
or minimize the direct appropriation. 
A. Resistance to Tax Collection 
In Ku Village, the villagers basically are willing to 
fulfil their responsibility of taxes and meet the 
compulsory rice purchasing quotas. According to the 
village cadres, almost all the villagers pay the compulsory 
rice quotas on time. However, the villagers cannot bear 
the extra extraction of tax from government. It is because 
the extra tax extraction of government has invaded their 
principle of justice and equity. In the events of tax 
As Scott states, "Everyday forms of resistance are, it should 
be clear, not a peasants' monopoly. Anyone who has analyzed the 
measures taken by landowners in the face of an announced land reform, 
to evade it application to their holdings by dispersing titles, bribing 
officials, or changing cropping patterns will recognize the pattern" 
(Scott, 1989:23). 
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resistance in Ku Village, I find that the villagers do not 
just struggle for the material interest, but also for moral 
concerns — justice and equity. The conflicts between 
village cadres and peasants are mainly due to their 
different understandings of property rights. 
In 1985, the campaign of "construction of socialist 
civilization" (Shehuizhuyi wenming jianshi) brought out by 
Chinese government to enhance the consciousness of "state" 
or "public" (gong)• Collecting the fee of contracted land 
was one of the ways to strengthen the awareness of state 
ownership of land. The local government planned to collect 
five dollars from each household. But the villagers of 
Xiaohuang refused to pay the fee because in their view, 
they had fulfilled their obligation in grain tax. It was 
unreasonable to collect contracted fee which was not 
collected at the beginning of "division of land to 
household". This dynamic of knowledge involves different 
concepts and interpretations of "people's obligation". 
There is a great contradiction of views toward the 
ownership of land between the villager and the state. The 
arable land theoretically remains under the ownership of 
the collectives and can only be parcelled out as use rights 
to villagers. To the villagers, the land distribution 
implied that they owned the land again. But in the view of 
government, the peasants only have the right to use the 
land, but not the ownership of the land. Chunsheng clearly 
explained to me the concept of "public" and "private" when 
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I asked her about the process implementation of 
responsibility system in Xiaohuang. 
"Dividing the land to households" (fentian daohu) 
does not imply the privatization of land. Most 
people misunderstand the concept of "public" 
工严 g^rj and "private" (shi) • Although the land is 
i〒二 1 加ted to individual households, the state 
still maintains the ownership of land. 
Due to these different views of land ownership, the 
villagers rejected the payment. But the local cadres 
cannot use coercion to collect the fee as almost all the 
villagers refused to pay. Taking the position as the 
middlemen between state and villagers, the village cadres 
faced pressure from two sides. To fulfil the task of the 
government, the village cadres had to find the eclectic 
solution. The village cadres used the collective fund to 
pay the fee for the villagers, then asked the households to 
sign their names on the list. In the end, the villagers 
pay the fee in name, the villagers' committee paid in 
reality. This event is hard to imagine in Mao's China.^ 
In Ku Village, I know there is another successful 
resistance of Kus to the tax collection on Shatian shaddock 
in 1985. Late October is the busy season of the villagers 
because they trade their shaddocks with shaddock buyers 
from town. In 1985, the villager cadres were also busy as 
2. According the officials of County Agricultural Committee; 
actually, they know that there are different strategies of the village 
organization. In Yangyan town, the house only paid three dollars, the 
other two dollars are paid by the town government. 
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they planned to collect the tax of shaddock. The 
provincial government planned to collect the tax from 
shaddocks as they thought the villagers had benefited in 
shaddock harvest. Uncle Chang and his wife recalled the 
collecting process. 
Chunsheng visited our home when we were trading 
the shaddock with the buyer. After we received 
the cash, Chunsheng said that she came to collect 
the tax of shaddock. She explained that it was 
the policy of upper government. She used many 
"sweet words" (huayuan qlaoyu) to persuade us to 
pay the tax. She acted like a beggar and asked 
us to cooperate with her. We assumed it was 
really the state policy and paid about one 
thousand yuan to her. But, afterward^ we found 
many villagers refused to pay the tax. We 
regretted paying the tax. 
According to my interviewees, there were different forms of 
reaction to the tax collection at that time. Some paid the 
tax like Uncle Chang's family unwillingly; others simply 
refused to pay the tax; some bargained the amount of tax 
with the village cadres； some said they would pay just 
after they verified it was really the state policy. 
Basically, there was a large proportion of villagers who 
refused to pay the taxes. Although there were varieties of 
reactions, there is a principled reason for resisting the 
tax -- injustice and inequity of the tax. 
In this event, a purely economic interest account of 
this resistance is inadequate. More important, there are 
inequities and injustice in this collection. The villagers 
thought that government did not provide any aid for them in 
the plantation of Shatian shaddock. The basic resource --
land -- is not provided by government. The cultivated land 
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is reclaimed by themselves. it is unreasonable to extract 
the tax from them. They often said: "Money is in our 
pocket, nobody can get it•“ 
According to Uncle Nianhua, the local cadres actually 
also did not agree to collect the tax because they thought 
that peasants had just obtained the profit, and collecting 
the tax would destroy their enthusiasm. Some villagers 
threaten to withdraw in shaddock planting. So some village 
cadres also did not put much effort into tax collection. 
They reflected the difficulty and problem to the 
government. In the end, the provincial government 
temporarily turned down the plan. But the collected money 
was not returned to the villagers. 
In these two cases, the peasants succeeded in checking 
the state tax collection as they shared common attitudes 
towards tax collection (even those who paid the tax)• 
Although there was no coordination and organization among 
the villagers, they individually practised the similar 
action. The tacit complicity in resistance with the 
individual strategies raised the political and 
administrative costs for the regime because the government 
had to appoint more enforcement personnel and expend more 
resources if it was determined to prosecute thousands of 
cases and raise the penalties for noncompliance. More 
important, the compulsory tax collection would destroy 
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villagers, enthusiasm in production which would influence 
the economy of Mei county. 
从 Resistance of Labour Extraction 
In Mao China, every year, the water conservancy 
project was coordinated by the brigade cadres and team 
leaders. Everyone had to contribute their labour to the 
collective without any excuse because all the labour 
belonged to collective. But after the decollectivization, 
no villagers voluntarily contributed their labour to 
irrigation work without payment. In Ku Village, I often 
heard the complaint from the village cadres that they could 
not mobilize the villagers to participate in the public 
irrigation program. They attributed this to the "small 
peasant mentality" of the villagers. As Chunsheng said: 
No money, no way! If you want them [villagers] 
to contribute their labour^ you have to pay for 
them. Voluntary labour is not a story nowadays. 
It is due to the "small peasant mentality "• 
The head of villagers' committee. Uncle Leng, also 
complained that: 
•••• today, our [villagers' committee] 
relationship with the villagers is based on cash. 
No cash, no discussion! Nobody listens to you. 
Why do the villagers resist participating in public 
work? In daily chatting with the villagers, they explained 
that it was because there was no need to organize the 
public work in Ku Village. After the land redistribution 
to the households, the household becomes the unit of 
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production and accounting. m Ku village, all the 
households are capable of organizing their production, 
including irrigation. Now all the households in the 
village have their own water pumps. They simply pump the 
water from the river to irrigate their field in the dry 
season. They think the village cadres organized the 
irrigation program just because they want to fulfil the 
task of government. Uncle Xiang said: 
ft is meaningless and unrealistic! We really 
^ve no need for the public irrigation program, 
situation of today is quite different from 
t ? collective era. All the land is divided. 
The organized water program just creates disputes 
among the villagers. 
• •• • all the villagers want to irrigate is their 
field first; all want to occupy the advantageous 
position in irrigation. We really don't want to 
conflict with others. 
Because it is functionally unnecessary, the Kus are not 
willing to participate in public work. 
Moreover, after decollectivization, the labour no 
longer belongs to collective. The government provides no 
more service and welfare to them, so they also will not 
contribute their labour to the public work. So they think 
it is reasonable to pay them if they contribute their 
labour to public work. They resist participating in public 
work without payment. 
To maintain the public irrigation program, a new form 
of "water-conservancy management responsibility systems" 
was introduced by the village organs to improve the 
irrigation system of Ku Village. Uncle Leng explained that: 
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conservancy project, we set 
take un th^^- t 删 yuan, whoever is willing to 
siTple^ gets the money. it is qlite 
So the villagers, committee contract out the water 
conservancy project once a year. Although not all the 
villagers have an interest in contracting the project, this 
responsibility system is the outcome of peasants' 
struggling. So we cannot deny that peasants are capable of 
changing their livelihood and reconstructing their 
relations with village cadres. 
C. Struggle for a Son 
While the rural reform in the late 1970s was 
introduced to stimulate economic growth, the one-child 
policy announced a month later was to slow down the 
population growth. The one-child policy encouraged all 
couples of the Han majority to limit their family to one 
child in order to ensure achievement of the national 
population size target of 1.2 billion in the year 2000.3 
The policy was strictly implemented in the early 
1980s. The systems of incentive (rewards) and disincentives 
3, The government advocated that the aim of the policy is 
to: "....improve the per capita availability of food, clothing, housing, 
health care, education, transportation, and consumer goods, to ease 
problems in employment, and to speed the pace of overall economic 
development" (Aird, 1982:287). 
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(penalties) were implemented in most provinces/ But 
beginning in the xnid-l980s, the policy's goals and means 
were relaxed and softened.5 In the provincial document of 
Guangdong, the number of conditions under which rural 
couples were allowed to have two children was increased in 
1984 and 1988. It was clearly stated that: 
！^ 二 二age the rural population to have one 
c^iid, the second child is allowed under the 
•/quotas and four year intervals. We 
strictly prohibit the third child and unplanned 
fertility and unmarried birth (Document, 
198 6) • 
So that by decade's end the majority of rural couples could 
have a second child. But in Ku Village, the goal of the 
government's birth control is not easy to achieve. Some 
new couples often have three or more children. It is 
because the dismantled rural socialist institutions have 
enhanced the fertility desires and undermined the cadres' 
power.e 
4. People having interest in the detail of one-child policy can 
read Banister, J. 1984. "Population Policy and Trends in China, 1978-
83". The China Quarterly, Vol.2:715-739; Banister, J. 1985. China's 
Changing Population. California: Stanford University Press; Aird, J.s. 
1982. "Population Studies and Population Policy in China". Population 
and Development Review, Vol 8:267-297; Goodstadt, L. F. 1982. "China's 
One-Child Family: Policy and Public Response". Population and 
Development Review Vol.8: 37-53. 
\ According to Greenhalgh, "in 1985 the leadership changed the 
national target for the year 2000 from 1,2 billion to about 1.2 
billion, officially interpreted as 1.25 billion. In late 1988 the 
minister in charge of the State Family Planning Commission announced 
that the population was likely to top 1.27 billion by century's end, 
possibly paving the way, politically, for another increase in the 
official target" (Greenhalgh, 1990:78). 
The scholars of China's population studies widely accept that 
the loss of control over rural society is triggered by economic 
reforms, which made it virtually impossible to enforce the birth 
control policy among the peasantry (Aird, 1982; Banister, 1984; 
Greenhalgh, 1990; Goodstadt, 1982). 
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in Ku Village, the task of birth control is mainly 
implemented by the women's representative. According to the 
women's representative, A Ling, there are 17 quota of 
fertility in Xiaohuang. The quota is distributed by the 
xiang government according to population of locality, she 
told me that basically Xiaohuang did not exced quota 
of fertility. That meant that they could fulfil the task 
me. government. She also explained her everyday task 
often have to visit the new and young couples 
in the village. If we find an illegal pregnancy, 
p/e will persuade them to terminate it. if the 
persuasion is not successful, we will fine them. 
But in general, we prefer to adopt the 
persuasion.， 
Banister summarizes the principal problems of birth control as following: 
"1) After instituting the contract system, the relationship between 
labour and income become even closer. Some of the people believe that 
"in order to get rich, one must have more boys"... 
2) Following the development of production, some of those who have 
obtained better income and wish to have more children pay no attention 
to the economic sanctions. They say, "We can afford the penalties. We 
can support the children. It is up to us how many we want.” 
3) The original regulations on rewards and punishments and the birth 
control measures have lost their restrictive power. A section of the 
cadres and backbone family planning workers is no longer able to 
receive subsidies for the farm work they miss. This affects their 
activism" (Banister, 1984:725). 
Ku Village shares the same problems as the other rural regions of 
China. The reconstruction of the local administrative institutions and 
the responsibility system have undermined the power of village cadres 
and enhanced the economic power and fertility desire of the villagers. 
7. However, as Aird states, the use of persuasion is often so 
aggressive "that it amounts to administrative harassment" (Aird, 
1982:284). Its methods include repeated visits by the cadres to have 
"heart-to-heart talks" (jiao xing) with reluctant couples, educating 
them about the need to control fertility, and mobilizing the women to 
have intrauterine rings inserted, to be sterilized, or to have an 
abortion. 
The methods of village cadres in implementation of population 
policy rang from strong persuasion to outright coercion. Although the 
Chinese government often emphasizes that the family planning is 
voluntary and suggests to use the public education, the coercion are 
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However, like other villages, the cadres in Xiaohuang 
also adopt the coercion in birth control because the 
persuasion has not been enough for them to fulfil the state 
policy. A Ling does not avoid to mention the use of 
coercion in Ku Village. she told me if the couple with 
unauthorized pregnancy or higher order birth did not pay 
the fine, they sometimes confiscated the property of that 
"illegal family", such as TV, furniture, bicycle and so on, 
until they paid the fine. The villagers in Ku Village are 
discontented with the coercive means of the village cadres. 
They told me that some cadres in other villages even 
destroyed the house of "illegal family". They said that 
the behaviour of village cadres was more abominable than 
Guomingdang (National Party) and bandits.« But ALing 
explained that they did not always employ the compulsory 
method because they also did not wish to hurt the human 
relationship (ganging) with the villagers. So they only 
often described explicitly in Chinese sources. Chinese government 
often refers the coercive practices as relying on ”administrative 
orders", resorting to "commandism," pursuing "indigenous policies", 
"overdoing things" and so on (Aird, 1982; Li, 1985; Hou, 1991) . This 
practices of coercion have aroused the attention of central government. 
As Aird quotes the Guanmlng rlbao of December 1978, "Some localities 
popularizing birth control have dispatched 'militia propaganda teams' 
to those households that did not practice birth control to 
'propagandize'[them] and exercise control over their food, drinking 
water, and work points. These local laws have caused great 
dissatisfaction among the people" (Arid, 1982:284). 
Although the central authorities have emphasized that persuasion 
will work if it is employed properly and warned that coercion in family 
planning matters must stop immediately, both the urban cadres and 
villager cadres continue to use the different kinds of coercive means 
(Aird, 1982; Banister, 1984; Greenhalgh, 1990; Ku, 1992). 
In the film and media of communist party, the government often 
propagated the dirty image of Guomingdang and bandit to the masses. So 
the Guomingdang and bandits only symbolize the evildoer and bastard. 
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adopted the coercive method in three "high tides" (gaochao) 
of family planning per year. 
The villagers have different strategies to resist the 
birth control of government. They think the simple way is 
to pay the flno. m Guangdong, the fine has become the 
only method of penalty in birth control. The problem with 
an economic penalty is that if the villager's economic 
power becomes strong, they can easily ignore the policy of 
birth control and pay no attention to the economic 
sanctions. The cash seems to legitimatize the unauthorized 
birth of the villager. Uncle Bi made fun of the policy 
and said: 
The policy tells us that 'best to have one, at 
most to have two, unplanned birth will be fined'. 
Ha! Ha! The government tells you that if you 
have money, you have more children. 
Desertion is also a significant strategy of the 
villagers to resist birth control. The village cadres 
cannot control the migration of villagers now because the 
villagers no longer need the certificate of permission from 
the village government to leave the village. Uncle Bi told 
me that women with unauthorized pregnancy often left the 
village and took cover at their relatives' home in other 
villages, other cities or other provinces. When the babies 
were born, the women came back to village. The villagers 
and the cadres called them "unplanned birth guerrilla 
9. I conducted the research about the local politics in population 
policy implementation in urban China in 1992. In the interview, the 
citizens in Shantou simply answered me that as they can afford the 
penalty, they could have as many children as they wanted. 
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force" (chaosi^eng tousheng youjiciui) . The village cadres 
Clearly understood this problem. A Ling told me the fine 
was difficult to collect, and the unplanned birth was also 
difficult to discover. 
二 /unplanned birth guerrillas] hide in 
nil'' v^ges or other places, you cannot catch 
二e二. We have much work to do. It is impossible 
to keep watch on them everyday.•• 
Sometimes, when they know that we have discovered 
？々ifx^  unauthorized pregnancies, they move away 
all the expensive things from their house. So we 
call take nothing from their house. 
In the interview in Chunshenghome, the village cadres 
showed their grievance and powerlessness in the task of 
birth control. Chunsheng complained that the family 
planning was an unpopular program. 
This [family planning] is a hard and thankless 
task. It often hurts the personal relationship 
(gan qing) between us and the villagers. Nobody 
[the upper government and villager] can 
understand the difficulties of the task. If we 
cannot fulfil the task, we have to pay a cash 
penalty from our own income.^^ Who wants to take 
this difficult and unpleasant work? 
The "cadres, job responsibility system" has also been 
introduced in the population policy implementation. The 
village cadres have to sign a contract with the government 
of higher level in order to guarantee the fulfilment of the 
target or quota of family planning. If the village cadres 
at different levels cannot fulfil the target, they will be 
punished. Actually, I do not know if this responsibility 
10. Uncle Si told me that Chunsheng told lies. He believed that 
nobody would take the post of village cadres if they had to pay a cash 
penalty from their own cash. 
144 
Everyday Forms of Struggle 
system is really carried out in practice. But when the 
local cadres are under direct administrative pressure from 
above to achieve quick results, they often adopt the 
coercive method because they have no other significant 
methods. So the peasants have little sympathy for the task 
run by village cadres because the village cadres in 
villagers, mind are not their protectors, but state agents 
who do not care about the interest of the villagers. Some 
also think that the cadres' work is irrelevant to them and 
some think the cadres who take the salary have to do the 
work. 
A purely economic interest account of the villagers, 
struggle for a son is inadequate.u Villagers resist the 
population policy because it contradicts the culture of the 
villagers. "Carrying on the family line" is always a major 
reason rural couples want sons in Ku Village. Uncle Xiang 
gave me the analogy that 
No matter how harsh the penalty, in the mind of 
"uncle peasants" (nongmin bobo), they always hope 
the key of their home can transfer to their sons • 
The daughter is the outsider^ we have no reason 
11. The scholars like Greenhalgh (1992) basically think that the 
economic institution and structure determine the fertility desire of 
the peasants. They think that under a collective economic regime, the 
advantages of children, especially the son, have become minimal because 
the function of children in traditional family were taken over by the 
team. In a traditional family, the important reason for desiring a son 
was to ensure economic support in old age. The sons were believed to 
have more economic benefits than the daughters as they latter will join 
their husbands‘ families at marriage. But in collective institutions, 
the collective guaranteed the basic livelihood of the old. The 
economic power of the daughter was equal to the son because they earned 
equal work points in collective. 
However, the "five guarantees" offered to the childless elderly 
was only at the merger level. These merger support told the fact that 
any rural resident wishing a decent level of living in old age had no 
choice but to have a son. 
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Sg^ir the key of my home to the outsider. All 
Another villager. Uncle Qiang, also expressed the same 
opinion. He said: 
土: not ours. At last, she has to 
sin T^^ ？产and • so everyone wants to have a 
Iunderstand why our government don^t 
^-Llow us to have a son. 
The villagers seem to be concerned with the reproduction of 
family rather than just the economic calculation. So if 
the villagers do not have a son, they will often give birth 
in excess of the plan. Brother Ming's wife, Liqing, told 
me that there was a family having their sixth child in 
order to have a son. Even the cadres, they also hope to 
have more children if possible. Liqing told me 
工，really understand the difficulty of the 
villagers. Taking the mind of the villagers 
(jiangxin bixin), although I am a cadre, I also 
think that one child [daughter] is not enough and 
safe, best to have two. 
Moreover, decollectivization increases the labour benefit 
of children, especially the son, because the relationship 
between labour and incoitie becomes even closer. In 
villagers' eye, the daughter is not the permanent labour in 
family. In contrast, the son is not only the permanent 
labour in family, he can also obtain another labour from 
his wife's family. The belief that "in order to get rich, 
one must have more boys" is prevalent in rural China. 
In sum, in the birth control process of rural China, 
we can see that policy implementation is a process of 
bargaining between the villager and states agent or 
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middleman charged with implementation and operating under 
considerable constraints. The bargaining between cadres 
and the villagers in the issue of birth control reveals the 
exercise of power in rural society. This bargaining not 
only reflects the pursuit of individual material interest, 
but also reflects the battle of knowledge in life-world. 
II. Everyday Forms of Resistance II - Offensive Action 
The villagers in Ku Village not just passively respond 
to the policy imposed by the government, they also take 
offensive action to protect their interest. They actively 
adopt the everyday forms of resistance to prevent further 
extraction from the state, and stop the cadres from 
resorting to coercion in policy implementation. They also 
compete for the goods and resources with the state. These 
actions often remain publicly invisible. 
A. Slander 
Slander is a popular means of resistance among 
villagers. When I talked with the villagers about their 
village cadres, they always gossiped that they were useless 
and were merely in name of cadres. They also belittled the 
importance of village cadres' task. I often heard the 
comment such that 
They have nothing to do J They only got the 
salary. We will not ask them for assistance• 
J don^t know what they have done. 
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Sa^T jobs are quite simple. Everyone can do 
In the quarrel between Uncle Xiang and Uncle Leng (head of 
villager�committee) , Uncle Xiang used the rude and 
blasphemous language to play down the role of Uncle Leng in 
Ku Village. He shouted: 
SWt/ Don't think you are terrific! You are just 
same as us• � 
^on^t be fierce! I am not afraid of you. Go! Ask 
Chunsheng to judge who is right and who is wrong. 
Village cadres^ shameless! 
When the village cadres could not solve the dispute 
among the villagers, the villagers would swear at the 
village cadres, saying that they did not fill the post with 
credit. They also made slanders about village cadres, 
which aimed to damage their reputation. Village cadres 
such as Chunsheng very much minded the blame and comments 
of the villagers. Chunsheng said: 
What we cannot tolerate is that our hard work has 
not been appreciated by the villagers but brings 
us a bad name. Do you know our job is just 
voluntary? They must understand that we are 
serving for them. We really cannot bear their 
blame and looking down！ 
Slander makes the village cadres not wantonly adopt the 
coercive method in implementation of state policy because 
they want to keep a good reputation. 
B, Sabotage 
Sabotage is another weapon the villagers employed to 
resist the cadres. If everyday resistance via slander is 
148 
Everyday Forms of Struggle 
the attempt to express the discontent of villagers toward 
their government, sabotage is a more defensive effort to 
fight against the state agent. Chunsheng told me that they 
did not dare to offend the villager today because the 
villager would destroy their fruit trees at mid-night. 
According to Chunsheng, there was a cadre (I do not know 
his name. He has resigned his post) whose shaddock tree 
was destroyed by someone. One morning, when he visited his 
shaddock tree, he found all the fruit of a tree were cut 
down by someone. But he did not know who cut down his 
fruit. 
Although this event does not often happen in Ku 
Village, the village cadres have drawn the lesson. So the 
village cadres told me that they avoid having any conflict 
with the villagers because they thought some villagers were 
"rude and uncivilized". This kind of resistance is 
significant as there is no organization to be banned, but 
only the generalized noncompliance by thousands of peasants 
in invisible corner. 
C. Feigned Ignorance and Underreporting 
Feigned ignorance and underreporting are other 
significant weapons of villagers to resist state 
extracting the surplus from rural society. As I stated in 
Chapter Five, the government had failed to collect the 
shaddock tax in 1985, but the government did not give up 




collection, the government ordered the local administrative 
organization to make statistics about the area and number 
Of the Shaddock tree in the villages. it was a hard work 
of the village cadres because they understood the 
difficulty and reaction of the villagers in last tax 
collection. But in this data collection, the village 
cadres failed to fulfil the task once again because the 
villagers adopted feigned ignorance as the strategy to 
resist the investigation. 
When I still stayed in the village, the data 
collection process was in progress. As I knew, when 
Chunsheng came to inquire the peasants household about 
their number of shaddock tree, the villagers often did not 
cooperate with her. Some refused to report the number, and 
some under-reported or misreported the number of trees. 
The defensive ones even verbally abused Chunsheng when she 
asked the villagers about their number of shaddock trees. 
Most of villagers feigned ignorance and tried to hide the 
truth by not answering questions clearly or completely. In 
the mind of villagers, they clearly knew of the aim of the 
statistics. More important, the villagers suspected that 
it was not the state policy but the wicked idea (gui zhuyi) 
of local cadres. After Chunsheng failed to fulfil the 
task, she under-reported and misreported the number of 
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shaddock trees of the peasants household in the reporting 
form. 12 
This event was told by Chongshen because he was very 
dissatisfied with Chunsheng, feeling that she shirked 
responsibility to him. When I last visited Chongshen one 
night, the deadline of the data collection was drawing 
near. He showed the report form to me and grumbled about 
many things: 
N，the villagers lack the concept of "public" • 
l^^yj^o anything for self interest. It is due 
� o the mentality of petty peasants' economy. It 
IS impossible to ask them to contribute some to 
the "public". 
An old woman (I do not know her) suddenly interrupted him: 
The villagers are poor. They have no money to 
pay for tax. 
Chongshen angrily said: 
No money? The average income of our village is 
above 1000 yuan. Today's peasants are rich, but 
the collective is poor! 
Then he ignored the old woman and continued to talk with 
me. 
I don^t know how to report the data. All the 
data she [Chunsheng] reported is false. It is 
impossible to report the data like that • How low 
her standard of education [wenhua shuiping]I I 
will not afford the responsibility, I will not 
change her handwriting! (He continued to 
grumble). 
I looked at the data in the report form. I found the data 
really was far from reality. As I knew, the village 
12. I agree with Scott that "under-reporting and other techniques 
were frequently encouraged by local team leader and cadres who had 
learned the bitter lesson of compliance with planned targets" (Scott, 
1 9 8 9 : 1 6 ) . 
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households planted at least more than 30 shaddock trees. 
But in the form, each household only reported five to 
twenty trees. Chongshen suddenly asked Uncle Si (who had 
come to visit Chongshen with me): 
Brother Si, how many trees do you own? I think 
really impossible only twenty. Don't tell 
the he in front of me 
Uncle Si just smiled and did not answer his question. 
Chongshen recognized the bitter lessons of misreporting in 
the Great Leap. But he said sometimes misreporting and 
underreporting was necessary in order not to damage the 
interest of the village. For example, last year, Xiaohuang 
Administrative District's average income was higher than 
Dahuang (another Administrative Village)• But because 
Dahuang was an important development district, in order not 
to compete with Dahuang, he deducted 200 yuan of 
Xiaohuangaverage income in the statistic report form. 
D. Poaching 
It is often reported by Chinese press that there is 
serious poaching in state's forest area. The government 
orders the concerned department to punish poachers 
severely. In Ku Village, poaching in state's forest area 
is also serious. As the wood can be sold a high price in 
market, the young villagers often fell the trees in back 
mountains of village. According to a young villager. 
Brother San, one cubic meter wood could sell about 300 
yuan. Each time, they could fell about three to four cubic 
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meter, and earned about one thousand yuan. As it is 
strictly prohibited by government, they usually take action 
at dusk and late at night. But actually, all the 
villagers, even the village cadres know they felling tree 
at the back mountain. 
It is very dangerous to cut down the so called state-
owned tree because the tree is very heavy and the hill is 
steep and precipitous. When I still stayed in the village. 
Brother San sustained a severe injury when carrying the 
tree down. 
One day late afternoon, the villager suddenly heard 
Brother San's cry. Then the news quickly spread out all 
the corner of Ku Village • When the villagers found him. 
He was in a state of unconsciousness because he had 
sustained an severe head injury. Brother Li quickly called 
a tractor from one village households. Some informed his 
family and carried the cotton blanket for Brother San. 
Some gave him some water. Many villagers came out to give 
a hand. Then several man carried him up to the tractor and 
sent him to the hospital in Songkou town. The villagers 
such Brother Li, Uncle Xiang, Uncle Qiang and so on took 
care for him in hospital over night on shift. When Brother 
San still stayed in hospital, the villager often visit him. 
Some gave him money, and some brought something to him. 
The solidarity among the villagers was shown in this 
accident. The villagers behaved no more selfishly. Most 
of them voluntarily assisted and supported Brother San and 
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his family after Brother San was hurt. This event also 
shows the solidarity among the villagers is not given and 
autonomous. It only manifests in a specific event and 
condition. More important, it reflects that poaching in 
villagers, mind is not a crime. They share the common view 
of property which conflicts with state's interpretation. 
It also explains the problems of enforcement of the state 
are due to tacit complicity, and occasionally active 
cooperation among the population from with the poacher 
comes. Several days after this accident happened, Uncle 
Jiang's wife told me that the cadres of Administrative 
District came to Ku Village to find out why Brother San was 
hurt, where he cut down the tree, what tree he felled. In 
the end, the cadres could not find the answer because the 
villagers feigned ignorance and said "I don't know! 
Moreover, in the conservation with the villagers, they 
actually did not think the forest was state's property. 
However, it was only part of natural resource and cutting 
down the tree was only part of their traditional practices. 
They often collected the firewood in the forest and felled 
the wood for building before the forest was defined as 
13. As Scott states, "Consider the difficulties that poachers would 
face if local residents were actively hostile to them and willing to 
give evidence in court. Poaching as a systematic pattern of 
reappropriation is simply unimaginable without a normative consensus 
that encourages it or, at a minimum, tolerates it. Otherwise it would 
be simple matter to apprehend offenders.... What is significant is that 
such coordination can typically be achieved through informal, rural 
networks and that when an "association" is formal its adherents have 
every reason - and often the means - to conceal its existence from the 
authorities the historians" (Scott, 1989:10). 
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state property. But now the state redefines the forest as 
government property and then imposes a whole series of 
regulations and officials to enforce them.i^ 
Uncle Leng, although in name the village head, in this 
event, I could not find his trace. He never played the 
role as a village leader. This event tells me why the 
villager often comment about them — "useless", "do 
nothing" and so on. 
After Brother San was hurt, I knew that Brother Xin 
also felled the tree at the late night with several young 
villagers. His activity was more tactical than Brother 
San's one. He rented a lorry to transport the wood to 
Songkou town. Before the action, they often scrutinized 
the time schedule of the forest guards. Their lorry passed 
the checking when there was a time gap between the shift. 
They could earn about 2,000 yuan each cart. They tried to 
avoid the notice and detection. Even if their vehicle was 
intercepted by forest guards, they also avoided direct 
confrontation with the guards. Brother Xin told me: 
When we are intercepted by the guards, we quickly 
pay the fine. Because after the fine is paid, 
they won't capture our vehicle. So we have 
another chance to earn more money. I know 
z 
In this event, I agree with E. P. Thompson (1991) and Scott 
that the most important fact about poaching is that: "The activity 
itself was part of the traditional subsistence routine of the rural 
population, an activity embedded in customary rights. Poaching as 
crime, therefore, entails less a change of behaviour than a shift in 
the law of property relations. Is the state and irs law which suddenly 
transform,s there subsistence routines into everyday forms of 
resistance" (Scott, 1989:9). Villagers practising their routine life 
now suddenly becomes committing to crime which Michel Foucault refer to 
as “state-created crime". So I would interpret poaching action of the 
villagers as rejection to state power. 
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somebody who hit guards has been put into prison. 
广产 to do that. A true man doesn't 
yanqiiftii) the worst of it (Haohan buchi 
m . Everyday Struggle of the Village Cadres 
In Mao,s China, village cadres derived their authority 
from their ability to intervene daily work and resource 
distribution. The introduction of responsibility system 
implies the withdrawal of the village cadres from daily 
control over the local economy. Their power relationship 
with the villagers not only changes in form, but in nature. 
The local cadres sense that their power is 
diminishing. They feel that they are betrayed by Deng and 
its party. In the interview, they recognized that they 
exercise far less power than village cadres of previous 
decades. The former cadre, Uncle Nianhua, resigned in 1992 
because he felt the local cadres had lost their authority 
to manage the affairs of village and implement the state 
policy. He said: 
Since after the land redistribution to the 
household^ every household does the work by 
themselves. The villagers no more need the 
assistance of us [cadres], and we have no more 
resources and opportunity to control them 
[villagers]. Apart from the disputes between 
them, they will not want to see us. I felt I am 
useless to stay at the post. So I resigned. 
Chunsheng was also full of grievance. She complained that: 
Our authority cannot be compared with before. In 
the collective era, the villagers were more 
obedient because they depended on us for many 
things such as the problem of feeding. Now the 
peasants household do the work individually. 
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二 sical^y they don't need the assistance of 
us So they don't obey our orders • 
The local cadres not only lost its power to intervene 
the daily production of the peasants, but also lost its 
capability to mobilize the villager to participate into the 
public affair such as road construction, irrigation work 
and so on. 
However, the cadres still have a certain measure of 
power over the peasant. ^^ Two events happened in Ku 
Village support this opinion. The first event happened 
when I visited the brigade accountant Chongshen's home to 
make a interview. While I was interviewing Chongshen and 
he was expressing his discontent, a man, about 35 years 
old, interrupt our dialogue. Chongshen unwillingly and 
asked the villager why he visited him. The villager said 
he want Chongshen to seal the letter which he wrote to 
apply for going to Hong Kong to visit his relatives. 
Chongshen asked him to show the application letter to him. 
The man seemed to be unwilling to show the content to 
Chongshen. He tried to cover the content up and just asked 
him to seal the chop on the blank. Chongshen was very 
angry and refused to seal the chop. 
Don,t cover the letter up! 1 really don^t want 
to know anything happened In your family! You 
15. As I have stated, power is not a zero-sum game that one gains 
the power means other will lost their power. As Oi and Nee's 
argument, the local cadres still maintain their structural advantage to 
control local resource especially after the fiscal reform (Oi, 1992; 
Nee, 1991b & 1992). But I do not intend to exaggerate the power of the 
village cadres like them because the empirical data really do not tell 
me so. The village cadres still maintain limit capability to control 




not coine to visit me ！ I don't want to 
J<^now your secret! 
The man hurried to explain: 
No! Don't say so! I have nothing to mean I don't 
卵n巧 you to know what happen. My wife wants to 
apply for going to Hong Kong to visit her sick 
aunt.. • 
Chongshen was still angry and stopped the man, 
Don,t tell me what happened of your wife! 工 
really don't want to know! But if I know 
nothing, I will not seal the chop for you. 
The man continue to explain and passed the letter to Chongshen. 
工 have nothing to mean that. But the Public 
Security Bureaus (gongan ju) in township told me 
that the letter must be sealed by Administrative 
District. 
Chongshen got the letter and read the content once. He 
shook his head and said: 
Your letter is not clear. I really don't 
understand what you say. Write the application 
letter again. If the letter is not clear^ I will 
not seal for you. 
The man seemed to be at a loss of what to do. He pleaded 
with Chongshen to write the letter for him. Chongshen 
refused at once without any consideration. But Chongshen 
then taught the man to write a good application letter. 
You must write who your are, why you want to go 
to Hong Kong, what is the relationship between 
your Hong Kong relatives and your wife. Write 
clearly and come to see me again. 
The man got back the letter and went away. Although the 
"chop power" no more influences the important aspects (eg. 
survival) of peasant life, the village cadres can make 
things difficult for the villagers. If the villagers want 
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to make thing easy, exchanging the gift with village cadres 
or keep good relationship with village cadres become 
necessary. The second event continues to illustrate and 
elaborate the "chop power" of the villager cadres. 
The second event was recalled by Uncle Si,s wife. In 
1992, the Administrative District planned to collect 20 
yuan per person from individual households for the road 
paving. To the villagers, 2 0 yuan was not too much today. 
Because paving road was also benefit them, most of 
villagers were willing to pay. But some villagers refused 
to pay the fund because they thought paving road was the 
responsibility of government. The "chop power" made 
village cadres in the end successfully collect all the road 
paving fees. Uncle Si's son, Huangitiao, works in the 
foreign invested factory in Dangshui (one of the towns in 
Pearl River Delta) • Before he went to work in Dangshui, he 
had to get the certificate of unmarried status for family 
planning purpose of government. The cadres told him that 
if his family did not pay the fees, they would not seal the 
certificate for him. They also informed the family with 
school children that if they did not pay the fee, their 
children would not be allowed to attend school in the new 
term. Their children had to carry the receipt of road 
paving fee to register in new term. 
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People may ask why the Administrative District 
succeeded in collecting the road fees but failed to collect 
the land contract fee and tax of Shatian shaddock. in my 
opinion, the administrative district succeeded in 
collecting the road paving fee because only a small number 
of villagers refused to pay the fee. So the village cadres 
found it possible to use different strategies to control 
the villagers who resisted to them. But in the event of 
tax collection of Shatian shaddock and land contracted fee, 
although the villagers did not consciously organize 
themselves to fight against the injustice policy of 
government, they shared similar views of land property 
rights and taxes of land. The village cadres are 
impossible to adopt the above strategies to control the 
village as not all family have schooling children and not 
all the families have members working outside. So the 
significance of "chop power" is low. When the solidarity 
among the village came out, even unconsciously, the "chop 
power" lost its capability. 
In the conversation with the cadres, I felt that they 
were keen to continue to put most of their effort into 
ensuring that they still resigned supreme in all aspects of 
the village public affairs. So for strengthening the 
collective economic power, according to Uncle Leng, the 
administrative district planned to establish a cement 
factory because the village cadres believed that the 
factory could enhance the income of collective. "Money is 
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power" became their belief. He explained that the village 
cadres in Pearl River Delta obtained their power to control 
the villagers because they owned many enterprises and 
industries. If the collective was rich, it could afford to 
funci different construction projects and provide welfare 
service. But the project of cement factory was turned down 
in the end because they lack the funds. 
V. Conclusion 
The class relation analysts often claim the everyday 
form resistance, which is largely taken-for-granted, as a 
marginal one because they are 
1) unorganized^ unsystematic^ and individual^ 2) 
opportunistic and self-indulgent^ 3) have no 
revolutionary consequences^ and/or 4) imply in 
their intention or logic an accommodation with 
the structure of domination. An argument along 
these lines necessarily implies that "real 
resistance" is organized^ principled, and has 
revolutionary implication (Scott, 1989:21-22). 
This elitist version of resistance will limit our 
understanding on the political action of underclass, 
peasantry and subordinated group. They often assume the 
peasants and even proletarians who participate in 
revolutionary movement are aiming at revolutionary 
objective. Actually, the rank-and-file actors are rarely 
have revolutionary aims like the revolutionary elites. The 
slogans or targets of revolution advocated by the elites 
are often reinterpreted and reconstructed by the rank-and-
file actor according to their own interest. 
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The peasants have their own dynamic and logic of 
political action. It is certainly true that peasants 
rarely intend to make a revolution, and their actions do 
not openly challenge existing power arrangement. They try 
to avoid open confrontation and accommodate with existing 
power relations because open revolution or riots often have 
to pay a large cost. Chinese history tells us that Chinese 
peasants do not commit violence until the powerful threaten 
their subsistence. As Scott state, 
More than one peasantry has been reduced brutally 
from open, organized, radical activity at one 
moment to sporadic acts of petty resistance at 
the next • What has changed in such cases is 
typically not the aim of the peasantry but the 
effectiveness of domination (Scott, 1989:22). 
The land dispute in Huiyan of Guangdong basically supports 
this argument. On 1st April of 1994, there were several 
hundreds villagers surrounding the village organs in name 
of anti-corruption. As a result, more than ten villagers 
were shot by the police and six villagers were arrested 
(Dongfang Daily, 2nd April, 1994) 
So the individual action of everyday resistance is not 
unreasonable. The individual action is not to say that 
these actions lack coordination. There is a variety of 
individual practice with unity of understanding and 
ideology. They cooperate in the form of silence 
16. The village organs got back the contracted land from the 
villagers and sold the land to the foreign investor. The villager were 
only pay 200 yuan in the important festivals. The villager doubted the 
huge sum were misappropriated by village cadres. In September of 1993, 
one villager organized the mass anti-corruption movement • In the end, 
the villager and his family members were arrested. This arouse the 
discontent of villagers, so they organized another movement this year. 
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surrounding "thefts" from the village cadres. No formal 
organization is created because none is required. The 
everyday forms of resistance are adequate for them to 
protect their interest and check the unjust extractions 
from government. So peasants are not powerless, irrational 
or passive as we thought. 
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Conclusion — From Socialist Clientelism to Household 
Individualism 
^fow do I know that you exist, and. If you do, 
•how do I know that my concept represents your 
real existence? 
E.P, Thompson. 1979 
This research is about the impact of rural reform in 
post-Mao China on the village politics. The powerlessness 
of village cadres, an atomistic rural community, and the 
erosion of patron-client bonds between village cadres and 
peasants are the three principal features of Ku Village. 
Because of this, I conclude that the socialist clientelism 
no longer exists in Ku Village, instead, household 
individualism is the dominant feature in the village. The 
economic and political power among the villagers is 
relatively equal. No new patron has emerged in the 
village. The peasants households are independent of 
village organs or cadres. They carry out their day-to-day 
production individually. They also respond to state 
intervention with the everyday forms of resistance in order 
to protect their interest. To spell out the 
distinctiveness of village politics in Ku Village, this 
chapter will lay bare its salient features and conditions 
which underlie their emergence. 
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I. The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds 
Ku Village under Mao shared the similar village 
politics with other rural regions. Socialist clientelism 
best describes the power relationship in Ku Village in 
Mao,s China. After coming to power in 1949, the Chinese 
Communist Party moved toward complete centralization of the 
economy in an attempt to achieve a high capital 
accumulation. For this purpose, in the 1950s the state 
monopolized the grain distribution, created the system of 
grain rationing, and introduced the people's agriculture 
commune to the village. The villagers had better 
guarantees for subsistence, but at the cost social and 
economic dependence on their assigned production team, and 
their collective production unit, and personal dependence 
on their team leaders for their income as well as other 
resource. The closure of markets and lack of available 
alternatives thus made the peasants participate in the 
collective production, and thus increased the need for 
villagers to cultivate the favour of villagers who 
controlled the resource distribution. The village cadres 
exchanged the resources to villagers for their loyalty and 
support. 
This forms the patron-client bond between the peasants 
and village cadres. However, this patron-client bond is 
unstable in Ku Village. Unlike the traditional patrons, 
the village cadres have reliable or sustained outside 
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backing of state instead of dependence on the village. 
They derive authority from their ability to influence the 
distribution of rewards in collective production. As the 
village cadres' base of power are dependent on outside 
backing by police, courts or military to guarantee their 
domination of local resources, but not their wealth, their 
contribution to public affair, their giving personal loans 
and donations and so forth, the relative power of the 
village cadres is vastly inflated. Their need for clients 
is reduced and the incentive to serve the community by 
protecting the local interest against the state is broken. 
In implementation of state policy, they usually stand on 
the side of state as their authority is appointed from 
outside and paid from above. So in the socialist 
clientelism, there is a lack of balance of exchange in 
patron-client relations. The patron is in a more 
commanding position and the clients depend more on the 
patron. However, this kind of social clientelist 
relationship is easily broken down when the patrons lost 
their support from the outside. They lost their base of 
authority after the retreat of state's support. The reform 
in the late 1970s inevitably eroded the power base of 
patron and broke down the patron-client tie in Ku Village. 
The following figure suitiinarizes the conditions why and how 
the patron-client bond break in Ku Village. 
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vil^age^^^' Structural Change and the Break of Patron-Client Exchange in Ku 
Nature of Change Effect on Patron-Client Relation 
• S ^ s t r a t t v ^ ~ v i l l a g e cadres lost their outside 
administrative organization support from state 
B* division^nf^?^ ，ystem and village cadres lost the key basic of diviLSion of land patronage that control the resource 
distribution and job opportunity 
1) monetization of taxation releases the peasants from the land 
and engages into other activities; 
peasants no more depend on the rice 
land for taxation which weaken the 
patron power 
C. Commercialization of 
production 
1) cash crop plantation village cadres lost the remained 
basic of patronage that control of 
rice land; cadres's position weaken in 
dealing with peasants who do not 
depend on rice land for subsistence 
2) abundant supply of unclaimed land is no more scarcity and 
villagers no land longer depend on the 
cadres for obtaining the very mean of 
production (land)； village cadres' 
position weakened because of decreasing 
peasants seeking access to rice land 
3) face-to-face transaction village cadres' position weaken as they 
cannot interfere in the face-to-face 
trading process 
4) opening the local market villagers' position strengthen as they 
no need to depend on cadres for 
production resource 
D. Available job opportunity villagers' position strengthen as 
they can release from the land control 
of the cadres 
E. Overseas villager factor villagers' position strengthen as they 
no more depend on village cadres for 
credit and financial assistance 
In Ku Village, the paralysis of the village organ 
becomes the striking feature. The reconstruction of local 
administrative organization breaks the outside support of 
the village cadres. Although the village organs still 
represent the state and implement the state policy in the 
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village, they can only obtain minimal support from the 
government (mainly financial support)• The fiscal autonomy 
of village organs only eroded their power because the 
village organs were incapable of fulfilling the function of 
local patrons who have the obligation of providing the 
welfare service and so forth to the villagers. Lack of 
village enterprise and industry, the village organs can 
only rely exclusively on agriculture. They are left with 
few income sources because they get neither a share of 
agricultural tax nor the profit from peasant sales of grain 
to state as both go to the central state. The introduction 
of the responsibility system and the division of land in Ku 
Village simply destroyed the power of village cadres who 
directly interfered into the daily life of peasants and 
controlled the life chance of peasants in the collective 
era. The Kus were independent in production and no longer 
dependent on the village cadres for more resource 
distribution, which also meant that there was no need for 
the villagers to exchange their loyalty and support with 
the cadres. 
The most important factor to influence the integration 
of village cadres and peasants is the commercialization of 
local economy. The shaddock plantation totally destroyed 
the patron-client bond between the village cadres and 
villager because almost all of the shaddock fields are 
claimed by the peasant households. To the Kus, the rice 
land becomes less important. As a result, the village 
168 
Conclusion 
cadres lose their last controlled mechanism of contracting 
out the rice land. The monetization of taxation further 
releases the peasants from the land and encourages them to 
engage into other activities because peasants no longer 
depend on the rice land, which are still controlled by 
village cadres for taxation. The face-to-face transaction 
process between the villagers and traders also prevented 
the intervention of the local cadres. Whoever has the 
capability to control the trading process can become the 
new patron and maintain a dependent relationship. It is 
the unintended consequence of the state policy which 
promotes peasants' autonomy in production and enhances 
their economic power; on the other hand, it erodes village 
cadres' ability to extract and allocate the agricultural 
profits, and the mainstay of village income. 
The opening of markets, available job opportunities 
and the overseas villagers factor^ also enhance the 
peasants power and make the peasants no more depend on the 
village cadres. 
For the client, the basic purpose of the patron-client 
relation is the provision of basic social guarantees of 
subsistence and security. After the economic reforms, the 
z 
village organs in Ku Village no longer serve these 
functions; instead, the individual household becomes the 
unit of subsistence and security provision. So the patron-
1. I guess it is also a factor to decrease the dependence of the 
villager on the village cadres. But the limit of empirical data 
prevents me from extending this point. 
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client relation between villager cadres and peasants does 
not need to be maintained. 
Now the remaining functions of village cadres are to 
implement the state policy and collect the taxes. 
Actually, the village cadres have no great difference to 
the villagers. They also plant in their own field and pay 
the tax. Their position in village organs provides no more 
advantages for them. Lacking of control mechanisms, they 
find it difficult to implement the state policy. The 
direct impact of the erosion of patron-client bond is the 
powerlessness of the village cadres in policy 
implementation. 
n. Household Individualism - an Atomistic Community 
The erosion of old patron-client relationship does not 
imply the emergence of new patron in the village. In Ku 
Village, there are not any new organizations such as 
kinship, religion and so on to replace the functions of 
brigades or production teams. There are not any households 
or local elites to control the very local resources (land) 
or provide service and protection to the villagers. It is 
an atomistic community. It is a community without patrons. 
It is a classless village. It is a village with economic 
and political equality. The households in village do not 
mutually intervene each other. So household individualism 
best describes the phenomena of Ku Village. 
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From an economic perspective, household individualism 
reflects the recurrence of small peasants economy. The 
small scale exchange, small scale agricultural production 
and small-scale ownership make the individual production 
possible. The peasants are self-reliant in production and 
transaction. They own their means of production. They 
reclaim the land for shaddock plantation. They obtain 
other resources through market. The face-to-face 
transactions are managed by the individual households. So 
there is no functional necessity for them to cooperate in 
daily practice because the individual households continue 
to be adequate production units which are capable of 
handling the full cycle of agricultural production. Even 
when they have, the cooperation is temporary and informal. 
From a political perspective, household individualism 
reflects in the everyday forms of resistance which require 
little or no organized and planning in resistance. They 
also respond individually to the extraction of government 
with everyday forms of resistance. Peasants prefer 
individual action and make their resistance to a minimal 
disadvantage. So it is difficult to find collective 
resistance in the rural society like Ku Village. The 
individual household becomes the unit of political action. 
I will discuss this in more detail in the following 
section. 




1) The household is a political and economic unit; 
2) The peasants depend on their households for subsistence 
and security; 
3) The peasants are likely to prefer individual household 
production over cooperative form of production if there is 
no need to cooperate with other peasants; 
4) The peasants are likely to adopt everyday forms of 
resistance to fight injustice and unequal state policies 
which threaten their household interest. 
m . Everyday Forms of Resistance as the Way of Peasant Life 
Evidence from Ku Village tells us that everyday forms 
of resistance are significant for peasants to protect their 
own interest. They do not intend to afford the luxury of 
open, organized, political activity. It is because of 
institutional constraints. More important, the villagers 
are far less interested in changing the larger structures 
of the state and the law. They often express that they are 
satisfied with their life and appreciate Deng's rural 
reform. In addition, formal, organized political activity 
is not their aim. Otherwise, they prefer the sporadic, 
unorganized, individual, but constant struggle against 
those who seek to extract taxes, rent and interest. As 
Scott often states, the peasants require little or no co-
ordination or planning in resistance. Their resistance 
represents a form of individual self-help, and they try to 
avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority 
172 
Conclusion 
(Scott, 1985, 1989). To the villagers, such kinds of 
resistance are often the most significant and the most 
effective over the long run. 
Although in Mao's China the extent of institutional 
constraint is larger than in post-Mao China, they 
constantly employ the everyday resistance as their weapon 
to protect their self-interest. This form of resistance 
has become the way of peasant life or peasants, political 
culture. They practice this resistance everyday, 
consciously or unconsciously. No matter under what kind of 
institution, this kind of resistance is the most safe. 
They do not need to plan, organize and mobilize the other 
villagers because they lack these techniques. Their 
consensus and solidarity is shared by the villagers. They 
cooperate with others in the form of silence, cheating, 
feigned ignorance, hiding the facts and so forth, which 
protect the resisters from the cadres. 
The evidence of Ku Village not only proves that the 
everyday forms of resistance are significant to the 
villager, but also reveals that the peasants are not so 
powerless as we thought. Although I do not intend to 
reject the version of "real resistance" which is organized, 
z 
principled, and has revolutionary implications, I think 
that this elitist version of resistance will limit our 
understanding of the political action of the underclass, 
peasants and subordinated groups. Actually, they rarely 
have revolutionary aims like the revolutionary elites. The 
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slogans or targets of revolution advocated by the elites 
are not necessary representing the goals and interests of 
peasants. it is unfair to judge the political action of 
peasants based on elitist perceptions. 
The peasants have their own dynamic and logic of 
political action. So the individual action of everyday 
resistance is not unreasonable. The individual action of 
different persons is not to say that these actions lack 
coordination. There are varieties of individual practice 
with unity of understanding and ideology. No formal 
organizations are created because none are required. 
IV. Rethinking Village Politics in Dengist China 
Although my finding is different from some other 
scholars' (eg. Oi and Nee) conclusion about the local 
politics in post-Mao's China, I do not intend to refute 
their argument and generalize that all the village politics 
as my case. If I intend to do so, I also make the mistake 
like "a blind person touching the elephant" that thinking 
whole reality just like the part I touched. The rural 
situation in post-Mao China was more complex than Mao's 
China. In Mao's China, the village politics were in a more 
uniform pattern as the political and economic situation in 
different villages were almost the same. All the peasants 
became members of the collective. Participation in 
collective labour became the only means of obtaining 
subsistence. The collective mode of production combining 
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with the closure of markets and other available 
alternatives created the similar political and economic 
structure in rural China. The villages basically shared 
similar politics in Mao's China. After the political and 
economic reforms of rural China, there are variations 
between different villages because different economic 
development strategies are permitted. It is undoubted that 
we can find different kinds of politics in villages. So 
clientelism no longer can generalize the village politics 
in post-Mao China. Oi's finding only reflects the partial 
political reality in rural China that the local cadres 
still maintain their power as they continue to maintain the 
basis of patronage through rural industrialization and 
enterprization. The rural industries and enterprises 
become the new power source of the local cadres who control 
the contract of enterprises, bank credit, social welfare 
and so forth. My case reflects another type of village 
politics that the local cadres lost their status of 
patrons. Obviously, the economy structure of Ku Village is 
quite different from Nee and Oi's description of rural 
society. There is not any enterprise and industry in Ku 
Village, where farming is the predominant occupation. The 
economic and political power among the villagers is 
relatively equal. No new patron has emerged in the 




From this research' I suggest adopting a broader view 
of power when we study the village politics. Most scholars 
such as Oi, Nee and so forth often reduce the power 
relationship to a narrow "material nexus". i think that 
power is not only defined as control over resources, and it 
cannot be satisfactorily understood in terms of formal 
structures of authority. Power is not simply something 
that is unquestioned possessed, accumulated and given. It 
emerges out of processes of social interaction. Someone's 
having power does not entail that others are without. The 
cadres in a village maintaining their authority does not 
mean that peasants cannot obtain their power. Simply 
speaking, authority is legally defined but power is 
socially defined. Power is the exercise of constraints and 
compulsion against the will of an individual and groups. 
The exercise of power is grounded in the challenge-response 
mechanism of class conflict. The zero-sum thinking of 
power is thus misplaced. 
Additionally, I want to re-emphasize the essence of 
acto-orient approach in social research, which emphasizes 
to locating individuals in the specific life-worlds in 
which they manage their everyday affairs and recognize that 
individual and social groups are "knowledgable" and 
"capable". The actors devise ways of solving problematic 
situations and actively engage in constructing their own 
social world. My case seems to confirm the assumption of 




powerless to influence policy making and implementation, 
but actively engage in the construction of their own social 
worlds and livelihood. They fight unjust intervention and 
policies of government with different kinds of strategies. 
Behind their resistance, the peasants have their moral 
concern and judgement. 
Moreover, I suggest to bring the analysis into a 
specific local context; if not, the research will become 
too general, common sense, and unspecific. Different 
political and economic structures, and culture nexus may 
create the chemical causation. Different cases may have 
different conjunctural causality in the village politics. 
So it is undoubted that my case is so contradictory to Oi's 
finding. I think we must recognize the multiple realities 
and diverse social practices of various actors. The most 
important thing for us is to explain why the diversity and 
variation between different places. 
Finally, I want to point out the limitation of current 
Chinese studies. Most scholars of village politics collect 
their data mainly through interviews with the officials at 
the county, township, and village levels and so forth. The 
biggest problem is that this data collection method will 
hide the role and voice of underclass, subordinate groups 
and peasantry. The "power" is also possessed and regarded 
as top to down exertion. In this analysis, the underclass 
or peasantry become powerless. So I suggest bringing the 
peasants into the political analysis and taking their 
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everyday practice seriously. For this purpose, we have to 
stay at the field for a relatively longer period as a 
participant observer. If not, we will miss the important 
aspect of the village politics — power of the powerless. 
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1. A Ling - female, about 35 years old, women 
representative in Xiaohuang 
2. Baba - villager, female, about 60 year old 
3. Brother Ming - about 40 years old, former vice-party 
secretary of brigade of Xiaohuang 
4. Brother Li - villager, about 25 years old, now works in 
the factory of Shenzhen 
5. Brother Xin - villager, about 21 years old 
6. Brother San - villager, about 20 years old 
7. Chongshen - about 50 years old, present accountant of Xiaohuang 
8. Chunsheng - female, about 50 years old, the party 
secretary of Xiaohuang production brigade and 
administrative district 
9. Granduncle WenDe - villager, about 75 years old 
10.Huangmao - male, villager, about 25 years old, works in 
factory of Dongguan 
11.Liqing - Brother Ming's wife, former villager, present 
cadres in Mei county 
12. Secretary Li - about 65 years old, former vice-chairman 
of Agriculture Committee of Mei County 
13.Sister Ling - villager, about 30 years old 
14.Uncle Bi 一 about 70 years old, former brigade leader 
16.Uncle Chang 一 villager, about 50 years old 
17.Uncle Chang's wife - villager, about 45 years old 
18.Uncle Bing - villager, about 60 years old, now lives in 
Songkou town 
19.Uncle Jiang - villager, about 50 years old 
20.Uncle Leng - about 55 year old, village head 
21.Uncle Nianhua - about 55 years old, former brigade 
leader in Xiaohuang 
22.Uncle Qiang — villager about 55 years old 
2 3.Uncle Si - villager, about 70 years old 
24.Uncle Wu 一 villager, about 65 years old 
25.Uncle Xiang - about 50 years old, principal of Songxi 
primary school in Ku Village 
\ 
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A p p e n d i j c B . G l o s s a r y 
baochan daozu, Hanchan Jichou 包產到組，聯產計酬’ poduction contracted to 
groups, compensation linked to output 
paochan daohu 包產到戶，production contracted to households 
baogan daohu 包幹到戶’ tasks contracted to household 
c^osheng tousheng youjidui 超生偷生游擊隊’ unplanned birth guerrilla force 
chi guojia fan 吃國家飯，ate state rice 
chi jiti fan 吃集體飯，ate collective rice 
chongyang 重陽，festival of Chinese 
cun 村，village 
cunweihui 村委會，villager's committee 
cunxiaozu 村小組，village samll groups 
da dizu 大地主，big landlord 
da h u大戶， big planting household 
dang 黨，the party 
dabao gan 大包幹,big contracting of production 
dangzhi bu 黨支吾|5， party branch committee 
dingchan 定產,unified production quota 
difang ganbu 地方幹部，local cadres 
dui Han 丟臉，losing face 
fenshui xian 分數線，score line 
fengshui 風水，geomantic omen 
fentian daohu 分田到戶，divide the land to the households 
gaochao 高潮，high tides 
gaohao guanxi 搞好關係，keep good relationship 
gaojia shu 高價書，high price education 
ge zibenzhuyi weiba 害(I資本主義尾巴，cut the tail of capitalism 
gong 公，public 
gongfen 工分，work points 
gongan ju 公安局，Public Security Bureaus 
guanliqu WJllM, administrative region or administrative district 
guanxi RIf系，personal networks 
guanyin temple 觀音廟，temple of Chinese God-
gui zhuyi 鬼主意，wicked idea 
guojia 國家，the state 
guojia ganbu 國家幹音P, state cadres 
Guomingdang 國民黨，National Party 
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han di 旱地，dry land 
Hang Jiang 韓江’ the main river in Guangdong 
haohan buchi yanqian kui 好漢不吃眼前膚亏，true man don't immediately get the 
hei wulei 黑五類二black five categories 
huayan qiaoyu 花言巧語，sweet words 
worst of it 
Jiao 角，unit of money 
jiaoyu Hang 教育糧，education grain 
jiangxin bixin 將心比心，taking the mind of the others 
jiu shehui 舊社會，old society 
jinguang dadao 金光大道’ golden road 
j让en kouliang 基本口糧，minimum amount of grain as a basic ration 
Jinshi 進士，successful candidate in the highest imperial examination 
J'ingji guanli weiyuanhui 經濟管理委員會’ economic management committee 
kaihuang zhongguo 開荒種果，opening out the wasteland and planting fruit tree 
kunnan hu 困難戶，economically distressed household 
llanchan daohu 聯產到戶 linking output to the household 
mu I久，unit of area 
nongmang 農忙busy season 
nongmin bobo 農民伯伯，Uncle Peasants 
nongxian 農閒，slack season 
qunzhong pidou dahui 群眾批鬥大會，mass struggle meeting 
pinkun shanqu 貧困山區，poor mountain region 
renzhi changqing 人之常'M， the way of the world 
shui tian 水田，wet field 
shehui zhuyi wenming Jianshi 社會主義文明建設，construction of socialist 
civilization 
si 私’ private 
toupo xueliu 頭破血流，head broken and bleeding 
tongxiao tonggou 統銷統購，unified purchase quota, unified sale quota 
tongyi Jingying, lianchan jichou 專業經營，聯產計酬’ unified management, 
output linked to labour 
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tiaopii fenzhi 調皮份子’ mischievous element 
tuhuangdi 土皇帝，local emperors 
wanyuan hu 萬元戶’ ten thousands income households 
wenhua shuiping 教育水平’ standard of education 
wubao Hang 五保糧，five guarantee grain 
xian 縣，county 
xiaonong yishi 小農意識’ mentality of petty peasants 
xiang or zhen 鄉鎮，township 
yamen 衙門，office of local government 
yaozhifu zhongguoshu 要致富，種果樹，want to become rich, plant the fruit tree 
present happiness 
yiliang weigan 以糧為剛’ agarian must be taken as the key link in agriculture 
yiku sitian 憶苦思甜，recalling past suffering and think over the source of 
youdai Hang ffi待fi， favouring treatment grain 
youbi 有病，sick 
yuan 元，unit of money 
yuanxiao 元宵，festival of Chinese 
zhengming 證明，certificate 
zhengfu 政府，the government 
zhongqiu 中秋，festival of Chinese 
zhong yuan 中原，inland of China 
zhuanye chengbao, lianchan Jichou 專業承包，聯產計酬，specialized contract, 
compensation linked to output 
ziliu di 自留地，private plot 
zili gengsheng 自力更生，self-reliance 
zijia fei 自家肥，home fertilizer 
zou huitou lu 走回頭路，taking the road back to old society 
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Appendix C. Note on Measures 
1 mu = 1/15 hectares = 1/6 acre 
= 0.5 kilogram = 1.1 pounds 
100 jin = 1 dan 
10 fen = 1 mao 
1 0 mao = 1 yuan 
S n S S ^ f teration of Chinese terms is in the pinyin system of organization of 
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